From Outcast to Established Players - The Transformation of Non-Democratic Parties After Democratization by Chen, Ketty W.
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 
GRADUATE COLLEGE 
 
 
 
FROM OUTCAST TO ESTABLISHED PLAYER –  
THE TRANSFORMATION OF NON-DEMOCRATIC PARTY AFTER  
DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
Degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
By 
KETTY WAN-I CHEN 
Norman, Oklahoma 
2011 
 
FROM OUTCAST TO ESTABLISHED PLAYER 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NON-DEMOCRATIC PARTIES AFTER 
TRANSITION 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 
  
BY 
 
   
     
       
___________________________ 
  Dr. Mitchell P. Smith, Chair 
           
      ___________________________ 
       Dr. Charles Kenney 
      
 ___________________________ 
       Dr. Suzette Grillot 
  
 ___________________________ 
       Dr. Mark Frazier 
 
 ___________________________ 
        Dr. Elyssa Faison
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright by KETTY WAN-I CHEN 2011 
All Rights Reserved.
 
 
 
 
For My Parents, Shih-li Chen and Hui-Chuan Hsu, with gratitude and 
for the wonderful people of Taiwa
 
 
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
The completion of this dissertation would not be possible if it weren’t for 
the consistent and exceptional support of many people.  I am deeply indebted to 
Dr. Mitchell P. Smith, the chair of my dissertation committee, for weighing my 
thoughts, helping me shape my ideas, and for posing thought-provoking questions 
and critiques through the dissertating process, so this project can reach its 
potential.  Dr. Smith’s guidance and support through the doctoral program also 
contributed immensely to my cultivation as a scholar of political science.  
Ambassador (Dr.) Edward J. Perkins, whom I worked for as graduate and 
teaching assistant, has been a steady source of inspiration, mentor and friend.  I 
couldn’t have weather the many obstacles of the doctoral program without him.  I 
am grateful to Dr. Charles D. Kenney for his meticulous and diligent feedbacks, 
and comments.  I’m also the beneficiary of his incomparable expertise in the field 
of democratization.  I took advantage of Dr. Mark Frazier’s incredible insights 
and keen observations of Taiwanese and Chinese politics.  I also offer my sincere 
gratitude to Dr. Elyssa Faison and Dr. Suzette Grillot, for sharing with me their 
robust knowledge and expertise in their respected fields of Asian history and 
international relations.   
Many individuals have aided the research process for this dissertation.  I 
extend my thanks to the officials and personnel of the Kuomintang.  They allowed 
me to spend long durations of time with them and shadowed them to learn about 
the operation and procedures of the Party.  Special thanks to Mr. Lin Yu-siang, 
 
 
v 
former KMT legislator and Taipei City council, Mr. Tu Chien-te, Director of the 
KMT Organization and Development Committee, Mr. Shao Ming-huang, Director 
of the KMT Party Archives and the Culture and Communications Affairs 
Committee, and Mr. Huang Chung-chuan, Head of the Li-chung Li of the Xinyi 
District.  The research also would not have been possible without the assistance of 
Mr. Yao Chia-wen, former Minister of the Examination Yuan, Dr. Shih Cheng-
feng of Tunghua University, Dr. Liu I-Chou of the National Chengchi University, 
the Taiwan Historical Association, the Wu San-lien Historical Archive, the 
Election Studies Center of the National Chengchi University, the Taiwan’s 
Elections and Democratization Study Center, and the many individuals who have 
given me the gift of their precious time and lent me some of their deepest 
thoughts on politics of Taiwan and their identities.   
My deepest gratitude also goes to the individuals who provided the love, 
encouragement and support, without which this dissertation could not have been 
completed.  Larisa Yun and Dr. Shan Shappleton generously offered their time 
and camaraderie during some of the toughest times in the program.  Dr. Jeff 
MacLeod, Dr. Mohamed Daadoui, Dr. Cyrus Contractor, Dr. Paul Jorgensen, and 
Valerie D’Erman acted as my constant discussants and instigated some of the 
most thought-provoking conversations one could have as a graduate student.  My 
deep appreciation is also for Dr. Donald Rodgers of Austin College, for extending 
the invitation to me to teach at his school and for providing the much-needed 
shelter to nurture an academic mind.  Don also gave the occasional shove when I 
 
 
vi 
was sidetracked and a shoulder to lean on.  I also profited greatly from Don’s 
tremendous knowledge on Taiwan’s domestic politics and his friendship.  
Misha Getter, whose friendship has been essential to me in the past fifteen years, 
continued to offer his relentless support during the several occasions when I was 
plagued by self doubts.  I am forever indebted to J. Michael Cole, deputy news 
chief of the Taipei Times, dear friend and partner in crime, who made his 
appearance during the most trying time of my life.  It was through our countless 
delightful and extensive discussions on Taiwan, politics, theories, books, music 
and life that my passion, motivation and drive were reinvigorated.  I would not 
have been able to push through the last stage to finish this dissertation if it wasn’t 
for Michael, his support, friendship and care.   
Finally, I give my sincere appreciation and thanks to my sister, Louise L. 
Chen.  Her sense humor, positivism and constant support made everything 
possible - Whatawhatawah, my dear sis!  To Mr. Snuggles, my most faithful and 
loyal friend of thirteen years, and Biguru, my rambunctious beagle, writing would 
have been the most solitary and boring experience if it weren’t for your 
companionship.  Finally, to my parents, who made tremendous sacrifices in all 
regards to bring me to the United States for a better life, and for giving me the 
chance to enjoy freedom and democracy, I owe everything to you.  I thank you for 
believing in me, for believing the things I do and my reasons for doing them, and 
I hope I can continue to make you proud.   
 
 
 
 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Title Page…………………………………………………………………………i 
Signature Page…………………………………………………………………...ii 
Copyright Page………………………………………………………………….iii 
Dedication…………………………………………………………………………. 
Acknowledgement……………………………………………………………… iv 
Table of Contents……………………………………………………………….vii 
List of Tables………………………………………………………………….....ix 
List of Illustrations….…………..………………………………………………..x 
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………..xi 
Chapter One: Introduction – The Puzzle of the Kuomintang 
Resilience ………………………………………………………………………...1 
A Case Study of the Kuomintang ………………………………………...5 
Regime legitimacy and recasting the research question of 
resilience…………………………………………………………………10 
Literature on Taiwan and the Kuomintang ……………………………...15 
 Other explanation to the Kuomintang Political Dominance……………..19 
 Research Methodology…………………………………………………..31 
 Organization of Dissertation……………………………………………..34 
Chapter Two: ”Our Party’s Loyalty is to the Three Principles of the 
People” – National Institutions and the Political Resilience of the KMT…...38      
Authoritarian Party-state and the KMT as ‘the’ Party o the Republic of 
China……………………………………………………………………..42  
One Party Rule……..…………………………………………….42 
The Lasting Structure of the Authoritarian Party-State……....….47 
National Institutions and the Kuomintang Resilience…………...51 
The Constitution……………….…………………………...……53 
  The Executive Yuan……………………………………………..56 
  The Legislative Yuan…………………………………………….57 
  The Judiciary Yuan ……………………………………………...63 
The Examination Yuan and the Control Yuan as Recruitment tool 
and the “Big Brother” …………………………………………...66 
Institutional Effects of KMT Programmatic Flexibility and 
Electoral Success………………………………………………...72 
The 1991 National Assembly Election ………………………….72 
The 1992 Legislative Yuan Election ……………………………77 
National Institutions and the Successful Invigoration of the 
Welfare System………………………………………………….78 
“Eighteen Pa” and Maintaining the Iron Votes………………….81 
National Health Insurance……………………………………….83 
The KMT takeover of the DPP “Welfare State”………………...85 
The Electoral System…………………………………………….90 
The SVMM System……………………………………………...93 
New Electoral System …………………………………………...98 
 
 
viii 
Conclusion……………………………………………………...100 
Chapter Three:”Small Soldiers can accomplish great things” – Local 
Institutions and the KMT Political Resilience……………………………….102 
 The Electoral System and the Local Institutions……………………….106 
 Grassroots Mobilization Strategies……………………………………..104 
 Local Factions and the KMT Resilience………………………………..108 
 “The Pillar Legs” – Tiao-a-kas…………………………………………109 
 Conclusion……………………………………………………………...119 
  
Chapter Four: “I love Tai‐Mei, Tai‐Mei Loves me!” – The Development of Taiwanese 
Identity and Party Politics……………………………………….121 
  Defining Taiwanese Identity and the Identity Discourse in Taiwan...….124 
 Political History and the Origins of Contesting Identities……………...128 
 228, White Terror and the Beginning of Ethnic Cleavages…………….136 
 Taiwanese Identity as a KMT Creation ………………………………..138 
  Land Reform……………………………………………………140 
  Education and Language Policy………………………………..142 
  Cultural Domination …………………………………………...147 
 Recasting Identity Issue – Becoming Taiwanese………………………149 
 1992 Legislative Election………………………………………………154 
1993 Municipal Council, Township Council and Township/Village   
Executive Elections …………………………………………………….156 
1994 Governors Election and Mayors Election………………………...158 
The First Democratic Direct Presidential Election, 1996………………160 
2008 Presidential Election……………………………………………...163 
Chapter Five: The Conclusion – Are you Ready? The KMT Solidification of 
Power…………………………………………………………………………...172 
  Barriers to Power for the DPP………………………………………….176 
 Party Origin and Organization …………………………………………177 
 The Electoral System …………………………………………………..181 
 The Issue of Corruption ………………………………………………..183 
 The Politics of Adaptation and the KMT Solidification of Power……..186 
Bibliography …………………………………………………………………..191 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Legislative Election Results (1992-2008)………………………………………14 
Table on Survey Question: Which political party considers public needs and 
opinion as important to the party?........................................................................89 
2004 Presidential Election Interview………………………………..…………..89 
Which Political Party is cleaner?.........................................................................185 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS  
 
 
The Kuomintang Party Structure………………………………………………46 
The Flags of the Kuomintang and the Republic of China……………………..51 
Business Card of Huang Chung-Chuan………………………….…………...114 
Taiwanese/Chinese Identity Tracking Survey………………….…………….126 
Demographic Chart of Ethnic Groups of Taiwan…………….………………131 
Textbook example of Nationalist Education……….…………………….......144 
Aging and napping members of the National Assembly…….……………….151 
Rally of Forced Retirement of the National Assembly members.……………152 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation investigates and examine how the Kuomintang has 
managed to weather critical challenges presented by the liberalization and 
democratization of Taiwan, while maintaining its political presence and 
consequently reconsolidating its crushing political dominance by recapturing the 
presidential seat and obtaining the most votes any presidential candidate in the 
history of Taiwan has ever captured.  
The Kuomintang is anything but a pesky insect that refuses to go away. 
The Kuomintang is a tightly run, self-sustaining, and highly disciplined political 
machine that is deeply entrenched in all aspects of Taiwanese society through 
institutions at both the national and local level, as well as through different 
dimensions of institutions in the form of the five yuans, electoral rules, and local 
bureaucracies and representative offices. These institutions are essential to the 
Kuomintang’s survival in Taiwan. This mutually engaging and interactive 
institutional relationship has helped sustain the Kuomintang for more than a 
century.  
The Kuomintang’s astonishing political success is a result of the 
collaborative, interlocking nature of national institutions, and most importantly, 
the Kuomintang’s deep entrenchment in local institutions, along with the 
Kuomintang’s cultivation of clientele and paternalistic social relationship
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
THE PUZZLE OF THE KUOMINTANG RESILIENCE 
 
 
They are like roaches. You thought you killed them by hitting them repeatedly 
with newspaper; then, you turned around, and you see them come alive and 
walking as if nothing has happened!  They are just like those roaches that would 
not die. – Mr. Ku Po-Hsiung, a Pan-Green supporter.1 
   
The vivid usage of popular Taiwanese slang by Mr. Ku when asked to 
illustrate his feelings for the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) did 
not come unwarranted. In fact, most of the participants who attended the same 
commemoration ceremony endorsed Mr. Ku’s view. On the other hand, how does 
Mr. Ku’s description correspond to reality? Is the Kuomintang a pesky creature as 
Mr. Ku described? The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate and examine 
how the Kuomintang has managed to weather critical challenges presented by the 
liberalization and democratization of Taiwan, while maintaining its political 
presence and consequently reconsolidating its crushing political dominance by 
recapturing the presidential seat and obtaining the most votes any presidential 
candidate in the history of Taiwan has ever captured.  
As this dissertation will demonstrate, the Kuomintang is anything but a 
pesky insect that refuses to go away. The Kuomintang is a tightly run, self-
sustaining, and highly disciplined political machine that is deeply entrenched in 
all aspects of Taiwanese society through institutions at both the national and local 
level, as well as through different dimensions of institutions in the form of the 
                                                             
1 “Da Bu Si De Jan Lang” (??????) is a popular Taiwanese phrase used to depict 
something that is pesky and annoying. The Interview with Mr. Ku was conducted on July 15, 2007, 
the twentieth anniversary commemoration of the abolishment of martial law. 
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five yuans, electoral rules, and local bureaucracies and representative offices. 
These institutions are essential to the Kuomintang’s survival in Taiwan. This 
mutually engaging and interactive institutional relationship has helped sustain the 
Kuomintang for more than a century. The Constitution of the Republic of China 
was written with the goal of providing the Kuomintang with institutional 
establishment and armed the party with the ability to pass and implement 
important legislation at critical political junctures, such as the liberalization and 
democratization of Taiwan. This dissertation thus contends that the political 
resilience of the Kuomintang is not a coincidence. The Kuomintang’s astonishing 
political success is a result of the collaborative, interlocking (contrary to Western 
checks and balances) nature of national institutions, and most importantly, the 
Kuomintang’s deep entrenchment in local institutions, along with the 
Kuomintang’s cultivation of clientele and paternalistic social relationships.  In 
addition, a lack of funds renders the political opposition unable to cultivate such 
international relationships.  
Contrary to conventional regime change, the Chinese Nationalist Party 
was established prior to the Chinese revolution and the establishment of the 
Republic of China. The constitution of the Republic of China was tailored to 
make the Kuomintang the political party of China. National institutions shaped 
the procedures, routines, and norms of the Taiwanese political system. They also 
set the rules of the electoral game and shaped the top-down, paternalistic 
relationships between national and local institutions. The characteristics of 
national institutions also enabled the Kuomintang to deliver to voters what the 
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party had promised, prior to and after each vital election during and after 
democratization. More importantly, while national institutions implemented the 
rules and norms for political players, local institutions played the roles of 
facilitators and cultivators of electoral supporters for the Kuomintang. Local 
institutions nurtured the culture of clientelism and paternalism—the electoral 
strategies adopted by the Kuomintang. While other explanations attempted to 
attribute the political success of the Kuomintang to the embedded Confucian, 
culture, Taiwan’s economic prosperity under Kuomintang’s authoritarian 
governance and the Kuomintang’s willingness to negotiate and communicate with 
its political opposition.  On the other hand, without the existing interlocking 
political institutions, Kuomintang’s political opposition could adopt similar 
policies and achieve the same political results as the Kuomintang.  The current 
political dominance of the Kuomintang in Taiwan, with over 75% of the 
legislative seats and the presidency, demonstrates otherwise. 
With so much attention in the field of political science focused on the rise 
of China, and all the research directed toward studying the Chinese regime and its 
policies, Taiwan-focused studies and studies on Taiwan’s domestic politics have 
been neglected. Taiwan is also often included as a subset of China studies, as a 
chapter in a book on China, or as part of the discussion on the disputed territories 
of China.2 Furthermore, the majority of the articles and books on Taiwan 
                                                             
2 Books on China that mention Taiwan are too many to list. Here are some examples: Susan Shirk,  
China, Fragile Superpower—How China’s Internal Politics could Derail its Peaceful Rise (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007);  Suisheng Zhao, China-US Relations Transformed—
Perspectives and Strategic Interactions (New York: Routledge, 2008);  David M. Lampton, Same 
Bed, Different Dream —Managing US-China Relations 1989–2000 (Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 2001);  June Grasso,   Jay Corrin, and Michael Kort, . Modernization and 
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generally focus on Taiwan’s international relations, with some strongly biased by 
American foreign policy and US-China relations.3  
Often, when people encounter articles and books on Taiwan’s domestic 
politics, they indulge the fascination with Taiwan’s transition to democracy with a 
minor focus on Taiwan’s democratic consolidation.4 Shelley Rigger has been the 
most prolific scholar of domestic politics in Taiwan.5  Rigger wrote about 
Taiwan’s democratization in her first book, Politics in Taiwan – Voting for 
Democracy, where she lauded electoral practices during the authoritarian era in 
Taiwan as the primary variable for Taiwan’s successful transition to democracy.  
Subsequently, Rigger also focused on one of the most complex issues in Taiwan – 
the politics of identity.  Rigger found, while the older generation of Taiwanese 
and Chinese were more adamant in identifying themselves as Taiwanese or 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Revolution in China—From the Opium War to the Olympics (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2009);  
Robert Ross and Zhu Feng, China’s Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International 
Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007). 
3 Some examples: Robert Sutter, . Taiwan in World Affairs. (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publisher, 1989);  Robert Sutter,  Taiwan-Mainland China relations: Status, Prospects, US 
Interests and Options (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995);  SteveTsang,  If China 
Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics (New York: Routledge, 2006);  Ted 
Galen Carpenter, China’s Upcoming War with America—A Collision Course over Taiwan (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2006);  Richard Bush  and Michael E. O’Hanlon, A War like No 
Other: The Truth about China’s Challenge to America (New Jersey: Wiley and Son Inc, 2007).  
4 Taiwan’s democratic consolidation is another area this author feels to be greatly lacking and 
neglected in the field of Taiwanese political studies. Some examples of literature on Taiwan’s 
domestic politics: Parris H. Chang, Parris H. “Changing Nature of Taiwan’s Politics,”. in 
Taiwan—Beyond the Economic Miracle. (Armonk: East Gate Books, 1992);  John F. Copper,  (As 
Taiwan Approaches the New Millennium (Lanham: University Press of America, 1999);  Chun 
Chieh Huang, Postwar Taiwan in Historical Perspective (College Park: University Press of 
Maryland, 1998);  Hung-Mao Tien,  “Transformation of an Authoritarian Party State: Taiwan’s 
Development Experience,” in Political Change in Taiwan (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992) Hung-
MaoTien,  “Dynamics of Taiwan’s Democratic Transition,” in In the Shadow of China—Political 
Developments in Taiwan Since 1949, ed. Steve Tsang (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1993). 
5 Shelley Rigger, Politics in Taiwan—Voting for Democracy (New York: Routledge Press, 1999);  
Shelley Rigger, From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 2001);  Shelley Rigger, Taiwan’s Rising Rationalism: Generation, Politics and 
“Taiwanese Nationalism” (Washington: East-West Center, 2006). 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Chinese with their political attitude toward China and the independent/unification 
issue correlating with their ethnic identity, second and third generation residents 
of Taiwan seem to overwhelming identify themselves as Taiwanese while bearing  
a more apathetic attitude toward China, for example, seeing China as just another 
foreign country to work and make money in.   
The goal of this dissertation is to fill the void in Taiwan studies by 
providing a comprehensive examination of the extent to which the Kuomintang 
has managed to consistently control the institutional levers of power.  Rigger 
argues that the Democratic Progressive Party was able to reap the benefit of the 
Kuomintang split and capture political power in 2000.  This dissertation agrees 
with Rigger but also further contends that institutional variables, especially local 
institutions, contributed to the Kuomintang’s securing a legislative majority 
through the DPP presidency (2000–2008). This dissertation represents the sole 
study focused exclusively on the strategic behavior of the Kuomintang and its 
resulting political success.  
A Case Study of the Kuomintang 
Sun Yat-Sen, whose idea of one-party democratic rule inspired the 
drafting of the Constitution of the Republic of China, initiated the enduring and 
self-sustaining features of national and local institutions.  Sun’s concept of “one-
party democratic rule” was contradictory in itself.  Sun’s goal was to democratize 
China; therefore he saw the need to create a vanguard party for the country.  Sun 
never addressed his theoretical contradictions, since one party rule is hardly 
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democratic.  In addition, adopting the Leninist institutional structure for the 
Kuomintang, where the party chairperson retains most power, was hardly 
democratic either.  Nevertheless, the Constitution of the Republic of China and its 
institutional features were subsequently adopted in Taiwan after the Kuomintang 
regime fled to the island in 1949 and have been in place ever since. The 
perseverance of the institutions can be first attributed to the decision of the 
Kuomintang to implement authoritarianism as its governing strategy when its 
regime first arrived Taiwan. Consequently, much as the Taiwanese identity 
emerged as an unintended consequence of KMT public policies, authoritarianism 
aided the persistence and carried forward the institutions over time. The 
Emergency Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion 
imposed by the KMT in 1949 served as a constraint to the emergence of a 
democratic political system in Taiwan. The provision also gave legitimacy to the 
KMT’s imposition of martial law by claiming the Chinese Civil War as 
justification. Martial law not only allowed the KMT to arrest and imprison 
political dissidents; it also allowed the KMT to ban the formation of other 
political parties, enshrining the KMT as the party of the party-state. As a result, 
with the suspension of the constitution, the institutions incorporated in the 
constitution were essentially suspended from performing their democratic duty as 
Sun Yat-Sen originally intended. The critical features of the institutions, such as 
the power to pass legislation and scrutinize budgets, or to craft civil exams 
conducive to the selection of individuals who agree with the political platform and 
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ideologies of the KMT, all explained the Kuomintang’s success in maintaining its 
political influence, and thus resilience, through time.  
In addition, the robustness of the explanation of the Kuomintang’s 
political resilience also depends on the subsidiary task of reconceiving and 
reconciling the issue of identity. The complex identity issue in Taiwan was the 
unintended product of the Kuomintang’s authoritarian rule and the practice of 
discriminatory policies toward the indigenous population. Taiwanese identity was 
one of the serious challenges to the Kuomintang’s political success after 
democratization. The portion of the population who identify themselves as 
Taiwanese constitutes 85% of the overall population in Taiwan. As this 
dissertation will demonstrate, the self-sustaining nature of national institutions, 
and the Kuomintang’s deep entrenchment in local institutions and its cultivation 
of clientele, paternalistic social relationships, are keys to the Kuomintang’s 
astonishing political success. Case in point: even after the Kuomintang lost the 
presidential election for the first time in Taiwanese history, the KMT retains 
branch offices in every township and local districts and has the most card-carrying 
party members.6 
The importance of the issue of identity can be exemplified by the case of 
Mr. Ku, the gentleman mentioned at the onset of this chapter. Mr. Ku was born in 
1933, under the colonial rule of Japan. In addition to mastering the Japanese 
language, assimilation and adoption of Japanese culture and customs was 
                                                             
6 Chien Te Tu, Deputy Director-General, Mobilization and Development Committee of the 
Kuomintang,  interviewed by author on December 7, 2007, in Taipei, Taiwan. The KMT currently 
has one million registered members while the DPP has about 300,000. 
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compulsory. The Japanese left Taiwan after surrendering in 1945. Taiwan was 
then received by the military forces of the Republic of China led by Chiang Kai-
Shek, on behalf of the Allied Forces. The original intent behind Chiang Kai-
Shek’s receiving Taiwan from the Japanese was for Chiang to eventually aid the 
Taiwanese in self-determination. However, Chiang Kai-Shek’s nationalist troops 
were lost to Mao Tze-Dong and the Chinese Communist Party forced Chiang and 
the Kuomintang administration to flee to Taiwan. Mr. Ku thus again became a 
compulsory citizen of another country, in accordance with a bilateral peace 
agreement signed by Chiang Kai-Shek’s administration and Japan.7 After the 
1947 annihilation of Taiwanese elites in a mass killing known as the 2-28 
Massacre, martial law was declared for the next forty years (1947-1986), making 
the Kuomintang one of the world’s longest ruling authoritarian parties.8  
Mr. Ku was adamant about referring to himself as Taiwanese, not Chinese 
or Japanese. According to him, such self-categorization was due to his 
observation of the preferential treatment of mainlanders from housing, education, 
and grocery subsidies to employment and education opportunities. On the other 
hand, in public, Mr. Ku never referred to himself as Taiwanese or advocated the 
idea that Taiwan should declare de jure independence until recently. Mr. Ku’s 
dormant behavior was attributed to the Kuomintang’s systematic elimination of 
political opposition and potential threats to its governance during what it is known 
                                                             
7 The Kuomintang often cites the Treaty of Taipei (1952) as the document that arguably returned 
Taiwan to the governance of the Republic of China. The treaty incorporated the Taiwanese as 
citizens of the ROC; however, there were debates over the validity of the treaty as well as the 
legality of transferring the citizenship of the Taiwanese to the ROC. 
8 Other authoritarian parties, for example, that have ruled their states for extended periods of times 
are the PRI from Mexico, CCP from China and PAP from Singapore. 
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today as the White Terror Era. The Kuomintang did so by accusing political 
adversaries of being communists, collaborators with the Chinese Communist 
Party, or simply revolutionaries scheming to overthrow the government for a new 
regime. During the White Terror Era, an unknown number of Taiwanese went 
missing, while an estimated 140,000 Taiwanese were imprisoned or executed on 
generally fabricated charges of treason.9  In addition, the Kuomintang’s decision 
to implement certain public policies and acts of nepotism further separated those 
who saw themselves as Taiwanese from the Chinese, or mainlanders, as they are 
often referred to.10 The deepening ethic cleavage was the unintended result of 
Kuomintang’s attempt to secure itself as the legitimate governor of Taiwan. This 
ethnic divide also gave the Kuomintang’s political opposition great ammunition to 
portray the Kuomintang as the party of the mainlanders. The issue of identity is 
one of the most important challenges facing the Kuomintang from an electoral 
perspective, for it often invokes great emotions from Taiwanese constituents and 
has a great effect on constituents’ voting choices. The Kuomintang authoritarian 
governance created resentment in the indigenous population, who perceived the 
party as a foreign, colonial entity. As a result, the Kuomintang realized the need 
for the party to strengthen its association with the Taiwanese and the emerging 
                                                             
9It is still unclear the exact number of disappearances, imprisonments, and deaths during the White 
Terror Era in Taiwan. If one counts the death toll during the 2-28 Massacre, the number of victims 
during the White Terror Era would increase dramatically. An estimated 15,000 to 30,000 
Taiwanese were killed, according to George Kerr and documents from the State Department. The 
government of Taiwan has yet to declassify all official records in the National Archive on the 
White Terror Era.  
10 Some of the policies are granting public and supplemental housing to mainlanders while 
subsidizing their children’s tuition. One of the policies that has consistently caused uproar is the 
18% interest on bank savings that public servants, teachers and members of the military are able to 
enjoy. The KMT also favored mainlanders as employees for governmental agencies and teaching 
positions in public schools.  
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Taiwanese identity. The Kuomintang’s utilization of its grassroots institutions and 
the cultivation of paternalistic social relations are at the heart of the party’s 
success in adapting and recasting Taiwanese identity in its favor. The 
Kuomintang’s accomplishments in embracing the Taiwanese identity and 
developing it as a tool to cultivate indigenous votes is the subject of chapter 4. 
Regime legitimacy and recasting the research question of resilience 
According to Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, authoritarian 
rulers that emerged after World War II suffered from a legitimization problem 
that interwar authoritarian regimes did not have.11 O’Donnell and Schmitter argue 
that the “Achilles’ heel” of post-1945 authoritarian regimes is what they call 
“ideological schizophrenia.”12 O’Donnell says, “[These] are regimes that practice 
dictatorship and repression in the present while promising democracy and 
freedom in the future. Thus, they can justify themselves in political terms only as 
transitional power, while attempting to shift attention to their immediate 
substantive accomplishments—typically, the achievement of ‘social peace’ or 
economic development.”13 The Kuomintang regime on Taiwan faced this precise 
difficulty as defined by O’Donnell and Schmitter.  
In the past fifty years, the Kuomintang has actively promoted and 
emphasized the ideas of reclaiming the “Chinese Mainland” and the unification of 
                                                             
11 Guillermo O’Donnell and Phillippe Schmitter, Transition from Authoritarian Rule—Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 15. 
 
12 O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, 15. 
13 O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986 15; emphasis added. 
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China.14  There were reasons for such a policy decision: (1) the leaders of the 
Kuomintang truly believed that there was still an on-going civil war between the 
Nationalist Chinese and the Chinese Communist Party, and that there was still a 
chance for the Nationalist Chinese to return to China as their legitimate 
government, presumably with military aid from Western democracies;15 (2) the 
Taking Back the Mainland propaganda campaign was to also impel the 
indigenous population to support this endeavor with either physical or monetary 
support; and (3) the policy gave the Kuomintang permission to impose martial 
law and therefore suspend the ROC constitution, making governing Taiwan and 
suppressing political opposition an easier task. As Shelley Rigger points out, 
“ROC elites were willing to set [everything else] aside in the favor of another goal: 
maintaining political, economic and military stability in preparation for unifying 
Taiwan and the rest of China.”16  Nevertheless, hope for recapturing power in 
China began to dwindle as attention from the international community and the 
party’s allies began to shift elsewhere, and the People’s Republic of China 
became increasingly assertive internationally. Bruce Dickson accurately states, 
“The main goal and tasks of the KMT changed: Rather than concentrating on 
plans to retake the mainland, the party [now has to] devoted more of its energy to 
                                                             
14 The Kuomintang actively promoted the party’s political propaganda at schools, with public 
servants, and especially in the military. The party had a political slogan that said “Taking back the 
Mainland” (Fan Gong Da Lu ????) painted in school yards, public spaces, train stations, and 
government buildings until 1997, when President Lee Teng-Hui declared that the Kuomintang had 
officially relinquished its claim as legitimate governor of all China. 
15 Milton J. T. Shieh,  The Kuomintang: Selected Historical Documents, 1849–1969 (New York: 
St. John’s University Press, 1970), 28. 
16 ShelleyRigger, Politics in Taiwan—Voting for Democracy (New York: Routledge Press, 1999), 
9. 
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issues of immediate concerns to Taiwan and its own reputation.”17 Instead of 
conducting itself as the original revolutionary party set to unify China, the regime, 
under the leadership of Chiang Ching-Kuo and Lee Teng-Hui, redirected its focus 
to the reinvigoration and utilization of institutional features conducive to the 
party’s survival, such as legislative reform and modification of electoral rules in 
the name of electoral reform. In addition, the Kuomintang emphasized the 
entrenchment of party grassroots organizations, in the form of party cells, for the 
purpose of exerting influence on local institutions and monitoring party member 
behaviors.  
In 2000, the Kuomintang suffered the first loss to the Democratic 
Progressive Party in the presidential election. The following year, the Kuomintang 
also lost its legislative majority when some of it more conservative members, as 
well as reform advocates, defected and formed their own splinter parties. The 
New Chinese Party was headed by legislative members of the former New KMT 
Alliance faction. The People First Party was led by former Provincial Governor 
James Soong, and the Taiwan Solidarity Union was a party founded by former 
President Lee Teng-Hui and former legislative members of the Collective 
Thoughts faction.18 The defection of party members and the formation of splinter 
parties seemed to have dealt the Kuomintang another blow to its prospects of 
survival in an increasingly competitive political system. 
                                                             
17 Bruce Dickson,  “The Kuomintang before Democratization: Organizational Change and the 
Role of Elections,” in Taiwan’s Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition; Riding the Third 
Wave, ed. Hung-Mao Tien (Armonk: M.E. Sharp, 1997), 49.  
18 New KMT Alliance (??????; Hsin Kuomintang Lienhsien);. Collective Thoughts 
Faction (???; Chi Si Hui). 
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Political pundits predicted the decline and disintegration of the 
Kuomintang,19 and scholars like Tun-Jen Cheng commented that “The Blue-camp 
is at a juncture where Benjamin Franklin’s aphorism applies: ‘hang together or be 
hanged separately,’” while identifying the Kuomintang as experiencing an 
identity crisis.20 The Kuomintang did suffer from a loss of seats in the Legislative 
Yuan elections and of administrative power after democratization. The losses, 
coupled with the fragmentation of the party, created the illusion of the eventual 
disintegration of the party and the solidification of the opposition power. On the 
other hand, the DPP’s electoral achievements have been less than somewhat 
consistent but much less dominating; in the 1992 Legislative Yuan election, the 
DPP garnered fifty-one seats (31.68%); in 1995, the DPP obtained fifty-four seats 
(32.93%); in 1998, the DPP obtained seventy seats (31.1%), in 2004, the DPP 
obtained sixty seats (39.56%); in 2008, the DPP obtained only twenty-seven seats 
(23.89%); the Kuomintang has consistently maintained a legislative majority, 
even in 2001 after the loss of the presidential election.  Therefore, compared with 
other parties of authoritarian regimes in post-communist Europe, South Korea, 
and Mexico, the reason for the Kuomintang’s consistency in durability and its 
political resilience is the interesting puzzle that deserves immense scrutiny and 
investigation.  
 
                                                             
19 A series of political talk shows emerged in the late 1990s and are now the most-watched 
programs on Taiwanese television. The viewing audience is allowed to call in during segments of 
the show to express their opinions on political issues. One of the most talked about topics of the 
popular show, 2100 Everyone Talks, on the TVBS Channel, was whether the KMT would 
eventually survive the split of its members and the relentless attack of its political opposition. 
20 Tun-Jen Cheng, “Strategizing Party Adaptation—The Case of the Kuomintang,” Party Politics 
12, no.3 (2006):  369, 389. 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Political Party/ 
Year 
KMT DPP Others (PFP, NP) 
1992 59.01% 31.68% 0% 
1995 51.83% 32.93% 21% 
1998 54.7% 31.1% 11% 
2001 30.22% 38.67% 34.44% 
2004 35.11% 39.56% 27% 
2008 (First 
Legislative Election 
under the new rule) 
71.68% 23.89% 0.89% 
Legislative election results (1992-2008).  Election Study Center, NCCU. 
Former authoritarian parties, such as the PDS of East Germany and the SdRP of 
Poland, as well as the Grand National Party of South Korea, were able to maintain 
their political resilience and influence after a string of electoral defeats in the 
1990s and 2000s, while the CPBM of the Czech Republic and the PRI of Mexico 
could not. 
The case of the Kuomintang is special as it is the only political party that 
suffered a civil war defeat but was able to carry its regime to another territory, all 
the while maintaining the party’s original name, party structure, and political 
institutions. The political parties referenced in this dissertation, while in the 
process of reinventing themselves and adapting to the changing political 
environment, all adopted names more acceptable to the general constituents and 
more indicative of the far-reaching reorganization of the party.21 To have a 
comprehensive understanding of the political resilience of the Kuomintang, in the 
face of the  identity challenge and the transitional power challenge identified by 
                                                             
21 The PDS of East Germany and the SdRP of Poland, as well as the Grand National Party of 
South Korea and the CPBM of the Czech Republic. 
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O’Donnell and Schmitter, is essential to a comprehensive understanding of the 
complexity of Taiwanese politics and its relationship with its neighbors, 
particularly with China.  
Literature on Taiwan and the Kuomintang 
Studies on Taiwan have been marred by the dominance of descriptive 
writings that are mainly historical and the undertheorization of Taiwanese 
politics.22 The authors of articles and books on Taiwan have diligently described 
the process of liberalization and democratization of Taiwan, the evolution to 
Taiwan’s current international status, and the difficulties in Taiwan’s relationships 
with China and the United States. The vast majority of the literature on Taiwan 
provides great depth on the three topics mentioned. For example, in Reshaping the 
Taiwan Strait, John Tkacik Jr. criticizes U.S. security in the Pacific as 
strategically deficient. Tkacik then offers an in-depth historical analysis of the 
United States policy toward Taiwan and offers suggestions, such as for the United 
States to rethink the concept of “One-China” as well as the continuation of arming 
                                                             
22 For example, Parris H. Chang, . “Changing Nature of Taiwan’s Politics,” in Taiwan—Beyond 
the Economic Miracle (Armonk: East Gate Books, 1992);  Joanne Chang, “Lessons from the 
Taiwan Relations Act,” Orbis  44, no. 1 (2000): 63; John F. Copper,  As Taiwan Approaches the 
New Millennium (Lanham: University Press of America, 1999);  Chun Chieh Huang, Postwar 
Taiwan in Historical Perspective (College Park: University Press of Maryland, 1998);  Ya-Li Lu, 
“Political Modernization in the ROC,” in Two Societies in Opposition : The Republic of China and 
the People’s Republic of China After Forty Years (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1991);  Chun 
Shan Shen,  “Reflection of the Cross-Strait Relationship,” in Postwar Taiwan in Historical 
Perspective (College Park: University Press of Maryland, 1998_; Hung-MaoTien,  
“Transformation of an Authoritarian Party State: Taiwan’s Development Experience,” in Political 
Change in Taiwan, ed. S. H. Tun-Jen Cheng (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992). Hung-Mao Tien,  
“Dynamics of Taiwan’s Democratic Transition,” in In the Shadow of China—Political 
Developments in Taiwan Since 1949, ed.  SteveTsang  (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1993). 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Taiwan with defensive weapons as the more feasible and advantageous policy 
toward Taiwan. Alan Wachman provides one of the most comprehensive analyses 
of China’s persistent claim on Taiwan as part of its territory and the changing 
strategies of China toward Taiwan from hard to soft and to hard again, in Why 
Taiwan?—Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity. Richard 
Bush offered two superb volumes of the difficulties facing the United States in 
regards to its relationship with Taiwan in Untying the Knot—Making Peace in the 
Taiwan Strait, and A War like No Other—the Truth about China’s Challenge to 
America. In Untying the Knot, Bush meticulously lays out the history of Taiwan 
from its colonial period to present, then identifies the United States’s diplomatic 
challenges with regards to Taiwan.23 Bush concludes that the Taiwanese should 
not be too dependent on the United States in any regard but should work toward 
improving the quality of Taiwan’s democratic system. According to Bush, “[The 
Taiwanese] are ill-served by a system that makes decisions based on a distorted 
reflection of the popular will, one that cannot make decisions supported by the 
mainstream because small minorities can call the tune.”24  
What seems to be absent in the vast amount of literature devoted to 
Taiwan is attention to finding the answers to the “why” and “how” questions on 
the domestic political development of Taiwan and efforts to ascertain theoretically 
                                                             
23 Bush identifies the challenges as the issues of sovereignty, economic cooperation, Taiwan’s 
domestic split on the issue of unification or independence, and the pressure from China on both 
Taiwan and the United States. 
24 Richard Bush,  Untying the Knot—Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington DC: The 
Brookings Institute Press, 2005), 348.  
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grounded answers to these questions.25 For example, there is a literary gap on the 
questions Why did the KMT elite ultimately decide to take the leading role in 
liberalization? or How did the KMT elites reconcile the issue of Taiwan identity 
amongst its members and with the public with its political platform of unification 
with China?   These questions make up the central puzzle of this dissertation— To 
what should be attributed the Kuomintang’s ability to retain its political presence 
without “bleeding to death,” and consequently consolidate its crushing political 
dominance?— all the more important.26   
Conventional literature on Taiwan, books such as The Changing Nature of 
Taiwan’s Politics by Parris Chang, Taiwan—Nation-State or Province? by John 
Copper, In the Shadow of China—Political Developments in Taiwan Since 1949 
by Steven Tsang, and Tien Hung-Mao’s Political Change in Taiwan, all 
encompass detailed accounts of the political transformation of Taiwan from an 
authoritarian regime to a democracy state; however, there is a general absence of 
theoretical explanations as to the reason behind the Kuomintang’s ultimate 
decision to take a leadership position in the liberalization and democratization 
                                                             
25 Joanne Chang, “Lessons from the Taiwan Relations Act,” Orbis 44, no. 1:(Winter 2000), 63; 
Hung Dah Chiu, . “Taiwan in Sino-American Relations,” in  China and the Taiwan Issue, ed. 
Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin (Taipei: INPR, 1979);  Carl Clark, “The Republic of China in 
the international Arena: Conflict, Clientelism, and the Search for Stability,” in Taiwan’s 
Development—Implications for Contending Political Economy Paradigms (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1989);  Ho Wang, “The Republic of China’s Policy Toward the United States 
1979–1989,” in Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan (Taipei: Institute of National 
Policy Research, 1992);  Gary Klintworth, “Taiwan’s American Interlude,” in New Taiwan, New 
China—Taiwan’s Changing Role in the Asia-Pacific Region (New York: St. Mary’s Press, 1995);  
Gary Klintworth, “Australia’s Taiwan Policy—1942–1992,” in New Taiwan, New China. (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995); Chun Shan Shen,  “Reflection of the Cross-Strait Relationship,” 
in Postwar Taiwan in Historical Perspective (College Park: University Press of Maryland, 1998); 
SteveTsang,  In the Shadow of China—Political Development in Taiwan since 1949 (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1993). 
26 By 2008, the KMT captured three-fourths of the Legislative Yuan seats and President-elect Ma 
Ying-Jeou won by a landslide with 58.45% of the votes, the highest votes obtained by any 
presidential candidate in Taiwanese history. 
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process of Taiwan. Alan Wachman attempts to provide such explanation by 
mentioning it very briefly in his book, Taiwan—National Identity and 
Democratization:  
Huntington wrote that in “noncommunist authoritarian systems, the standpatters . . . [are] 
normally perceived as right-wing, fascist, and nationalist.”. In the case of Taiwan, the 
epithets “right-wing” and “nationalist” could easily have been applied to the “hard-liners” 
in the KMT. The reformers on Taiwan are those viewed as “soft-liners,” people who 
favor democratization over continued authoritarian rule, but who wish to monitor the 
pace and direction of reform so that the transformation occurs gradually, peacefully, and 
in such way that they are able to retain power for as long as possible.”27  
In a recent interview on the resignation of the Kuomintang party secretary 
general, King Pu-Tsun, Tien explained that King’s resignation was a reflection of 
President Ma Ying-Jeou’s quest to further democracy in Taiwan. Tien’s 
interpretation might seem plausible if there were no other upcoming major 
political events in the future. However, the joint election for the Legislative Yuan 
and the presidency is now set for January 14, 2012,28 and Tien has provided no 
explanation about the effects of upcoming elections on the political behavior of 
the Kuomintang.  
More importantly, what has been underacknowledged is also the extent to 
which the Kuomintang managed to avoid marginalization during and after 
democratization and remain politically powerful. The literary deficiency also 
stems from the assumption that the Kuomintang as durable, since the party has 
been in existence for more than a century and has weathered two world wars, a 
                                                             
27 Alan Wachman, ,Taiwan—National Identity and Democratization (New York: East Gate Books, 
1994), 43. 
28 Hung Mao Tien made the comment at the Making Democracy Work in Interesting Times 
Conference cosponsored by the Heritage Foundation and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, 
Jan 10, 2011, Taipei, Taiwan.
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civil war, and displacement. One of the most well-researched and detailed books 
on Taiwanese domestic politics is Politics in Taiwan—Voting for Democracy by 
Shelley Rigger. In the book, Rigger hails consistent elections as the variable that 
explains Taiwan’s democracy and praises the Kuomintang for leading the 
democratization process and for its willingness to negotiate and compromise with 
its political opponents.29 While Rigger identifies the growing diplomatic isolation 
of Taiwan and international events such as the OPEC embargo as reasons for 
reform, Rigger’s book portrays the actions of the Kuomintang as reactive without 
truly explaining why the “DPP performs best in head-to-head competition; even 
after more than ten years in existence, the party still cannot equal the KMT in [all 
other] races.”30 
Other Explanations of the Kuomintang’s Political Dominance 
Most domestic studies on Taiwan’s democratization and of the 
Kuomintang’s political dominance generally center on two major variables: the 
Kuomintang’s leadership role in the socioeconomic development of Taiwan, and 
the Kuomintang elite’s willingness to interact with the opposition. Studies on 
socioeconomic development by and large focus on examining Taiwan’s 
industrialization, urbanization, education reform, living standards, and the growth 
of the middle class. It was assumed that voters would lend their support to the 
political party that sustained economic growth and bettered the lives of citizens. 
The socioeconomic development of Taiwan is not an adequate causal variable to 
                                                             
29 Rigger, 1999, 3. 
30 Rigger, 1999, 188. 
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explain the sustainability of the Kuomintang because under the DPP 
administration, the unemployment rate was kept under 4% and there was 
continued economic growth of 8%.31 While the Kuomintang claims credit for 
Taiwan’s rapid economic accomplishments, this did not prevent voters from 
voting for its opposition. In fact, support for the opposition started to increase 
after 1980 when Taiwan was labeled as one of the Four Tigers of Asia along with 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea.32  
Another reason cited by some was that effective communication between 
the Kuomintang regime and its opposition reinforced the Kuomintang’s 
endurance and sustainability.33 According to this explanation, the Kuomintang is 
seen by the voters as the party of democratization and compromise and not the 
authoritarian party it was before. This explanation also does not seem to be 
convincing. The Kuomintang was the only political party allowed under the 
Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Mobilization for the 
Suppression of Communist Rebellion or the Temporary Provision that lasted from 
1949 to 1987. According to Tien Hung-Mao, “The party completely monopolizes 
power within the government, the armed forces, and the police force, [and] . . .all 
key officers in the various branches of the government, the military and the policy 
force are party members. At times, distinctions between the party and the 
                                                             
31 The Government Information Office of Taiwan, “The Story of Taiwan: Economy—The Fruits 
of Economic Development,” www.gio.gov.tw/info/taiwan-story/economy/.../3-5.htm.  
32 Shelley Rigger,  From Opposition to Power—Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 47–49. 
33 Linda Chao and Ramon Myers,  The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life of in the Republic 
of China on Taiwan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998);  Shao-Chuan Leng, ed.,  
Chiang Ching Kuo’s Leadership in the Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan  
(Lanham MD: University Press of America, 1993);  SteveTsang, ed., In the Shadow of China: 
Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993). 
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government blur.”34 After democratization, the Kuomintang state apparatus was 
never completely removed and reinstalled. In addition, unlike political parties in 
Western Europe or the United States, neither the KMT nor the DPP were used to 
coalition building. In other words, the KMT itself was not used to having to 
compete for support. The communication between the Kuomintang and its 
opposition was not the type of communication and negotiation political parties in 
Western Europe or the United States engage in. Since the beginning of 
liberalization and democratization, both the KMT and the DPP have more often 
engaged in mud-slinging. Both political parties criticize the other as the party of 
“no” or the party who opposes for the sake of opposing.35 Instead of coalition 
building, the DPP and Pan-Green social organizations regularly hold both large- 
and small-scale protests to oppose KMT policies, since the KMT has always had a 
legislative majority. One of the prime examples of this deadlock behavior was 
when the Pan-Blue majority stalled the Arms Procurement Bill forty-four times, 
before finally passing the same bill after the KMT president took office in 2008. 
Between 2000 and 2007, with Chen Shui-Bian as the president and his party in 
the legislative minority, the DPP was unable to pass most of the bills in the 
Legislative Yuan.  
Other than the socioeconomic achievements of Taiwan under the 
leadership of the KMT and the alleged capability of negotiation with the political 
opposition, there is also the culturalists’ explanation of KMT political resilience. 
                                                             
34 Hung-Mao Tien, The Great Transition—Political and Social Change in the Republic of China 
(Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1989), 71. 
35 The common phrase used in Taiwan was “wei fang dui er fang dui” (opposing for the sake of 
opposing). 
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Academics like Peter Moody attribute KMT’s political success to the party’s 
ability to adapt and therefore maintain its political presence, due to the party’s 
prodemocracy ideological framework. Nevertheless, Moody’s culturalist 
explanation can be rather insufficient. In his book, Political Change in Taiwan—a 
Study of Ruling Party Adaptability, Moody ascribes the KMT’s ability to adapt to 
the changing political environment to the party’s Confucian ideological 
framework. Moody then concludes that even though the Kuomintang is a strong 
political party with a Confucian ideological framework that is prodemocracy, the 
party’s traditional form and institution might be too strong for democracy.36  
The weakness of Moody’s culturalist explanation is two-fold. First, 
whether Confucianism is prodemocracy is a debatable philosophical issue. 
Confucius’s writings advocate a paternalistic society with strict rules on 
interpersonal relationships. Confucius outlined rules for the five relationships he 
deemed most important between individuals: (1) ruler to ruled; (2) father to son; 
(3) husband to wife; (4) elder brother to younger brother; and (5) friend to friend. 
According to Confucius, the relationship between father and son is the most 
important, and “filial piety” is the most essential virtue one must observe in 
Confucianism. In his other writings, Confucius offers advice on governance to 
emperors much like Machiavelli did in The Prince. Confucius emphasizes that an 
emperor should possess a paternalistic attitude toward his subjects and take care 
of his subjects because most of the time, subjects do not know what is best for 
themselves. In other words, it should be fair to say that Confucius advocated a 
                                                             
36 Moody, 1992, 189;  emphasis added. 
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governing system that has an overarching governing state apparatus instead of a 
representative form of government or majority rule. In addition, Confucian 
writing does not mention political participation of citizens or contestation between 
different political factions. Therefore, the Kuomintang political resilience should 
not be attributed to the “prodemocracy” ideological framework as identified by 
Moody. On contrary, the Kuomintang’s ability to adapt rests on following the 
paternalistic relationship Confucius advocated, as the Party promotes such 
relationships within local institutions through tiao-a-kas. Furthermore, the KMT 
also follows the Confucian proposed government structure by maintaining the 
overarching governing apparatus as its national institutions in the form of the five 
Yuans.37 
In addition, the argument that contends that Confucianism is supportive of 
democracy stems from the interpretation of Confucian texts that Heaven does not 
recognize the power of an unworthy ruler. Rebellions and natural disasters would 
occur if the ruler neglected to perform his proper paternalistic duties. A successful 
rebellion resulting in the toppling of an emperor means that the heavenly forces 
recognized the failure of the emperor, as the emperor is supposedly ordained by 
the Gods. Nevertheless, this interpretation does not explain the Confucian 
advocacy of the paternalistic, patron-client relationship between the emperor and 
his subjects as well as in all other aspects of interpersonal relationships. This also 
                                                             
37 A tiao-a-ka is an elected local representative or simply a community leader who is familiar with 
the area he resides in. The tiao-a-ka serves as a bridge between the residents of his district and the 
KMT through activities such as hosting monthly meetings for KMT legislators so community 
members can air their grievances, offering free classes, banquets, and even “vote buying.”. The 
tiao-a-ka constitutes one of the most important parts of local institutions necessary for the political 
success of the KMT. The role of the tiao-a-ka will be the subject of a subsequent chapter.  
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doesn’t portray Confucianism as supportive of regime change or as 
philosophically supportive of democratic transition. According to Confucius, 
there would not be a need for regime change or the occurrence of revolution if all 
individuals, including the emperor, fulfilled their roles in society and behaved 
properly according to his teachings. As Huntington puts it: 
Confucian societies lacked a tradition of rights against the state; to the extent that 
individual rights did exist, they were created by the state. Harmony and cooperation were 
preferred over disagreement and competition. The maintenance of order and respect for 
hierarchy were central values. The conflict of ideas, groups, and parties was viewed as 
dangerous and illegitimate. Most important, Confucianism merged society and the state 
and provided no legitimacy for autonomous social institutions at the national level.38 
In other words, the weakness of the explanation is that the Confucian culture is 
used to explain and interpret both the absence of democratic behavior of the ruler 
and the presence of democracy and executive decisions that honor the preferences 
of the people. 
The second weakness of the culturalist explanation is that it tends to 
characterize unexplainable or complicated political behavior as simply “cultural.”. 
In addition to the on-going philosophical debate on the prodemocracy foundation 
of Confucianism, Francis Fukuyama argues that Asian countries are able to 
generate and maintain democracies because it is the Confucian culture in those 
countries that allows them to do so.39Fukuyama uses Taiwan, South Korea, and 
Japan as examples of successful Asian democracies that arose after the political 
arenas in those countries were dominated by one political party for decades. 
Fukuyama states, “Let us begin with ways in which Confucianism is obviously 
                                                             
38 Samuel P. Huntington, “Democracy's Third Wave,” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 1 (1991):24.  
39 Francis Fukuyama, “Confucianism and Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 6, no. 2 (1995):25–
26. 
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compatible with democracy . . .  [it] is the Confucian emphasis on education itself 
[and it is a] doctrine that unified the political and social spheres and legitimated 
the state’s authority in all areas of life.”40 Fukuyama then moves to elaborate on 
the extent to which Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan have all achieved the status 
of developed nations through rapid economic development, and that Seymour 
Lipset’s Modernization theory offered validation for the genesis of democracy in 
the abovementioned Asian democracies.  
The deficiency in Fukuyama’s culturalist explanation is that it is difficult 
to distinguish whether he attributes the genesis of democracy in Taiwan, South 
Korea, and Japan to the Confucian nature within the political leadership and/or in 
the civil societies of those countries, or to the level of economic development and 
prosperity in those countries. Perhaps the most important fallacy in Fukuyama’s 
analysis lies in his misinterpretation of Lipset’s Modernization Theory. The 
Lipset article Fukuyama refers to numerous times was dedicated to elucidating the 
maintenance of democracy rather than the genesis of democracy. In this seminal 
article, Lipset offered empirical evidence to demonstrate that the level of 
economic development would in essence create a political environment conducive 
to the maintenance of democracy. On the other hand, Lipset did not draw similar 
conclusions about the genesis of democracy.41  
 In additional to the dearth of theoretical explanations for Taiwan’s 
political development, the few alternative explanations can be summed up in three 
                                                             
40 Fukuyama, 1995, 21, 24–25. 
41  Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and 
Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959):69–105. 
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subcategories: functionalist, essentialist, and exogenous. The functionalist 
explanation argues that the political resilience of former authoritarian parties is 
the inevitable result of lacking other political alternatives. The KMT, according to 
the functionalist explanation, adapted to the changing international and domestic 
environment by adopting voter-friendly public policies, revamping the pro-
unification platform, and promoting the party’s original prodemocracy ideology 
for the purposes of maintaining political support from the population and 
remaining politically relevant. In other words, they adapt and adjust because they 
have to. Parris H. Chang, in “Changing Nature of Taiwan’s Politics,” holds that 
“the opposition (mostly Taiwanese), the attentive public” along with “external 
pressure” from the United States and the People’s Republic of China, all added up 
to the mounting pressure for the Kuomintang to change in order to remain 
politically relevant.42 Chang argues that the Kuomintang was “suffering from a 
crisis of confidence, despite denial by government spokesman.”43 Consequently, 
the KMT “saw the writing on the wall” and the decision was made to take the lead 
on democratization in order to stay in power.44 Alongside Parris Chang, Tien 
Hung-Mao and Steve Tseng also contend that the changes within the KMT, 
whether they were ideological or programmatic, were inevitable.45 Tien and 
                                                             
42 Parris H. Chang,  “Changing Nature of Taiwan’s Politics,” in Taiwan—Beyond the Economic 
Miracle  (Armonk: East Gate Books, 1992), 27–29..  
43 Chang, 1992, 29–30. 
44 Chang, 1992, 32. 
45 Parris H. Chang,  “The Changing Nature of Taiwan’s Politics,” in Taiwan—Beyond the 
Economic Miracle (Armonk: East Gate Books, 1992); Hun-Mao Tien,  “Transformation of an 
Authoritarian Party State: Taiwan’s Development Experience,” in  Political Change in Taiwan 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992);  Hung-MaoTien,  “Dynamics of Taiwan’s Democratic 
Transition,” in In the Shadow of China—Political Developments in Taiwan Since 1949, ed. 
SteveTsang  (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,1993). 
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Tseng contend that the combination of opposition forces, the general public, and 
external pressure made changes compulsory for the KMT. However, Tien and 
Tseng neglect to explain the timing of such adaptation. The Kuomintang has 
always faced opposition from indigenous groups as well as pressure to survive 
after its relocation after the Chinese Civil War. It managed to stay afloat through 
its authoritarian governing methods.  
The exogenous explanation asserts external compulsion. This explanation 
holds that the extent of political resilience of the Kuomintang, as the result of 
adaptation, is dependent on Taiwan’s external relationships, especially those with 
the United States and China. Tien Hung-Mao argues that the democratization of 
Taiwan was propelled by the KMT administration’s struggle to survive in the 
international community, and by the Party’s jockeying for international space 
with and support from China.46 Joanne Chang in “Lessons from the Taiwan 
Relations Act,” Carl Clark in “The Republic of China in the international Arena,” 
and Wang Ho all argue that the leaders of the Kuomintang have obvious 
incentives, such as self-advancement within the party and within the national 
government, if the political party remains in power; therefore, they will always 
find methods to entice the masses to vote for them.47  However, as Stathis 
                                                             
46 Hung-MaoTien,  “Dynamics of Taiwan’s Democratic Transition,” in In the Shadow of China— 
Political Developments in Taiwan Since 1949, ed. SteveTsang  (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 1993). 
47 Joanne Chang, “Lessons from the Taiwan Relations Act,” Orbis 44, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 63; 
Hung Dah Chiu,  “Taiwan in Sino-American Relations,” in China and the Taiwan Issue (Taipei: 
INPR, 1979);  Carl Clark, “The Republic of China in the international Arena: Conflict, Clientelism, 
and the Search for Stability,” in Taiwan’s Development—Implications for Contending Political 
Economy Paradigms (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989);  Ho Wang, “The Republic of China’s 
Policy Toward the United States 1979–1989,” in   Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on 
Taiwan (Taipei: Institute of National Policy Research, 1992).  
 
 
28 
Kalyvas argues in his book on the formation of confessional parties in Western 
Europe, it is crucial to examine the extent to which political leaders choose one 
political decision over the other. Kalyvas asserts that one cannot assume that the 
mobilization of the masses is what politicians and their political parties are 
expected to do and will do.48 The exogenous explanation, so goes the logic, is that 
the KMT was coerced, by the threat of losing support from its traditional Western 
democratic allies, to democratize and adopt voter-friendly policies in the name of 
survival. The exogenous explanation ignores the possibilities of alternative 
choices and their consequences. 
 The last explanation is essentialism, which served as a basis for the 
prediction of the marginalization and disintegration of the Kuomintang. 
Essentialism conceives social and ethnic identities to be primordial, and they are 
“naturally strong, dominant and collective sentiments.”49 Furthermore, 
essentialism asserts, social and ethnic identities would inexorably transform to a 
political identity, as a country’s political environment continued to change. In 
other words, essentialism posits that the transition from social identity to political 
identity is something innate and unavoidable. Following essentialist logic, the 
political Taiwanese identity would emerge inevitably through a vehement 
eruption as Taiwan liberalized then democratized. Consequently, the Taiwanese 
political identity would motivate the Taiwanese to cast their ballots for the KMT’s 
political adversary, the DPP, a party that emerged out of the social movement of 
                                                             
48 Stathis Kalyvas,  The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1996), 7–8. 
49 Kalyvas, 1996, 8. 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mostly indigenous activists that demanded liberalization and democratization of 
Taiwan.50  
The Democratic Progressive Party and its Pan-Green coalition have 
always campaigned under the slogan “We are the political party of the Taiwanese, 
and Taiwanese vote for Taiwanese.”  Furthermore, according to the most recent 
TEDs survey, 75% of those surveyed agreed that the Democratic Progressive 
Party is the party representing the interests of the Taiwanese.51 Following such 
logic, there would be no puzzle about Kuomintang’s political resilience and 
success.52 The Taiwanese-identified voters and the majority would consistently 
vote for the DPP. Interestingly, the election results contradict the essentialist 
expectation. The KMT and its coalition not only has never lost the legislative 
majority; in the presidential election in 2008, the KMT presidential candidate 
received 58.4% of the overall votes, making Ma Ying-Jeou the highest vote-
obtaining presidential candidate since democratization. In addition, in the five-
municipality election in November 2010, the KMT captured three out of the five 
cities. 
Each of the abovementioned explanations may sound plausible, and some 
of them can explain the KMT’s political success to a certain extent; but they also 
                                                             
50 According to the most recent public opinion survey from Chengchi University’s Election Study 
Center, more than 70% of the population in Taiwan identify themselves as Taiwanese.  
Taiwanese/Chinese Identification Trend Distribution in Taiwan survey conducted by the Election 
Study Center of National Chengchi University. ???? ???/?????????. ???
??????????????. The survey shows that the of the population who identify 
themselves as Taiwanese has been consistently increasing since 1992.  
51 Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study, 2008 (TEDs2008P): Presidential Election 
Survey. The percentage of those surveyed who thought of the KMT as the party representing the 
interests of the Taiwanese was 37.5%. 
52 Over 90% of DPP and TSU politicians are Taiwanese, and the two parties’ political platforms 
have always been “Taiwanese should vote for Taiwanese.” 
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suffer from identifiable defects, as the above section has illuminated. There is also 
a common thread that can be woven through these explanations that makes them 
disputable. These conventional explanations assume inevitability coupled with 
external compulsion. The failing of these explanations is that they do not 
recognize the extraordinary importance of institutions, at the national and local 
level. They assume as long as political parties are willing to be flexible and adapt 
to the changing political environment, the parties will be able to maintain a 
political presence. However, explanations based on such assumptions fall short in 
explaining the reason some authoritarian parties became electorally successful 
and some did not. In addition, conventional explanations also flounder in 
elucidating the opposition’s lack of electoral success, even though most 
constituents identify the DPP as the party of the indigenous population, and the 
DPP has also engaged in adaptive behaviors.53  
In contrast to previous scholarship, this dissertation takes political 
institutions in Taiwan seriously and argues that they are most indispensible to the 
Kuomintang’s electoral success and the reason behind the party’s ultimate 
consolidation of political power. The combination of the many dimensions of 
political institutions and the levels of institutions creates an impervious security 
framework for the Kuomintang to (1) recover from initial electoral setbacks; (2) 
be ideologically and programmatically flexible to adapt to the changing political 
                                                             
53 Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study, 2008 (TEDs2008P): Presidential Election 
Survey. The Democratic Progressive Party has modified its ideological platform from strongly 
proindependence to the 1996 Consensus, advocating that Taiwan become an independent country 
after its first democratic presidential election, to the Constitutional Consensus, advocating a 
platform agreeing with the Republic of China’s constitution that Taiwan is part of the Republic of 
China, and the Taiwan Consensus,  advocating Taiwan’s de facto independent status while 
keeping the official country name, the Republic of China. 
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environment; and lastly (3), engage in proactive and aggressive political 
campaigns to reconsolidate the party’s political power. In other words, the 
procedures, routines, and norms established and embedded within the five 
governmental branches, the constitution, electoral rules, and the clientele nature 
of grassroots institutions serve as safety valves for the KMT. The constitutional 
design also enables the routines and norms to be carried over time and the self-
sustaining nature of institutions also keeps the KMT deeply entrenched within 
Taiwanese society. It is this deep entrenchment and the ability to keep close tabs 
on the citizens that makes national and grassroots institutions the most important 
variable in the Kuomintang’s political resilience.  
Research Methodology 
 
In order to discern the most critical elements of party structure and 
institutions, this dissertation incorporates forty in-depth interviews with political 
actors, from party elites from the Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive 
Party to local grassroots leaders (tiao-a-kas”). The interviews were indispensible 
to understanding the structure and operation of the Kuomintang. In addition, the 
interviewees bore witness to legislative processes and were also participants in the 
collaboration of national institutions. More importantly, the interviews of 
grassroots organization leaders provide valuable understanding of the recruitment 
process of Kuomintang cells and shed light on the depth of party entrenchment at 
the most local level. Questions were posed to the grassroots leaders on whether 
they are a member of the Kuomintang, and they are not, then follow up questions 
inquire their preferred political affiliation and why.  It is through questions as 
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such, the author was able to obtain information on the motivation behind an 
individual’s desire to become a tiao-a-ka for the Kuomintang and whether the 
individual would defect if KMT’s political opposition is able to offer the same 
incentives.  Questions were also posed to political actors at both the national and 
local level, since there are political actors embedded within institutions at both the 
national and the grassroots level.  A list of interview questions will be provided in 
the addendum section. 
The author spent numerous afternoons at local tiao-a-ka offices observing 
“constituent services” provided by the tiao-a-ka, and at afternoon tea gatherings of 
local community members with the tiao-a-ka. The documentation of the 
interactions between the tiao-a-ka and community members served as 
confirmation of the thesis of this dissertation—that grassroots institutions are one 
of the two ingredients in Kuomintang resilience. It is also widely known that high 
level Kuomintang officials rarely grant interviews to outsiders; therefore, this 
dissertation provides an unusual insider’s look into the tight-knit Kuomintang 
party apparatus. One of the Kuomintang elites this dissertation paid special 
attention to is the Kuomintang Organization and Development Committee 
director, Tu Chien-Te. Mr. Tu has been a member and official of the Kuomintang 
for thirty-two years. Tu began his political career as a grassroots organization 
leader and moved his way up to the director position of the Kuomintang’s 
organization and mobilization apparatus. This particular party organ Tu is in 
charge of bears the responsibility of organizing and mobilizing party members 
from all levels. Tu was called to assist the Taichung mayoral candidate, Jason Hu, 
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in the most recent five-municipality election, where the Democratic Progress 
Party was favored to obtain the mayoral seat. Hu eventually defeated the DPP 
candidate, winning by 30,000 votes.54 
In addition to the political elite interviews, the compilation of national and 
local election results from the Election Study Center of National Chengchi 
University help to elucidate the relationship between the electoral successes of the 
Kuomintang and the timing of public policies the KMT chose to advocate at the 
time of elections.55 Furthermore, the documentation from the Kuomintang party 
archive help shed light to the discriminatory policies of the Kuomintang and the 
subsequent development of the Taiwan identity.  Moreover, biannual ethnic 
identity and party preference surveys serve as evidence of the lack of 
transformation of social and ethnic identities to constituents’ party preferences.  
The survey demonstrated that even though there is an increase of individuals 
identify themselves as Taiwanese, the party preference stayed consistent, where 
the Kuomintang retaining majority electoral support.  Political party identification 
and satisfaction surveys are the most popular and frequently conducted surveys in 
the political science field in Taiwan. The survey results demonstrate a significant 
relationship between the issues the Kuomintang actively pursued and the citizens’ 
desire to vote for the party. Moreover, the surveys provide statistical evidence that 
                                                             
54 Election results from the Central Election Commission, Taipei, Taiwan.  Hu won 730,284 votes 
out of the 1,428,642 total votes casted. 
55 The data sets from NCCU ESC were Party Preferences Trend Distribution in Taiwan (June 
1992–December 2007),” Taiwanese/Chinese Identification Trend Distribution (June 1992–
December 2007),” Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with China Preference Distribution 
(December 1994–December 2007),” and most importantly, the face-to-face survey conducted after 
the 2008 presidential Election.  
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social and ethnic identity in Taiwan does not automatically translate into political 
identity. 
The author was also able to obtain the results of the face-to-face survey 
and the follow-up survey for the 2008 presidential election from National 
Chengchi University. The survey shows that 45% of the respondents agreed that 
the most important issue of the election was economy, and 0.9% of the 
respondents thought unification/independence was the most important issue; 0.7% 
of those survey identified national identity as the most important issue of the 2008 
presidential election.56 The theme of the Kuomintang presidential candidate for 
the 2008 election was “economics first, politics later” in combination with the 
advocacy of a policy goal named “6-3-3.”57 The survey respondents identified the 
Kuomintang candidates as the most capable of resolving the economic issues 
facing Taiwan. The survey results will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent 
chapters. 
Organization of Dissertation 
 Since the levels (national verses local) and the dimensions (executive, 
legislative, judicial, examination, control yuans, party organization, and electoral 
rules) of institutions are the variables identified by this dissertation as the 
                                                             
56 2008 presidential election follow-up survey, Taiwan Election and Democratization Studies, 
2009. 
57 “Economic first, Politics Later” was Ma Ying-Jeou’s campaign promise in dealing with China 
and the difficult relations between Taiwan and China. Ma advocated a plan to work with China to 
improve economic relations between Taiwan and China, while putting aside the political questions 
of unification and independence, arguing that the unification and independence issue was too 
complicated for anyone to resolve in a short time. The policy goal of “6-3-3” refers to Ma Ying-
Jeou’s promise to obtain economic growth of 6% while reducing the unemployment rate to 3% 
and increasing Taiwan’s GDP to $30,000 USD. In 2008, the GDP of Taiwan was roughly $18,042 
USD.  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explanation for the Kuomintang’s electoral resilience, they are the focus of two 
chapters of the dissertation. Chapter 2 provides the framework of national 
institutions as laid out by the Constitution of the Republic of China, which was 
brought to Taiwan by the Kuomintang trustee government and reinstated after the 
abolishment of martial law. The Constitution of the Republic of China instituted 
five branches of government. The five branches of government provide more 
reinforcement for each other compared to the checks and balances that the United 
States constitution stipulates. Analysis of the operation of the five yuans 
demonstrates that while the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Yuans reinforce 
and consolidate the Kuomintang’s political power, the functions of the 
Examination and Control Yuans are not only to recruit potential members for the 
Kuomintang; the operation of the two yuans also keeps those who are 
unsupportive of the Kuomintang from retaining financial sources and from career 
advancement. Then, the complicated election rules are also designed to prevent 
challengers from penetrating the web of party-sponsored candidates.  
The following chapter presents local or grassroots institutions with a close 
examination of the tiao-a-ka, or the “Small Pillars” phenomenon in Taiwan. The 
tiao-a-ka serves as bridges between national political actors and the local 
community. They are also the reason for the Kuomintang’s deep entrenchment in 
Taiwanese society. As stated at the outset, the clientele nature of the tiao-a-kas 
has enabled them to not only keep precise track of potential votes in their districts 
but also to reward and be rewarded for delivering the maximum votes for the 
Kuomintang. The close interaction between national and local institutions and the 
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self-sustaining nature of the institutions have made them endure over time, even 
after democratization. With the Kuomintang retaining the legislative majority, the 
Kuomintang was also able to offer and advocate its programmatically flexible 
policy platforms at critical times. 
 Chapter 4 addresses the issue of identity. Taiwanese identity is the 
unintended product of the Kuomintang authoritarian legacy. Although the ethnic 
and social Taiwanese identity did not translate to political identity, the 
Kuomintang’s political adversaries were still able to utilize the island’s 
authoritarian past against the ruling party. The chapter tackles the methods the 
Kuomintang employed to revamp the party’s authoritarian image and the party’s 
quest to reinvigorate the party’s original ideology of democracy and human rights. 
With the issue of identity effectively dealt with, the Kuomintang consolidated its 
political power in 2008. 
Chapter 5 concludes by providing an analysis of the 2008 legislative and 
presidential election, where the Kuomintang consolidated its absolute power by 
capturing 75% of the seats in the Legislative Yuan, then moved to also capture the 
presidential seat with 58% of the overall votes, the highest percentage of any 
presidential candidate in the history of democratic elections in Taiwan. The 
chapter also examines the party structure of the DPP, the political adversaries of 
the Kuomintang. The chapter presents an analysis on the Democratic Progressive 
Party’s deficiencies and inability to challenge the Kuomintang with a consistent 
vote share.  
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The case of the Kuomintang can serve as the starting point toward a 
theoretically grounded explanation of authoritarian party resilience after 
democratization. The KMT is the governing party of a former authoritarian 
regime that has managed to remain without changing the name of the party. Even 
though party members have defected in the past, most Kuomintang members have 
returned since 2007, and the Pan-Blue coalition captured three-fourths of the seats 
in the Legislative Yuan election in January, 2008.58 In addition, even some 
members of the Pan-Green coalition also defected from the Democratic 
Progressive Party to join the Kuomintang.  
This dissertation integrates analyses of multidimensional institutions in 
Taiwan at both the national and local level. This dissertation concludes that 
enduring and interactive institutions entrenched at all levels of Taiwanese society 
offer the most valid explanation for Kuomintang’s political resilience. 
                                                             
58 The list was presented at a joint press conference by the Pan-Blue coalition on November 14, 
2007. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
OUR PARTY’S LOYALTY IS TO THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF THE 
PEOPLE 
(????, ????).1 
National Institutions and the Political Resilience of the KMT 
Our enemy is neither the military police nor the riot police. The independence of 
Taiwan is not just about destroying the Kuomintang. It is about building a new 
country with a new political system and institution with our wisdom, organization 
and determination. – Yao Chia-Wen, Former Minister of the Examination Yuan 
and one of the Formosa Eight defendants.2 
This chapter seeks to explain the extent to which institutions at the 
national level contribute to the political resilience of the Kuomintang after 
democratization (1987 – present).  As Table 1 in the previous chapter has 
indicated, the KMT and its Pan-Blue coalition have consistently dominated 
legislative majority since 1987.  This chapter explicates dimensions of national 
institutions in Taiwan and asserts that the procedures, routines, and norms 
established and embedded within the five government branches, the KMT party-
state corporatism, and the “Single, nontransferable Voting in Multi-Member 
districts” (SVMM) electoral system act as safety valves for the Kuomintang3.  
The constitutional design brought to Taiwan by the KMT government permitted 
the party to keep its complete entrenchment within governmental bodies, local 
                                                             
1 This is the first line from the national anthem of the Republic of China, and it currently is also 
the official national anthem used by Taiwan. This first line literally translates to, “Our party’s 
loyalty is to the Three Principles of the People.” Critics of the anthem claim that the song should 
be the party anthem for the KMT, and the Three Principles of the People the song refers to is the 
theory of governance drafted by Sun Yat-Sen, the founder of the Republic of China. In addition, 
the lyrics to the rest of the song are also teachings of Sun Yat-Sen.  
2 Chia-Wen Yao, Formosa in the Wind (Feng-Chue-Mei-Li-Dao ?????) (Vanguard 
Publishing: Taiwan, 2008).  
3 The SVMM system of Taiwan is what is usually referred to, in the field of political science, as 
the SNTV system.  The SVMM system was used by Taiwanese politicians and then Taiwan 
studies scholars, so it remained unchanged; however, some scholars of Taiwan have been trying to 
refer to Taiwan’s old electoral system as the SNTV system.  The SVMM/SNTV system is 
explained in detail in the following section.   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governmental units, and grassroots organizations, while also allowing the party to 
monitor behaviors of both party and nonparty members and to award or punish 
those who consistently offer their support to the KMT or choose to defect.  
National institutions also set the rules of the electoral games for the 
Kuomintang and its political adversaries. In Politics in Taiwan—Voting for 
Democracy, Shelley Rigger argues that elections can help transform an 
authoritarian regime, and that one of the major functions served by regularly held 
elections in Taiwan was to facilitate mobilization and political participation.4 
Elections in Taiwan, as limited and controlled as they were, set precedents in 
unintended directions for subsequent democratic government of the country.  
The pre-democratization Taiwan exhibits the characteristics of 
competitive authoritarianism.  According to Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way,  
“In competitive authoritarian regimes…violations of these [minimum] criteria [of modern 
democratic regimes] are both frequent enough and serious enough to create an uneven playing 
field between government and opposition. Although elections are regularly held and are generally 
free of massive fraud, incumbents routinely abuse state resources, deny the opposition adequate 
media coverage, harass opposition candidates and their supporters, and in some cases manipulate 
electoral results. Journalists, opposition politicians, and other government critics may be spied on, 
threatened, harassed, or arrested. Members of the opposition may be jailed, exiled, or—less 
frequently—even assaulted or murdered”5.  
 
During the authoritarian era, the KMT inflated the importance of elections 
for the purpose of establishing legitimacy in Taiwan; thus, elections and the 
electoral system became one of the most important institutional factors in the 
political resilience of the KMT to date. Not only are the institutions at the national 
level mutually reinforcing, local institutions are also lodged deeply in civilian 
organizations from parent-teacher associations, folk dancing clubs at local parks, 
                                                             
4 Rigger, 1999, 3. 
5 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism, “ Journal of 
Democracy 13, no.2 (2002): 52, 53 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community martial arts classes, to Rotary Clubs in order to reflect the preferences 
of the constituents to the political players at the national level.6 For example, the 
head of the parent-teacher association at Jen-Ai elementary school has always 
been a KMT parliamentary member. Jen-Ai Elementary school is located in one 
of the most “blue” or pro-KMT districts in Taipei. In addition, the KMT’s 
Organization and Operation Department was established for the sole purpose of 
keeping track of and monitoring social and grassroots organizations in Taiwan. 
The predecessor of the Organization and Operation Department was called the 
Civil Tasks Department. The tasks of the various internal party organizations will 
be discussed later in the chapter. 
Ultimately, a chief executive officer, the premier, was appointed by the 
president, and the head of the Legislative Yuan, who has always been a member 
of the Kuomintang, worked together with the premier in determining the precise 
public policy to promote at each critical time. For example, the 1990s proved to 
be the most challenging time electorally for the Kuomintang. Most political 
parties in democratic countries would consider the KMT’s 60% vote share and 
71% seat share in the 1989 supplementary legislative election a great victory. 
However, for the KMT, the shrinking majority was a troubling trend, suggesting a 
raise of concern of legitimacy not only for the party but for the very state it had 
founded.7 Moreover, at the grassroots level, the cost of winning elections was 
increasing. Local factions of the KMT were extremely effective in voter 
                                                             
6 The Organization and Operation Department (?????) was established for the sole purpose 
of keeping track of and monitoring social and grassroots organizations in Taiwan. The predecessor 
of the Organization and Operation Department was called the Civil Tasks Department (???).  
7 Rigger, 1999, 149. 
 
 
41 
mobilization; on the other hand, the local factions of the KMT were unable to 
employ compulsory mobilization methods, so they demanded funds from the 
party for buying votes in order to maintain the electoral quota. With its vote share 
dropping significantly and steadily and the cost of winning increasing, the leaders 
of the national institutions thus organized and mobilized legislators from the 
KMT to first force members of the National Assembly to retire and then conduct 
Taiwan’s first democratic legislative election in history, showcasing the 
Kuomintang as the leader and supporter of democracy.8 
The collaborative nature of the national bodies facilitated the endurance of 
both national and local institutions and allowed the Kuomintang to be 
programmatically flexible at each critical juncture of Taiwan’s political history, 
from assuming the leadership role in democratization to advocating specific 
public policies targeting specific cross sections of potential voters, such as 
universal health care, women and minority rights legislation, public assistance for 
the elderly, and the “18-pa interest rate programs” for the Jungongjiao.9 Both 
national and local institutions in Taiwan “provide information relevant to the 
behaviors of others, enforcement mechanisms for agreements, penalties for 
defections, and the like.”10 The combination of the unblemished institutional 
design and the Kuomintang’s ability to embrace precisely targeted and 
                                                             
8 The other successful electoral maneuver of the Kuomintang will be discussed in later sections of 
this chapter. 
9 Jungongjiao(???) is the encompassing term given to those who are members of the military, 
the education sector, and civil services.  
10 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalism,” Political Studies  XLIV (1996): 939. 
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exceedingly practical electoral platforms consequently catapulted the Kuomintang 
to the status of one of the most durable and dominant political parties in the world. 
The Authoritarian Party-State and the KMT as “the” Party of the Republic of 
China 
 
One-Party Rule 
The Republic of China emerged from the Chinese Revolution during 
which the last dynasty of China was overthrown. The Republic of China began as 
a revolutionary social organization named the Society to Rebuild China (Hsing 
Chung Hui). The secret society was organized by Sun Yat-Sen in 1894 in the 
Kwangtung Province. Shortly after its founding, the Society to Rebuild China was 
reorganized and became the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance (Chung-guo Ke-
ming Tung-meng-hui) in Tokyo in 1905. The goal of Sun Yat-sen and his 
followers were, as stated in their alliance declaration, to “drive out the Tartars, to 
restore the Chinese nations, to establish a republic and to equalize land 
ownership.11 After the successful October 10t, 1911, revolution that toppled the 
Qing Dynasty, the Republic of China was established, and the Chinese 
Revolutionary Alliance was then formalized into the Kuomintang.  
Prior to the 1920s, the Republic of China was weak and plagued by 
regional warlords, and the KMT was very loosely organized. Sun, who had 
escaped to Japan during the Period of Warlords, returned from exile and 
reorganized the party with the help of Comintern along the Leninist line of 
democratic centralism. The top-down style of party discipline has continued until 
                                                             
11 Milton J. T. Shieh, “Inaugural of the Hsing Chung in Honolulu, Nov 24, 1894.” in Kuomintang 
Selected Historical Documents, 1894–1969 (New York: St. Johns University, 1970), 1–5. 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the present day.12  KMT party members are held to stringent Leninist discipline. 
According to Article 44 of the KMT Party Charter, members of the KMT are to 
follow party orders, keep party secrets, and refrain from attacking the party or 
other comrades in the presence of outsiders. They are not to join other political 
parties, nor are they allowed to organize small groups within the party.13 The 
strict party discipline and the harsh punishment of violators held the KMT 
together for almost a century and also prevented factionalism that has in contrast 
plagued the DPP since the establishment of the party.14 The KMT party officials 
and apparatus had always been merciless in expelling members who defied the 
party. Like any political party, there were also instances of cohesion erosion. For 
example, in the subsequent five-municipality speakers and vice speakers of the 
legislature election, ten KMT legislators from the city of Tainan decided to vote 
in accordance with merit or their personal desire rather than according to the 
party.15 The KMT stripped the ten legislators of their party membership. The loss 
of party membership not only would prevent a political candidate from 
representing the party, but the politician would also essentially lose all monetary 
                                                             
12 The warlords dominated most of China from 1917 to 1927. The ROC temporary revolutionary 
regime named Sun its provisional president. The KMT revolutionaries negotiated with the loyal 
imperialist forces and Sun agreed to step aside in favor of imperial general Yuan Shih-Kai, who 
would sell out the Manchus, as president. The KMT hoped to act as loyal opposition; however, 
Yuan soon suppressed the party, declared himself the new emperor, and killed the parliamentary 
leader. Sun fled to exile in Japan. Source of the Party structure: http://www.kmt.org.tw. 
13 KMT Party Charter, http://www.kmt.org.tw. 
14 The DPP has long suffered from the kind of factionalism that at times almost threatens the 
breakup of the party. The factions of the DPP are differentiated by political generations based on 
when the politician enters the Dangwai movement. In all, the DPP has the Kang (Centrist) Faction, 
the Formosa Faction, the New Tide Faction, the Justice Alliance and Welfare State Alliance, the 
Taiwan Independence Alliance, and the Main Stream Alliance. 
15 “Party Disciplined 10 Legislators for Runaway Votes in Tainan City(??10?????, ??
??????????),? NOW News, December 29, 2010, 
http://www.nownews.com/2010/12/29/91-2677585.htm. 
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support, along with mobilization support from the grassroots organization loyal to 
the Kuomintang.  
Sun, who is recognized as the father of the Republic of China or “Guo 
Fu,” had been composing a series of articles designated to be the blueprint for the 
political institutions of the Republic of China and the role the KMT should play in 
the newly founded country. Among Sun’s writings were articles on the structure, 
organization, and discipline of the KMT. Sun also dedicated a large portion of his 
writings to the arrangement of political institutions for the Republic of China and 
to his political ideology—the Three Principles of the People. The Three Principles 
of the People consists of three parts: the Principle of Nationalism, the Principle of 
Democracy, and the Principle of People’s Livelihood. Each part of the Principles 
is comprised of a series of lectures elucidating the appropriate governance of the 
Republic of China, with the Kuomintang taking the lead as the only party suitable 
to ultimately modernize China.16  
The long-standing KMT policy regarding the governance of the Republic 
of China was that one party rules the state. The founders of the Kuomintang 
coined the phrase i-tang-chih-kuo, or “a one-party-run country” (????), to 
describe the guiding principle of governance of the KMT.17 According to Peter 
Moody, “The principle that the party rules the state is an expression of the KMT’s 
revolutionary commitment, its self-concept as a political vanguard.”18 Sun Yat-
Sen’s original intent was to create a political party that was capable and strong 
                                                             
16 Yat-Sen Sun, The Three Principles of the People, 4th ed. (Taipei: China Publishing Company, 
1982). 
17 Sun, 1982, 56–59. 
18 Moody, 1991, 99. 
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enough to rule a territory as big as China.19 In the Three Principles of the People, 
Sun repetitively mentioned the classical English model that allows virtually 
unlimited freedom of action to the party that controls a majority in the House of 
Commons within the flexible confines of a constitution. In the case of Great 
Britain, the constitution was uncodified. On the other hand, Sun and the founders 
of the Republic of China adopted a written constitution for the ROC modeled 
after the republican-style representative democracy of the United States. The 
Constitution of the Republic of China was written with enough elasticity that it 
incorporated the three branches of government that resembled the powers and 
functions of Western democracies, along with two additional branches modeled 
directly from the old Chinese examination and bureaucratic system to aid in the 
recruitment of government officials and to keep a check on the bureaucracies and 
their members. The Republic of China constitution was implemented in Taiwan 
by the KMT administration after it retreated from China. The Constitution of the 
Republic of China is still the constitution honored by the government of Taiwan 
today.20  
                                                             
19 China has the world’s third largest territory, 3.7 million square miles, after Russia and Canada. 
20 As mentioned in the previous chapter, President Lee Teng-Hui advocated many constitutional 
amendments of electoral rules and regulations, and for the equality and social benefit of ethnic 
groups, that allowed the KMT to fulfill its campaign promises and obtain the majority of votes 
during elections. 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Figure 1: The Kuomintang Party Structure21 
 
The ROC constitution and its amendments are the basis for institutions in Taiwan, 
creating the ideal electoral environment for the KMT. In other words, under the 
ROC constitution, which was written by founder Sun Yat-sen with the electoral 
dominance of the KMT in mind, the KMT has the political advantage of playing 
                                                             
21 Kuomintang official party website: 
http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=para&mnum=107. 
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at a game in which rules and conditions have been tailored to the KMT’s political 
advantage in the forms of electoral rules and mutually reinforcing institutions.22  
The Lasting Structure of the Authoritarian Party-State  
 As mentioned in the previous section, the KMT was reorganized in the 
1920s, and its organization owes a great deal to Leninism. The party emphasized 
“democratic centralism, leadership by a professional political vanguard, and 
mobilization.”23 During the First National Congressional Meeting, the KMT 
established a military academy, Whampoa, with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek 
as commander. The Whampoa Academy was created to train a party army with an 
internal control system similar to the Soviet commissar system.  
 At the base of the party structure are numerous basic units. The basic unit 
of the KMT is the “cell.” Cells are organized based on the members’ occupations 
rather than geographic location. The cell directs each member’s political activity 
and is responsible for mobilization. “Ever since democratization and the DPP 
trying to go after our party assets, we have to reduce the number of our cells, but 
this just means the cells are now bigger. They still have the same functions. All 
the cells would come alive prior and during every election.”24 The cell, according 
to Ping-Lung Jiang and Wen-Cheng Wu, is characterized by “tight discipline and 
is organized not only for electoral mobilization, but for agitation, propaganda, 
                                                             
22 The constitution and the branches of government will be discussed in greater details under the 
Formal Institution section of the chapter. 
23 Rigger, 1999, 64. 
24 Tu Chien-Te, Deputy Director-General, the KMT Organization and Development Committee, 
interviewed by author on June 14t, 2007. 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discipline, and if necessary, clandestine action.”25 The party cells often have close 
ties with local government officials such as heads of villages (tzun zhang), wards 
(li zhang), neighborhoods (lin zhang), county magistrates (sian zhang), and 
commissioners and community leaders known as tiao-a-kas. Some officials who 
hold local administrative offices would assume roles as tiao-a-kas for the KMT. 
The tiao-a-kas are the links between the constituents, the KMT, and its institutions. 
The KMT party constitution requires the cells to meet once a month. Local 
officials also conduct their own monthly meetings with residents of their villages, 
wards, and neighborhood. Huang Chung-Chuan, the head of Li-Chung ward, says 
that he has never missed conducting the monthly meetings for the residents of his 
ward.26 In addition to local cells, which are responsible for mobilizing and 
monitoring party members, the KMT also has full-time party employees 
responsible for the local party headquarters, which are often referred to as 
“service centers for constituents (Shuan-Min-Fu-Wu-Chung-Shin).” The service 
centers are local institutions in which the KMT interacts with the public, and are 
the primary tools in cultivating the culture of patronage and clientelism within 
local institutions.  
Taiwan political experts like Shelley Rigger, Peter Moody, Tun-Jen Cheng, 
and Stephan Haggard defined the predemocratized Republic of China as an 
authoritarian party-state.27 The Kuomintang not only is deeply embedded within 
                                                             
25 Ping-Lung Jiang and Wen-Cheng Wu, “The Changing Role of the KMT in Taiwan’s Political 
System,” in Political Change in Taiwan, eds. Tun-Jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard   (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 77. 
26 Huang Chung-Chuan, Head of the Li-Chun Li, Hsin-Yi District, City of Taipei, interviewed by 
author on June 29, 2007. 
27 Rigger, 1999, 74–80; Moody, 1991, 99–132; Cheng and Haggard, 1992, 74–82; Chao, 1992, 
43–67. 
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national institutions; the Kuomintang has also infiltrated social, trade, and 
political organizations from Housewives Associations, Doctors Unions, Teachers 
Unions, and Farmers Associations, to Labor Unions. There has always been a 
blurry line between governmental institutions and the Kuomintang party 
apparatus, which extends to Kuomintang party assets and the national reserve. In 
past decades, it was nearly impossible for one to pinpoint where the governmental 
institutions ended and the Kuomintang party apparatus began.28  
Since democratization, the KMT has consistently and consciously 
deemphasized Sun Yat-Sen’s original “one party-run country” governing stance 
to distinguish the KMT from the ROC. During Lee Teng-Hui’s inaugural speech 
in 1996, he said, “This gathering does not celebrate the victory of any candidate, 
or any political party, for that matter. It honors a triumph of democracy for 
twenty-one million people. It salutes the confirmation of freedom and dignity—
the most fundamental human values.”29  Lee further elaborated, “The job of 
president was not something I had inherited from someone else; I had been 
chosen for it by the people themselves.”30 Ma Ying-Jeou, the second 
democratically elected president from the KMT, distanced himself from the KMT 
tradition of inherent leadership in his inaugural speech:  
Upon being sworn in, I had an epiphany about the significance of accepting responsibility 
for the 23 million people of Taiwan. Although I have never felt so honored in my life, 
this is the heaviest responsibility that I have ever shouldered. . . . The new government 
will be for all the people. It’ll remain non-partisan and uphold administrative neutrality. 
                                                             
28 One of the most controversial issues in the blurring of government and party lines is the issue of 
pension for public servants and government officials. When an official retires, he can count the 
years he spent as a KMT party member as years of public service and receive a pension in 
accordance with the years the official was both a KMT party member and in public service.  
29 Lee, 1999, 197–198. 
30 Lee, 1999, 197. 
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The government will not stand in the way of social progress, but rather serve as the 
engine that drives it.31  
 
Nevertheless, there are observable examples that demonstrate that the 
KMT and the ROC are still intimately linked to each other. For example, the 
KMT party flag and the ROC national flag are variations of each other. As the 
title of this chapter points out, the Republic of China’s national anthem celebrates 
the KMT’s ideological foundation—the Three Principles of the People. The first 
line of the anthem exclaims:   
Three Principles of the People. The foundation of our party.  
Using that, we established the Republic.  
Using that, we advanced into a state of total peace.  
Oh you Warriors, For the people, Be the Vanguard.32  
 
The lyrics of the ROC national anthem were derived from Sun Yat-Sen’s 
keynote speech at the opening of Whampoa Military Academy.33 More poignantly, 
in the information on the origins of the Republic of China national flag and 
national anthem, they are still listed as “Party Flag and Party Anthem” on the 
official KMT website. In addition, the glorified leaders of the Republic of China, 
Sun Yat-Sen, Chiang Kai-Shek, Chiang Ching-Kuo, and Lee Teng-Hui were all 
chairpersons of the KMT at one point or another, and all played significant roles 
in KMT and ROC history.34 
                                                             
31 China Post, May 21, 2008, 8,  http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-
news/2008/05/21/157332/p4/Full-text.htm. 
32 Kuomintang Official Website, http://www.kmt.org.tw/hc.aspx?id=29. 
33 Kuomintang Official Website, http://www.kmt.org.tw/hc.aspx?id=29. 
34 Lee Teng-Hui fell out of favor with the KMT after his vice president and 2000 presidential 
candidate, Lien Chan, lost the presidential election to the DPP’s Chen Shui-Bian, and Lee took a 
more aggressive stance on establishing Taiwan as a separate state from the People’s Republic of 
China. Lee was eventually forced out of the KMT and formed another party called the Taiwan 
Solidarity Union. 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Kuomintang Party Flag      Republic of China National Flag 
 
National Institutions and the Kuomintang Resilience 
 Institutions are defined as collections of interrelated rules and routines that 
define actions in terms of relations between roles and situations35. National 
institutions, as defined in this dissertation, are structures that ultimately serve as a 
basis and blueprint for the operation of the polity. Local institutions, on the other 
hand, are grassroots organizations that cultivate norms, habits, and relations 
between individuals that steer the behavior of political actors. Local institutions 
cultivate two tiers of norms and relationships: first, the relationships between the 
individual constituents, and secondly, the tiao-a-kas and the community leaders’ 
relationship with the party.  
 There are several dimensions to national institutions in Taiwan, which 
interactively created an irreproachable system for the Kuomintang. The 
dimensions are the five branches of government and the electoral rules designed 
by Sun Yat-Sen and amended by subsequent KMT legislators. In examining the 
horizontal and vertical security provided by national and local institutions, one 
                                                             
35 Stephen Bell.  “Institutionism: Old and New” (2011) http://printfu.org/read/institutionalism-old-
and-new-1b9d.html?f=1qeYpurpn6Wih-
SUpOGumK6nh7Xd6dnd3Nrk29jc1dLe4NKmj8XR2IjG3taJvNndl6jYpqGwh-jch6vlo5-
loJfX2t_j49XEuMrc14up56Cmp4fSkbHYrp2dqpTR4ujWr5yU0eLmxtfNk-
Xjl9PY26PO2pvU6crm3pTFw6Onqp-unK7a4urO6N3Z2eHXz-DP6NqT3NPch6_l 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must also remember that the two levels of institutions are not independent. They 
operate in interrelated ways and sustain each other. For example, the Single Non-
transferable Multi-member district (SVMM) system, as part of the national 
institutions, not only helped in reducing intraparty conflict, it also facilitated 
cooperation among KMT candidates; therefore, it consolidated the party’s overall 
control over electoral outcomes. The SVMM system also created a “candidate 
oriented” voting environment that encouraged voters to vote for their favorite 
candidate instead of along party lines. Additionally, the habit of candidate-
orientated voting patterns generated by the SVMM system not only allowed the 
KMT greater flexibility in nominating candidates; it also facilitated clientelistic 
characteristics within local institutions that were upheld and sustained by the tiao-
a-kas. In all, institutions at the national level served as the foundation and master 
plan for the KMT to recruit members and win elections. During the eight-year 
administration of the Democratic Progressive Party, the DPP, due to the lack of 
legislative majority, was prevented by the Kuomintang and its Pan-Blue coalition 
legislative majority from adopting a new constitution or amending the existing 
one for it to become more objective; therefore, the DPP was competing in 
political games where the rules were still being set by the KMT. The KMT has 
been practicing in the same electoral arena for decades, even though it has been 
with strictly controlled local elections and minor political parties approved by the 
KMT. Moreover, this political system in itself has made it extremely difficult for 
the KMT’s political adversaries to capture enough political power to implement 
any changes.36  To win an election under the SVMM system, “a candidate does 
                                                             
36 Even though Chen Shui-Bian and the DPP won the presidency in 2000 and 2004, Chen 
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not a majority of the votes cast; it is necessary only to finish near the top”37.  The 
larger districts demands more candidates to enter the electoral race.  As the 
number of candidates increases, the percentage of the vote required to win a seat 
diminishes.  This system favors large, well-organized parties with resources to 
manage candidates and mobilize supporters; in other words, the system favors the 
Kuomintang. 
The Constitution 
 There is a two-fold contribution of the Constitution of the Republic of 
China and its subsequent provisions to Kuomintang’s political resilience and 
success. First, the ROC constitution embodies Western democratic characteristics 
while instituting Chinese-style bureaucratic recruitment agencies through the 
examination system, rewards for supporters, and close monitoring of 
governmental employees and officials. The second aspect of the constitution that 
positions the Kuomintang in a politically favorable light is that it is ideologically 
democratic. According to the founders of the Republic, the ROC is designed to be 
a mixed system of representative democracy, even though in practice the 
constitution’s democratic provisions were suspended from 1949 to 1986, and the 
Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion was 
instead put in place, with the Kuomintang claiming an on-going civil war with the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
remained a minority president and was unable to capture a legislative majority to implement the 
policy promises he made to the voters. Even when the KMT lost the majority in the legislative 
election of 2001, the KMT and its splinter parties still constituted the majority of the legislative 
seats. This period saw the emergence of the Pan-Blue coalition, which refers to the KMT and its 
splinter parties, which routinely worked together to block or pass legislative proposals. 
37 Shelley Rigger, From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (Lynne 
Rienner Publisher, Inc, 2001), 42. 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Chinese Communist Party and vowing to take back the mainland.38 During the 
authoritarian era, the KMT party-state harnessed strict control of Taiwan and all 
aspects of the citizens’ lives. After the constitution was restored under President 
Lee Teng-Hui, the ROC constitution and its components carried through and 
replaced the Temporary Provision as the institutional and ideological basis to 
establish a Chinese democracy with the Kuomintang as its vanguard. 
The ideological and philosophical basis of the ROC constitution was the 
Three Principles of the People formulated by Sun Yat-Sen, who was a medical 
doctor based in San Francisco. According to Sun, the three ingredients to 
constructing a great Chinese nation are nationalism, democracy, and livelihood of 
the people. The original intention of Sun was to establish a democratic China; 
thus, the constitution incorporated both characteristics of presidentialism and 
parliamentarianism. The political system for the ROC included the presidency and 
five separate branches of government, or the five yuans. The first three yuans, 
executive, legislative and judicial, were modeled after the American three-branch 
system, but instead of the Western concept of checks and balances, the three 
yuans support and sustain each other with the premier and the Speaker of the 
Legislative Yuan often working together as the advocates of governmental 
policies. The latter two yuans, the Examination and Control Yuans, are derived 
                                                             
38 The Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion was a series of 
temporary constitutional provisions passed by the National Assembly of the Republic of China on 
May 10, 1948. Usually referred to as the Temporary Provisions, the provisions allowed the 
president, Chiang Kai-shek, and the his son Chiang Ching-Kuo after his passing, sole governing 
power due to the on-going Chinese Civil War. The provisions also allowed the president and vice 
president to be exempted from the two-term limit. These provisions were originally designated to 
remain in effect until China could be recovered from the CCP. During democratization, President 
Lee Teng-Hui declared the Period of Communist Rebellion had ended on April 30, 1991, after the 
National Assembly abolished the Temporary Provisions on April 22.  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from the imperial Chinese watchdog and the examination recruitment system of 
civil servants and public offices.  
With the Kuomintang as the legislative majority, the party’s legislative 
proposals almost always receive support from the legislators, while the 
opposition’s legislation is often unable to even make it out of committee. The 
interaction between the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan ensured the 
Kuomintang’s programmatic and policy flexibility at critical junctures of 
Taiwan’s political history. For example, prior to the first democratic legislative 
election in 1992, the Legislative Yuan adhered to President Lee Teng-Hui’s 
request and voted to forcibly retire the members of the National Assembly, who 
were elected in 1947 on the mainland, solidifying the Kuomintang’s position as 
the leader of democratization. Moreover, in 1992, the Executive Yuan pushed for 
the application for Taiwan to rejoin the United Nations, and the resolution was 
passed overwhelmingly by the Legislative Yuan.39 The Kuomintang thus utilized 
such legislation to create a new image of the party as an advocate of the 
Taiwanese before the 1993 local municipal, township, and village executive 
elections.40 To further cement the KMT as the party champion for the people’s 
livelihood, the Department of Health, at the guidance of the Executive Yuan, 
drafted the National Health Insurance Bill and submitted it to the Legislative 
Yuan at the end of 1993, prior to the governor and mayoral elections of 1994.41 
According to Lin Cheng-Chieh, a former DPP legislator, the NHI bill was passed 
                                                             
39 In the 1992 election, the KMT took 103 seats out of the possible 161.  
40 The KMT captured 67% of the council seats and 82% of the executive posts while the DPP 
captured only 7% of the council seats and 11% of the executive posts. 
41 The KMT candidate for the governor of Taiwan, James Soong, won the election by capturing 
56% of the vote. 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by the KMT majority after only two or three days’ discussion.42 The NHI came 
into full effect in 1995, just in time for the 1996 first democratic presidential 
election in Taiwan.43 Therefore, for a succinct understanding of KMT political 
resilience, one should first examine institutions at the national level. The 
successive sections are dedicated to this purpose. 
The Executive Yuan 
The Executive Yuan is considered the most powerful branch of the 
government under the ROC constitution. The president has direct control over this 
particular branch of government. The branch consists of the premier, the vice 
premier, and eight ministers and other ministerial-level organs with heads all 
appointed by the president. The eight ministries are Foreign Affairs, National 
Defense, Justice, Education, Economic Affairs, Finance, Interior, and 
Transportation and Communication. In addition, other ministerial-level 
institutions were created to encompass other aspects of society; in particular, 
ministries such as the Government Information Office are responsible for 
distributing official statements from the government and monitoring the media. 
The Mainland Affairs Council was established by President Lee Teng-Hui to deal 
with issues with the People’s Republic of China. The Central Elections 
Commission was established to ensure elections are free and fair. In addition, 
other ministerial-level institutions are the Council of Economic Planning and 
Development; the National Youth Commission, responsible for cultivating the 
young to participate in the political structure; the National Science Council; the 
                                                             
42 Fell, 2005, 39. 
43 Lee won by obtaining 54% of the overall vote, while Peng of the DPP received 21% and the 
New Party candidate captured 14%. 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Council of Agriculture; the Environmental Protection Administration; the Council 
for Labor Affairs; the Central Bank; the Council for Aboriginal Affairs; and the 
Central Personnel Administration. The numerous government organs under the 
direction of the Executive Yuan reflect the Executive Yuan’s all-encompassing 
responsibility for public policy formulation and oversight. The Executive Yuan 
initiates policy formulation. It is also the Executive Yuan, not the Legislative 
Yuan, where most legislation, bills, and laws are drafted; upon legislative passage, 
the bills are then implemented by the ministries of the Executive Yuan. The 
Executive Yuan thus has the ability to exercise a powerful influence over the 
policy agenda. 
Even more importantly, all government offices and ministries have within 
them party cells.44 The party cells serve as communication bridges and monitors 
between the premier, the ministers, and the president and high-ranking party 
officials. Thus, the Executive Yuan is the national institution that bears the 
responsibility for all policy formulation as well as all administrative duties within 
the state. During the authoritarian era, almost all members and employees of the 
ministries were members of the KMT.  It was impossible for the DPP to fire and 
replace all personnel, who were also civil service workers, in all the ministries 
and ministerial agencies after capturing the presidency from 2000 to 2008.  
Habitually, these agencies would then still hire and recruit KMT supporters as 
employees over nonparty or DPP members.  
Legislative Yuan 
                                                             
44 Rigger, 1999, 61. 
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The legislative branch is the elected body of representatives that was 
designed to bear responsibility similar to the American Congress. While policies 
are formulated in the Executive Yuan, the purpose of the Legislative Yuan is to 
check the Executive Yuan. The Legislative Yuan has the power to pass, reject, or 
alter the wording of legislation formulated by the Executive Yuan. The legislative 
branch originally consisted of the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly.45 
Before the constitutional amendment of 1994, the most important purpose of the 
National Assembly was to elect the president and the vice president. Other 
purposes for the National Assembly were to recall the president and vice president 
and to approve appointments by the president. The National Assembly would later 
be abolished in 2004 by the Pan-Blue-dominated Legislative Yuan in preparation 
for electoral reform. The 2005 electoral reform replaced the SVMM with the 
single-member-district system. The new system reduced the seats of the 
Legislative Yuan from 225 to 113 and changed the terms of the legislators to four 
years, so that legislative elections coincide with the presidential election. 
Expecting its next presidential candidate to be the charismatic, American-
educated Ma Ying-Jeou, who had a rather immaculate reputation compared to the 
usual political candidates, the Kuomintang sought to have Ma Ying-Jeou 
eradicate the party’s authoritarian and corrupt image and encouraged constituents 
to vote for the KMT in the legislative election as well.46 The election results of the 
                                                             
45 After the adoption of the amendment that allows the president and vice president to be directly 
elected by the constituency, the National Assembly essentially became useless. The National 
Assembly was suspended from 2000 to 2005 by another amendment. In 2004, the Legislative 
Yuan passed another series of amendments abolishing the National Assembly. 
46 In the legislative election in 2008, the first time the single member district system was in 
practice, the KMT and the Pan-Blue coalition obtained  three-fourths (85 out of 113) of the seats. 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2008 legislative election demonstrated that electoral reform is another step that 
consolidated KMT’s political prowess.  
As mentioned above, the function of the Legislative Yuan is to confirm 
emergency orders, approve budgets, pass or reject legislation submitted by the 
Executive Yuan, and propose amendments to the constitution. The Legislative 
Yuan provides grants-in-aid to local governments, redistricting and settling 
disputes between the national government and local governments. Accordingly, 
the Legislative Yuan possesses the tremendous power of resource and funding 
distribution. During the authoritarian era, the Legislative Yuan was a rubber 
stamp and would only have to resolve minor budgetary disputes between local 
and provincial government. However, during the eight years of DPP 
administration (2000–2008), the KMT-dominated legislature often aggressively 
impeded many of President Chen Shui-Bian’s policies and delegated resources to 
local governments that were headed by fellow KMT members. In other words, the 
Legislative Yuan was able to indirectly assist, in combination with the party-
controlled media, in creating the image of Chen’s incompetence as president 
while facilitating a positive public image for KMT government officials.   
One of the most important actions of the Legislative Yuan in recent years 
was the passing of electoral reform in 2005 and 2009. Electoral reform not only 
amended the electoral rules to amplify the KMT’s electoral strength in the form of 
patronage and clientelism, it also created new municipalities by redistricting 
according to demographics supportive of the KMT. For example, before 2008, 
only the election of the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung were held by special 
 
 
60 
election. In 2009, the Legislative Yuan passed new redistricting and electoral 
reforms that upgraded and renamed Taipei County to Xinbei City. It also 
upgraded Taichung City to Greater Taichung City and merged Tainan and 
Kaohsiung Counties with their respective cities, turning them into Greater Tainan 
and Greater Kaohsiung cities.47  
Xinbei City can be considered one of the prime examples of the 
Legislative Yuan shaping an advantageous electoral environment for the KMT. 
The Taipei County Magistrate, Zhou Xi-Wei, had been performing poorly since 
taking office. His approval rating was in the lower 20%. Zhou also was involved 
in various negative publicity scandals that caused his support to dwindle. First, the 
director of Zhou’s county office was caught and charged with receiving expensive 
gifts, such as overseas vacation trips and luxury cars, from local big businesses in 
exchange for his help in obtaining government construction bidding.48 Secondly, 
Zhou’s vice magistrate, who is married, was caught in a very public affair with a 
female legislator.49 The vice magistrate resigned after the affair was discovered. 
Lastly, Zhou, in order to boost his accomplishments in protecting and improving 
the environment in the Danshui River area, had county employees purchase 
$3,6000NT worth of mudfish and clams to put in the muddy sections of riverbeds 
right before the celebration of Zhou’s success in protecting the Danshui River’s 
                                                             
47 Three-fourths of the legislators from the Legislative Yuan were members of the KMT in 2009. 
The name Xinbei City means “The New Northern City.”. The New Northern City will have 2.6 
million residents and the area will be greater than Taipei City, including cities and townships such 
as Shanchung, Banchiao, Yonghe, Beitou,  Danshui, Pingxi and Pingli. 
48 “Director of Zhou Xi-Wei’s Office, Mai Huei-An allegedly receiving bribes. Prosecutor 
requests issue of arrest warrant,” Now News, November 9, 2008, 
http://www.nownews.com/2008/09/11/138-2333515.htm. 
49“Due to the Affects of Extramarital Affair, Lee Hung-Yuan’s Resignation Granted,” The United 
Daily News, March 20, 2009, http://mag.udn.com/mag/news/storypage.jsp?f_ART_ID=185272. 
 
 
61 
ecosystem. Locals reported seeing county employees making arrangements and 
buying the river creatures at the local market, and the media also was able to 
obtain Zhou’s budget, which showed funds specifically dedicated to the animal 
purchases.50 The KMT realized if Taipei County was to hold an election along 
with the other counties in December, 2009, Zhou was bound to lose. Therefore, 
the Legislative Yuan voted to upgrade Taipei County and rename it as Xinbei 
City in order to postpone the election for one year, therefore buying the party 
more time to decide whether to nominate Zhou again as a candidate or support 
another candidate.51 The electoral result of the five-municipality election in 2010 
was also another success story for the KMT. The KMT candidate captured three 
out of the five municipalities, including Xinbei City. The KMT ultimately 
replaced incumbent magistrate Zhou with Vice Premier Eric Chu, who bears a 
striking resemblance to Ma Ying-Jeou in age, reputation, and political family 
background. Chu won Xinbei City with 56% of the vote share. 
 The upgrade of Xinbei County gave the legislative branch the ability to 
influence and to better the chances for candidates of a particular party, in this case 
the Kuomintang. In addition, the redistricting and upgrading of municipalities also 
means the elected mayors of the newly established cities will govern considerably 
more residents, wield more political power, and, most importantly, receive more 
funds for policy implementation, such as building the MRT system for Taichung, 
                                                             
50“Exposing the Fakery of Environmental Protection. Taipei County Buys Mudfish to Lie to 
Citizens,” The Apple News Daily, October 26, 2009, http://ipobar.com/read.php?tid-83641.html. 
51 Zhou ultimately announced that he will not seek reelection on February 22, 2010, and the KMT 
is looking to nominate the current vice premier and former Tao-Yuan county magistrate, Chu Li-
Luen, as candidate for Xinbei City mayor . . “Low Approval Rating: Zhou Announced Bowing 
Out of Election,”  ,  http://video.chinatimes.com/video-report-cnt.aspx?tid=851&nid=7669. 
 
 
62 
improving schools, roads, and libraries, environmental protection, and social 
welfare.52 Critics of the municipality upgrades claimed that the legislative action 
was a preventive strategy on the part of the KMT to ensure that if the opposition 
captured another presidency, the local governments are still being controlled by 
its own party members, to ensure the Legislative Yuan’s ability to delegate funds 
to the municipalities supportive of the party, and to reward those who cast their 
votes for the KMT in forms of public services, welfare, and infrastructures. 
The legislative branch was weak during the authoritarian era and served as 
merely a rubber stamp to the executive branch. In addition, the Kuomintang was 
also deeply entrenched in the legislative bodies. Both the Legislative Yuan and 
the National Assembly, similar to other government bodies, had embedded party 
cells, which are called “party units,” inside their buildings in order for the KMT to 
better coordinate and monitor actions of its party members. With the Kuomintang 
retaining a legislative majority, the Legislative Yuan passed legislation proposed 
by the Executive Yuan without much debate. Some opposition members dubbed 
such action as “legislative escort.” In addition, after the DPP took the presidency, 
the Pan-Blue-dominated Legislative Yuan rejected legislation submitted by the 
DPP premier while passing policies that were conducive to portraying the KMT in 
a positive and capable light. For example, the Legislative Yuan refused to pass the 
arms procurement bill and budget, which would have allowed Taiwan to purchase 
                                                             
52 MRT is the abbreviation for Mass Rapid Transit. It is the equivalent of the Metro in Washington 
DC or the subway system in New York. Taipei was the first city to have an MRT system, which 
was initiated by former president Lee Teng-Hui and approved by the Executive Yuan and the 
Legislative Yuan. The city of Kaohsiung also received its own MRT system that began operating 
in 2008. One of the most popular platforms for the candidates running for Taichung City was to 
lobby the central government for an MTR system in Taichung. 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defensive weapons from the United States, sixty-two times during former 
President Chen’s administration, but passed an almost identical bill and budget in 
2009 after President Ma Ying-Jeou took office. After democratization, the 
Legislative Yuan possessed the power to be selective of the public policies. The 
modifications to the KMT-conducive electoral rules will be discussed in the later 
section. 
The Judiciary 
The ROC constitution did not explicitly mention an independent judiciary. 
The courts in Taiwan do not have a jury system. Judicial reform became one of 
the most contentious issues, after Taiwan’s democratization. The Democratic 
Progressive Party and other KMT political adversaries have consistently accused 
and labeled the judicial branch as no more than a tool for the Kuomintang to 
legitimize harassment and persecution of its political opponents.  
The organization of the judiciary of the ROC is quite different than that of 
its Western democratic counterparts. Judges, prosecuting attorneys, and defense 
attorneys have to pass examinations implemented by the Examination Yuan. The 
judiciary is composed of a president, a vice president, and fifteen justices who 
serve six-year terms. All are appointed by the president and approved by the 
Legislative Yuan. The Judicial Yuan is organized into the Council of Grand 
Justices and a hierarchy of courts: the Supreme Court, the high courts and district 
courts, administrative courts, and a Committee on the Discipline of Public 
Functionaries.53 The judges from the Council of Grand Justices and the Supreme 
Court are appointed by the president with tenure. Thus, the important implication 
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Copper, 2009, 124. 
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here is that most justices who are now serving in higher courts in Taiwan were 
most likely appointed by a KMT president at one time or another and were also 
screened by the Examination Yuan, while being closely monitored by the Control 
Yuan.  According to John Copper, “Critics of the Judicial Yuan have argued that 
it is not as strong as a judicial body of government should be and not sufficiently 
independent of ruling party influence.”54 Advocates of judicial reform allege that 
the judges are simply life-long government employees recruited by the heavily 
Pan-Blue-influenced Examination Yuan and the civic exam system designed by 
the Kuomintang government; thus, judges are never impartial.55 Former President 
Chen Shui-Bian promised judicial reform when campaigning for the presidency; 
nevertheless, due to his party’s minority status in the Legislative Yuan, the 
judicial reform Chen promised never took place.  
There are a few Taiwanese axioms concerning the judicial branch. The 
most famous saying that is still widely quoted, especially by the KMT opposition, 
is from a former KMT secretary general, Hsu Shui-Te. Hsu once proclaimed that 
“the Courts belong to the KMT.”56 Hsu was attending the 14th Party 
Representatives Conference of the Kaohsiung and Pingtung areas and was in the 
process of appeasing his comrades after they expressed great discontent over the 
court’s investigations and indictments of corruption. In his attempt to calm the 
attendees, Hsu asserted that the Kuomintang essentially ran the courts. There are 
two additional popular maxims referencing the Judiciary—one is “When elected, 
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Copper, 2009, 125. 
55 The examinations are administered and implemented by the Examination Yuan, another 
governmental organ within the ROC government that bears a  striking resemblance to the imperial 
Chinese examination system for civil offices. 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Po-Fu Chang, The Journalist Magazine, no. 437 (July 1995). 
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the person passes the challenge. When one is not elected, one goes to jail,” and 
the other maxim is in reference to KMT officials who find themselves in hot 
water with the law: “First trial: retry; Second trial: sentence turns to in half; Third 
trial: everything is all right.”57 These popular sayings of mockery refer to the 
general public’s belief and the fact that most cases against members of the KMT 
will either be reduced to a lesser charge or the defendants will ultimately be 
acquitted.  On the other hand, if the defendant is from a political adversary of the 
KMT, the outcome of the trial will be quite different.58 Former President Chen 
Shui-Bian was charged with corruption forty-five minutes after his term ended as 
president and was then taken into custody five months after Ma Ying-Jeou took 
office as president. Chen remained in jail without bail while no charges were filed 
for a year. Chen and the first lady, along with ministers of his administration, 
were then convicted of corruption and sentenced to life in prison, while KMT 
officials who engaged in similar behavior remained free.59 The concept of 
separation of powers under the ROC constitution, unlike the Western democratic 
system it mimics, did not create a system of checks and balances. The heavy 
influence of the executive branch on the Legislative Yuan and the partisan nature 
                                                             
57 “????, ???? (Dan-Quan Guo-Guan, Lo-Quan Bei-Guan)” and “????, ????, 
???? (Yi-Shen-Chun-Pan, Er-Shen-Jian-Ban, San-Shen-Bu-Xuan.” 
58 In 2008 and 2009, academics and politicians in the United States, Australia, and United 
Kingdom signed five separate letters to the newly elected president, Ma Ying-Jeou, urging 
transparency of the judicial process and the release of former President Chen Shui-Bian, who has 
been held without specific indictment for more than a year. In September of 2009, Chen was 
convicted of corruption but is still being held at Tu-Cheng Prison while he waits for his appeals.  
59 James Soong, the KMT presidential candidate, former governor of Taiwan, and chairperson of 
the People First Party, was accused of taking campaign contributions and special funds for the 
governor and transferring the funds to his personal account. The scandal caused Soong to lose the 
presidential seat in 1997, but Soong was never charged with any crime. In addition, Ma Ying-Jeou 
himself was also charged with the same crime when he served as Mayor of Taipei. Ma was 
acquitted, even though his banking records indicated that he had directly deposited special 
mayoral funds in his wife’s personal account. 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of the Legislative Yuan prevented the opposition from effectively implementing 
legislation of its choosing. The judiciary and officers of the courts often arrest, 
charge, and convict members of the political opposition. Even if members of the 
KMT opposition are found not guilty, they have already been tied up in the court 
processes for years. Moreover, the KMT party cells within each branch facilitate 
the interactive, mutually sustaining workings of the branches, and the national 
institutions  serve as safety valves for the KMT.  
The Examination and Control Yuan as Recruitment Tool and the “Big Brother” 
The first three Yuans were designed as and have fulfilled the role of 
cultivators of routines, procedures, and norms of national institutions. In addition 
to the previously mentioned three yuans, the latter two yuans, Control and 
Examination, were developed to be tools of recruitment and monitoring agencies 
of potential KMT members and government officials. Both yuans were inspired 
by the Chinese imperial bureaucracy of examination and the disciplinary agency 
of accountability and virtue.  
The Control Yuan was established to serve as a governmental watchdog 
and was modeled after the Imperial Censorate in dynastic China. The Control 
Yuan possesses remarkable power and can impose tremendous pressure on 
government officials. The Control Yuan retains the powers to impeach, censure, 
and audit all government officials, including the Executive Yuan and its ministries. 
The Control Yuan also manages the Ministry of Audits and has the power to 
investigate any public official based on complaints from the public. The twenty-
nine members of the Control Yuan and the minister of the Control Yuan are 
 
 
67 
appointed by the president and confirmed by the Legislative Yuan. In effect, the 
Control Yuan has been serving as a tool for the KMT to surveil activities of 
government officials and party members. Since the Control Yuan does not have to 
reveal the source of complaints, the official who is the subject of censure is 
essentially at the mercy of the yuan and its members. For example, one of the 
most recent controversies surrounding the power of the Control Yuan was sparked 
by the censuring of the minister of the Government Information Office and 
Taiwan’s representative to Germany, Hsieh Jhy-Wey, along with other 
government officials under the previous DPP administration, based on allegations 
of corruption and misusing governmental funds. Opposition to the KMT claimed 
that the Control Yuan was merely a mechanism utilized by the KMT to harass and 
intimidate those who held government positions under the DPP administration. 
Furthermore, the opposition also accused the current president of only appointing 
those he knew would not actively investigate corruption and fraud involving his 
government officials. Moreover, the Legislative Yuan also made it extremely 
difficult for non-KMT presidents to exercise control power. For example, when 
President Chen Shui-Bian submitted his list of Control Yuan members to the 
Legislative Yuan for approval, the KMT-dominated Legislative Yuan refused to 
approve any of the members on the list.  
 The Examination Yuan, like the Control Yuan, emerged out of Chinese 
tradition. The Examination Yuan is responsible for writing and administering 
what is similar to civil service exams in the United States. To Sun and the 
founders of the ROC, the examination function and the merit-based selection of 
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government officials and bureaucrats was so important that it deserved a separate 
branch of government to oversee it. The Examination Yuan is also responsible for 
recruiting and screening applicants for government services.    
 Critics of the Examination Yuan claim that the exams were deliberately 
constructed to benefit mainlander applicants, including the usage of the Mandarin 
language and the exams’ emphasis on Chinese culture, geography, and history. 
Since the Examination Yuan is also responsible for job qualifications, job security, 
and retirement benefits, the Examination Yuan possesses the overarching power 
to hire or fire those who are supportive or unsupportive of the KMT. In other 
words, the Examination Yuan is responsible for hiring almost all members of 
Jungongjiao.60 As a result, during the fifty-year KMT dominance, the majority of 
the members of the Jungongjiao were mainlanders or the children of mainlanders, 
and those Taiwanese who passed the civil service exams and served as public 
officials adopted similar habits, including their voting preferences, in order to 
guarantee job security, retain positive evaluations, and receive handsome 
retirement benefits. As former Government Information Office Minister Shieh 
Jhy-Wey once exclaimed, “The biggest cult in Taiwan is Jungongjiao!”61 
According to Dafydd Fell, “The political loyalty [to the KMT] of these sectors 
was [also] rewarded with a generous system of social welfare benefits, which 
stood in stark contrast to the complete lack of welfare provisions for most of the 
other occupational groups.”62 For instance, one of the most contentious benefits 
                                                             
60 As the previous chapter indicates, Jungongjiao(???) is a name given to those who are 
members of the military, the education sector and civil services. 
61 Shieh Jhy-Wey at the March 16, 2008, Highfive Rally in Taipei, Taiwan. Attended by author.  
62 Fell, 2005, 10. 
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includes the Jungongjiao’s 18% savings, retirement benefits, tax exemption, and 
now even funeral funds for those who served in the ROC military during the 
Chinese Civil War.  
Most Taiwanese refer to the interest and welfare benefits the members of 
the Jungongjiao receive as “18-pa,” meaning “eighteen percent.” Jungongjiao 
members are allowed by law to receive an 18% fixed interest rate on their savings 
accounts. In addition, Jungongjiao members can also receive their retirement 
funds as a lump sum with 18% fixed interest regardless of the economic situation 
of the country. During the eight-year DPP administration, DPP legislators and 
party members aggressively lobbied for the abandonment of 18-pa; however, the 
Pan-Blue-dominated legislature refused to pass such a measure. The Legislative 
Yuan finally made modifications under extreme public pressure to reduce the 
number of the Jungongjiao who are able to enjoy such benefits; however, the 
benefits were never eliminated and are still in place as of today.63 According to 
the Central Personnel Administration, retired members of the Jungongjiao who 
were receiving the 18% savings benefit totaled 410,000, with Jun (members of the 
military) totaling 190,000, Gong (civil servants) totaling 60,000, and Jiao 
(teachers) being 150,000. On the other hand, the Ma administration restored the 
original benefits for the Jungongjiao in 2010, and every member is now entitled to 
all benefits. In addition to the savings and retirement benefits (unlike the United 
States, which has tax-free grocery stores only on military bases), members of the 
civil service, public school system, and the military can all shop at specialty tax-
                                                             
63 During the DPP administration in 2006, the Jungongjiao benefits were being modified so that 
the 18% only applied to those who retired; however, the Ma administration restored the original 
benefit of 18% in 2010.  
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free stores throughout the cities and enjoy reduced pricing and tax-free products. 
Therefore, most members of the Jungongjiao become what scholars have labeled 
“iron voters” for the KMT. The villages and public housing units where the 
members  the Jungongjiao reside are called “iron vote areas.”64  
The two government branches inspired by ancient Chinese tradition 
inadvertently assisted in maintaining the political space for the KMT, even after 
democratization, by providing the vote share the party needed in order to sustain 
itself in the new competitive political environment. The operation of the Control 
and Examination Yuans created “iron vote areas” for the KMT by generating a 
political and social environment in which those who support the KMT policy, 
ideology, and teachings ultimately receive greater benefits than those who do not. 
Therefore, as the previous section demonstrated, the Constitution of the Republic 
of China institutionalized the KMT party-state and the blurring of the line 
between the state and the party. The KMT essentially is able, in combination with 
fluid programmatic platforms, to infiltrate all levels of government while 
employing its coercive power from the traditionally Pan-Blue-dominated 
Legislative Yuan by fiddling with constitutional design and electoral rules to 
achieve the necessary electoral advantage while maintaining solid support from 
the iron voters.  
 In all, the Constitution of the Republic of China supplied the Kuomintang 
with the institutional establishment that helped maintain and sustain the party 
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through the passage of important legislation at critical junctures to guarantee the 
party’s political influence and space. The ROC constitution also put in place 
institutions at the national level embedded with party cells for maintaining and 
recruiting those who would ultimately remain loyal to the party in the long run 
and for preventing the political opposition from obtaining positions within the 
governmental bodies as well. The ROC constitution not only endowed the KMT 
with the ideological basis to portray the party to the constituents as the political 
party that advocates democracy, it also furnished the KMT with levels of 
institutional support. The procedures, routines, and norms established and 
embedded within the five government branches serve as safety valves for the 
KMT. Because of constitutional design, the KMT is able to keep its deep 
entrenchment within government bodies, monitor behaviors of party members and 
punish them if necessary, and recruit new party members and create iron voters.  
Institutional Effects of KMT Programmatic Flexibility and Electoral Success  
After democratization, the KMT was faced with the challenge of 
constructing a solid, coherent political platform to complete with other parties for 
votes. The KMT needed to address salient campaign issues that political parties 
from industrialized democracies must address and pitch to voters: the issues of 
social welfare, the economy, and class relations. The Kuomintang needed to 
become as ideologically and programmatically flexible as other democratic 
parties in order to remain politically significant and maintain support. As the 
KMT moved away from its original claim to unify all of China’s lost territories, 
the KMT then found itself having to turn to the indigenous population originally 
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oppressed by the party as a source of support and legitimacy. The KMT’s decision 
to adopt a flexible ideological and social policy platform would not have 
translated into electoral success if the national institutions were not as mutually 
supportive and interactive as the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan in 
implementing the political platforms of the Kuomintang while bypassing the 
opposition. The KMT was thus able to weather the constraints and criticisms it 
encountered as a result of anti-Chinese sentiment espoused by the emerging 
Taiwanese identity, and the opposition’s characterization of the Kuomintang as a 
resource-extracting, authoritarian, imposing, foreign colonial ruler. The 
Kuomintang was then able to transform itself into a pragmatic party, characterized 
by inclusionary or aggregative policies, and successfully counter the constellation 
of forces with which it had to bargain.65  
The 1991 National Assembly Election—Legislative and Executive Yuans Shaping 
Electoral Victory 
 The 1991 National Assembly election was the first full democratic 
election in Taiwan. All of the parliamentarians of the first National Assembly 
were forced to retire at the end of 1991, and the 1991 National Assembly election 
was for the voters to elect 225 new parliamentarians. An additional 100 seats were 
to be appointed by the political parties to fill at-large seats and to represent 
members of the overseas community. The 1991 elections were the first in which it 
was possible to broadcast campaign advertisements on television. After 
experiencing the four highly publicized events mentioned in the previous section, 
and with the KMT’s political legitimacy under severe scrutiny, the DPP went 
                                                             
65 Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 
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forth with its “Taiwan for Taiwanese” platform with full force. The DPP called 
for a Republic of Taiwan (ROT) and a new Taiwan constitution. Even though the 
DPP would later split into factions that advocated aggressively pushing for 
Taiwan independence and those who were more moderate, in 1991, the DPP party 
headquarters and the candidates all campaigned under the platform of Taiwan 
independence and the call for the voters to drive foreign authoritarianism out of 
Taiwanese politics. This radicalization culminated when the DPP passed the 
Taiwan Independence Clause to add to the Party Charter. The clause states,  
The DPP’s position on Taiwan’s future is the “people’s self-determination,” and it 
maintains that all inhabitants should jointly determine their common destiny. As 
Taiwan’s largest opposition party, the DPP has the responsibility to reflect the aspirations 
of the masses of society, to vigorously try to obtain accelerated implementation of 
constitutional government reform, and to avoid Taiwan’s losing its way in the abyss of 
unification.66  
The DPP party headquarters then released a television ad with the on-screen 
slogan “Let us establish a sovereign, independent Republic of Taiwan.”67 Many of 
the candidates gave their individual campaigns similar titles. For example, Lin 
Cho-Shui (???), one of the senior DPP legislators, ran under the slogan, “ROT 
defeats ROC” in 1991.”68. Wu Ming-Yang (???) called on the voters to write 
ROT on their international mail to show the world that the Taiwanese deserved a 
republic of their own instead of the defeated residue of the Republic of China.69 
The DPP also attacked the KMT’s reunification policy with China by claiming 
that unifying with the poor and backward China could only hurt Taiwan. 
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Resolution of the DPP National Party Congress, October 7, 1990. 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Under the old Central Election Committee rule on television ads, the characters for “Taiwan” 
were blacked out of the DPP ad, so the ad broadcast on television only showed the characters for 
“Let us establish a sovereign, independent republic.” 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“ROT Defeats ROC” (???????????), Liberty Times, December 14, 1991, 1 
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Liberty Times, December 11, 1991, 1. 
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 The KMT dealt with the opposition’s harsh attack by leaping to the 
offensive with several bold moves. First, the KMT did not formally sever itself 
from the original ideology of reuniting all China and establishing a Chinese 
Republic, but President Lee Teng-hui issued a statement, with the support of the 
premier and the Legislative Yuan, stating that due to the changes in the 
international environment, the growing strength of the PRC, and the increase of 
cross-strait interaction, there was a need for creating an institution to handle 
mainland affairs. Lee then established the Presidential Advisory Council on 
Mainland Affairs in September of 1990. A few months later, in January of 1991, 
the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) was established by the Executive Yuan and 
its funds were provided by the Legislative Yuan. On March, 1991, the Executive 
Yuan approved the council’s National Unification Guidelines. The guidelines 
established three preconditions for unification: democracy, liberty, and equal 
prosperity on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The MAC and the national 
Unification Guidelines were implemented in order to send a direct message to the 
voters that the leaders of the KMT were dedicated to the promoting and 
maintaining democracy and liberty. In addition, Lee argued that the establishment 
of the MAC was a clear indication that Taiwan, although under the official name 
of ROC, was already an independent country run by a Taiwanese president.70 In 
Lee’s acceptance speech as party chairman, he stated,  
A leader of this county, I have upheld the ideal of popular sovereignty. This is also the 
principle advocated by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen. The people of our society already have a strong 
awareness of popular sovereignty today. We all possess the aspiration to be masters of 
this state . . . we have just begun to practice democratic government, and our 
institutionalization process has not caught up with democratic development. Therefore, 
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we must admit that different opinions exist in this society, which affect the formation of a 
symbiotic community. This goal can only be achieved through our mutual understanding, 
cooperation, wisdom and tolerance and brotherly love.71 
In April of 1991, Lee ended the Temporary Provisions that had circumvented the 
granting of full civil and political rights to citizens. In the following month, just a 
few months before the National Assembly election, Lee went further and canceled 
the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion, officially 
ending China’s civil war. Lee also forfeited the ROC claim to be the rightful 
government of all China with an amendment passed by the Legislative Yuan 
modifying the territory of the ROC to include Taiwan, with the capital in Taipei. 
Instead, the Executive Yuan then promoted the platform that China was divided 
into two areas, under the jurisdiction of two states. In addition, the KMT also 
campaigned under the slogan “reform, stability and prosperity” and claimed credit 
for Taiwan’s economic and political successes to date. The KMT was careful in 
constructing its television advertisements, so that the ads did not remind the 
constituents of the authoritarian era. Instead, the television ads portrayed the 
KMT as an “experienced, responsible political party with enough flexibility for 
reform.”  It also advocated the idea that the constituents should view the KMT as 
a “faithful old friend.” “The protective and nurturing role of the KMT was 
illustrated with the image of a naked infant boy lying on the rich blue expanse of 
the KMT party flag.”72 The ad underscored that over the past four decades, the 
KMT had helped Taiwan through many political storms and led Taiwan from 
economic, social, and political infancy to maturity. In other words, the television 
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ads depicted the KMT as the devoted guardian of Taiwan that would do whatever 
it took to protect Taiwan from external threats or from its own population, such as 
the advocates of independence.73  As former KMT legislator Mu Min-Chu pointed 
out in an interview, “We’ve not changed on [our stance on] national identity . . . 
we may have different methods.”74 The KMT also capitalized on the voters’ 
sentimental attachment to Taiwan’s first native-born president. Another featured 
KMT slogan stated, “To support Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui, please vote for 
the KMT.”75  
The combination of the KMT’s television advertisements, and President 
Lee’s actions prior to the National Assembly election and his interpretation of the 
status of Taiwan as an existing independent state run by a native president, proved 
persuasive to the voters. The 1991 National Assembly election was an electoral 
victory for the KMT. The KMT captured 179 out of the 225 available seats with 
71.2% of the overall 8.93 million votes cast. This entitled the party to appoint 60 
out of the 80 available at-large seats and 15 of the 20 seats reserved to represent 
overseas citizens. The DPP won 40 seats with 23.9% of the votes. The DPP was 
able to appoint 20 at-large delegates and 5 overseas representative seats. While 
there were still mixed feelings within the KMT on Lee’s way of adapting to the 
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new political environment, one thing was clear: the KMT had deflected another 
challenge posed by its opposition and the new democratic political environment.  
1992 New Legislative Yuan Election—Executive Push for Taiwan-Centered 
International Policies 
A year after the National Assembly election, the Taiwanese were due to 
elect a brand new Legislative Yuan. The last time the Republic of China had a 
Legislative Yuan election for the entire legislative branch had been in 1947. There 
were supplementary elections in between due to the Temporary Provision of the 
Constitution and the enactment of the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression 
of Communist Rebellion. The year 1992 was the first time in almost four decades 
when all seats in the legislature were contested.  
Lee Teng-Hui and the KMT headquarters made the decision to not restrain 
the KMT candidates who were challenging the idea of One-China. In addition, 
Lee and Premier Hau Pei-Tsun filed application with the United Nation to 
recognize Taiwan as a nation-state. The KMT legislative candidates also added 
“UN for Taiwan” as a campaign platform, while promising to amend the 
constitution to include the direct popular election of the president. The KMT party 
cells within the national institutions under Lee’s leadership turned a blind eye to a 
Taiwanese candidate within the KMT, who advocated the same ethnic stance as 
their DPP counterparts, that “Taiwanese should vote for Taiwanese.”76  While the 
Taiwanese legislative candidates from the KMT were energized by Lee’s 
encouragement to run campaigns that catered to the local population’s increasing 
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Julian Baum, “Building the Ballot: Enter a New Generation of Politicians,” Far Eastern 
Economic Review, October 1, 1992, 17. 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sense of Taiwanese identity, the campaigns also demonstrated to potential voters 
that the KMT was no longer the same “China KMT” or “Old K.”77 
 The Legislative Yuan election was held on December 19t, 1992. Voters 
were to elect 161 legislators for the Legislative Yuan. Thirty at-large 
representatives and six overseas representatives were chosen from lists submitted 
by the parties before the election. Similar to the election results of the National 
Assembly, the legislative election results gave the KMT a solid majority in the 
legislature. The KMT took 103 seats out of the 161 total seats in the Legislative 
Yuan. Twenty out of the thirty members of the Wisdom Coalition were elected. In 
addition, the conservative, pro-unification wing allied with the hard core old 
guard of the KMT also did very well. Eleven out of the twelve members from the 
New Alliance were elected. The results of the 1992 Legislative Yuan election 
demonstrated that by encouraging and supporting its members to adopt a Taiwan-
centered political platform and to campaign under a more moderate pro-Taiwan 
theme, the KMT was able to continue to obtain a majority when facing critical 
attacks from the DPP and the challenge of winning the trust of the electorate after 
the four atrocious events in the 1980s. The DPP also claimed political victory as it 
was able to capture fifty seats and 31.9% of the popular vote, which was more 
than it ever had; nevertheless, the KMT’s solid majority in the Legislative Yuan 
remained.78  
National Institutions and the Successful Invigoration of the Welfare System  
                                                             
77 “Old K” was the nickname given to the KMT by the Taiwanese. It signified the KMT’s 
ideological rigidness and fear of change. “Old K” also meant the king in the deck of poker cards. 
78Election results from the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University. 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 Prior to democratization, Taiwan’s welfare system modeled other 
authoritarian regimes, which were systems benefiting progovernment groups. 
According to Kirchheimer, political parties responded to changes in the 
socioeconomic structure by giving up on particular social groups that articulated 
relatively narrow interests.79 The “platforms of Volksparteien (people’s party) 
would have to be broadened as they attempted to transcend traditional economic, 
religious, and territorial divides.”80 Gordon Smith further concludes that the future 
of political party systems would be dominated by “parties free from the ballast of 
ideology and able to appeal to diverse social groups . . . whilst the old-style 
‘narrow’ parties would languish in gentle decline and pine away in helpless 
opposition.”81 Similar to political parties in Western Europe, as Taiwan 
underwent economic development and democratization, the KMT not only de-
ideologized the original party position only to uphold Sun and Chiang’s legacy, 
the party’s public welfare programs also underwent drastic transformation, so that 
they would become more and even all inclusive. Moreover, while pushing for 
several nationalized welfare programs such as the Universal National Health 
Insurance (NHI) to offer benefits to all citizens, the KMT also promoted and 
implemented different social welfare programs, such as contributory pensions, a 
welfare allowance for aged farmers, a senior citizens allowance, and a childcare 
allowance and paid maternity leave, targeting specific social groups. All the 
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Kirchheimer, 1990,  52. 
80 Daniel Hough, “The PDS and the Concept of the Catch-all Party,” German Politics and Society 
20, no. 4 (2002): 28. 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Gordon Smith, Democracy in Western Germany: Parties and Politics in the Federal Republic 
(London: Heinemann Press, 1979), 86. 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policies were drafted and proposed by the premier and then passed by the 
Legislative Yuan.  
 While identity constitutes the most divisive issue in Taiwan due to the 
country’s historical experiences, social welfare seems to be one of the most 
polarizing and salient issues all political parties in democracies must tackle. For 
example, the Republican Party since Ronald Reagan and the British Conservative 
Party under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher both campaigned under the 
platform of welfare state retrenchment and tax cuts. The debate over 
nationalization verses privatization of social programs amplified the left-right 
divide in many industrialized democracies in Western Europe and in the United 
States. On the other hand, it was the issue of identity that divided the political 
parties as well as the constituents in Taiwan. Following Sun Yat-Sen’s Three 
Principles of the People, the KMT should be considered as a party from the left. 
Conversely, DPP, the Democratic Progressive Party, is the political adversary of 
the KMT and has also been the advocate of equal rights, welfare, and fair 
treatment of all residents of Taiwan. Therefore, while many of the policies for the 
implementation of social programs are similar for the KMT and the DPP, the 
KMT, in collaboration with the Executive and Legislative Yuans, was the 
political party capable of passing the appropriate legislation, and thus obtained 
more votes by (1) maintaining the party’s iron votes by not reforming existing 
social welfare programs for the Jungongjiao, and (2) taking over and actually 
implementing DPP social welfare programs proposals. According to Sheng Shing-
Yuan, a political science professor at National Chengchi University, “Everyone 
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thinks social welfare programs are important, the people, the KMT and the DPP. 
People would vote for the political party they believe would give them what they 
want the fastest, so political campaigns on social welfare in Taiwan became who 
is better at issue-stealing and a race of legislative leapfrogging.”82 Even though 
initially both political parties undertook different social welfare issues, the KMT 
with National Health Insurance and the DPP with pension policies, the KMT was 
able to establish issue ownership of almost all social welfare issues by either 
proposing similar legislation or simply taking over the DPP platform on social 
welfare in subsequent elections. 
 “Eighteen Pa” and Maintaining the Iron Votes83 
 The specific social groups who benefited most during the authoritarian 
days of the KMT were those who were members of the military, civil servants, 
and public school teachers, all of whom had to pass the necessary exam 
administered by the Examination Yuan. Once admitted, members of the 
Jungongjiao were able to obtain public housing, subsidies for rent and utility bills, 
pension plans, tax breaks, and for those who chose early retirement, the 
government rewarded the decision by offering a fixed 18% interest for their 
pension savings. After democratization, the Kuomintang administration sought to 
create an inclusive welfare system to entice potential voters; on the other hand, as 
                                                             
82 Interviewed by author in Taipei, June 19, 2007. 
83 “18-Pa” which literally translates to “eighteen percent,” is the nickname given to those who are 
in the military, or who hold public civic positions, or who are educators (Jun-gong-jiao ???), 
by those who do not work in those fields.  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contentious and costly as the Jungongjiao benefits are and were, the KMT made 
no modification to such a beneficial system.84 
The origins of the Jungongjiao’s special benefits originated from the 
KMT’s transition to Taiwan in 1949. The KMT not only established an 
authoritarian state apparatus to prevent uprisings and the formation of political 
opposition, the KMT, while taking control of the military, also planted 
mainlanders to work in civil servant positions and to become teachers in public 
schools. In this aspect, the KMT acted very similarly to South Korea under the 
leadership of Park Chung-Hee. Both regimes utilized the implementation of 
welfare provisions to raise their political legitimacy and to formulate a welfare 
system benefiting progovernment groups. Since the 1950s and 1960s, legislation 
has been passed to ensure that the Jungongjiao communities receive the most 
extensive welfare provisions and benefits. This behavior correlated with the 
KMT’s attempt to implement public policy that would eventually create a China-
centered identity for indigenous groups as well as create political stability. Not 
only did the KMT offer high interest rates for the members of the Jungongjiao, 
the KMT majority in the Legislative Yuan also passed the Retired Public Servant 
Pension Lump Sum Collection Benefit’s Act,  the  Military Veteran Old-age and 
Maintenance Benefit’s Act,  and the Educators Pension Savings and Interest 
Benefit Act.85 According to the Central Personnel Administration, retired public 
                                                             
84 For example, in 2001, the spending on the Jungongjiao benefits alone cost the government 1.2 
billion USD. In 2008, the Jungongjiao spending was 2.3 billion USD. 
85Retired Public Servant Pension Lump Sum Collection Benefit’s Act (???????????
??????), Military Veteran Old-age and Maintenance Benefit’s Qct (?????????
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servants and educators who are currently receiving the 18% interest benefit total 
more than 129,000 . Retired military personnel who are currently receiving the 
18% interest pension benefit total more than 203,000 individuals. In other words, 
there are more than 332,000  individuals as well as their family members 
receiving benefits from the government-implemented Jungongjiao policies. 
Therefore, one would find the Jungongjiao and their family members to be “iron 
voters” of the KMT. Furthermore, according to Huck-Ju Kwon, the welfare 
system in Taiwan was so imbalanced that in 1991, 74% of the central government 
welfare expenditure was spent on the Jungongjiao.86 The DPP has always been 
extremely critical of the expenditure imbalance and advocated reform to get rid of 
the 18-pa and Jungongjiao benefits all together. However, the Executive and 
Legislative Yuans are protectors of the benefits for the Jungongjiao. Thus, the 
members of the Jungongjiao community are also considered “deep-blue” or die-
hard supporters of the KMT.  
National Health Insurance  
 As Kirchheimer argued, political parties will ultimately respond to 
socioeconomic changes by giving up their particularistic characteristics and 
articulating inclusive policy platforms to widen their electoral appeal.87 The 
National Health Insurance was one of the largest national welfare provisions 
implemented by the KMT under the leadership of Lee Teng-hui. After 
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Huck-Ju Kwon, “A Comparison on East Asian Welfare Systems,” in The East Asian Welfare 
Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon white and Huck-Ju Kwon, 
eds. (London: Routledge, 1998), 27–75. 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democratization, the KMT expanded the scope of its welfare provisions. The 
public was notified of the submission of the National Health Insurance bill to the 
Legislative Yuan by the Ministry of Health toward the end of 1992. After the 
KMT captured a legislative majority in 1992, the NHI bill was reviewed and 
passed by the legislature after two days’ discussion. By 1994, 60% of the 
population was covered by health insurance.88 “The most significant move away 
from the previous pattern of concentrating welfare on core-pro-KMT groups was 
the introduction of National Health Insurance in 1995.”89  The NHI is also a 
successful issue initially proposed by the DPP but was co-opted by the KMT, and 
Lee Teng-Hui captured 54% of the votes in the first democratic presidential 
election in Taiwan. 
 Throughout the 1980s, one of the policy reforms advocated by the 
Dangwai Movement and then the DPP was the creation of a healthcare system for 
all residents of Taiwan. The advocacy of a nationalized healthcare system was to 
elucidate the preferential treatment pro-KMT groups received. While Lee and his 
Mainstream Faction continued to receive support from the overall population, the 
plan to pass the National Health Insurance program by 2000 was pushed forward 
to 1995 with direction from the Executive Yuan and the support of the Legislative 
Yuan. Within the first year of the passage of the NHI bill, the government 
managed to insure 95% of the population. The percentage of the population 
covered by the NHI increased approximately 1% per year until the percentage 
reached 98%. According to William Hsiao, professor of economics at the Harvard 
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School of Public Health and one of the healthcare advisors to the Taiwanese 
government, “They had trouble with the last 2 percent, because some were living 
overseas and others were homeless. The government literally sent people to find 
homeless under the bridges and enroll them. Now they have close to 99 percent 
coverage.”90 With the legislative majority, the KMT was able to pass the NHI bill 
after only two or three days of debate, taking ownership as well as the credit for 
the proposal that originated with its political opposition. The NHI turned out to be 
extremely popular with the population, with more than a 70% satisfaction rating.91 
 According to Dafydd Fell, in 1992, the KMT placed a number of 
television ads promoting its plan to introduce the NHI. “As soon as NHI came 
into operation . . . the KMT began to trumpet its successful implementation.”92 
One of the most influential television commercials on the NHI was during the 
1998 legislative election. In a television ad titled “Capability of the KMT Led 
Government,” the ad compared the KMT’s success in introducing the NHI to the 
failure of Bill Clinton’s healthcare program.93 The NHI ad featured the members 
of the Legislative Yuan and hailed them as champions of ordinary citizens. The 
NHI has been one of the accomplishments the KMT utilizes in every election to 
demonstrate the effectiveness and capability of the party in implementing welfare 
policies beneficial to the population.  
The KMT Takeover of the DPP “Welfare State” 
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Anne Underwood, “Health Care Abroad: Taiwan,” New York Times, November 7t, 2009,  
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 The term welfare state was also originally introduced by the DPP in 1992. 
In the 1992 Legislative Yuan election the DPP proposed the concept of turning 
Taiwan into a state of welfare, “fu li guo” (???). Initially, the DPP proposal 
targeted the elderly as a strategy to entice potential voters. The DPP proposed 
“old-age pensions” (????) and linked the old-age pension proposal to the 
existing ethnic cleavage in Taiwan. The DPP criticized the existing KMT welfare 
policy on the elderly by accusing the KMT of only taking care of old Chinese 
Civil War veterans. Since the Asian value of filial piety was still very prevalent in 
Taiwan, most couples, at one time or another, would face the burden of raising 
children as well as taking care of their elderly parents. Sensing that the old-age 
pension plan might also be very popular amongst electorates, the KMT launched 
an offensive; on the one hand, they attacked the DPP for making campaign 
promises to voters that the party could not keep due to the party’s lack of control 
in the Legislative Yuan; on the other hand, the KMT legislators rushed to draft 
their own bill, the Senior Citizen Allowance (??????), which was almost 
identical to the bill proposed by the DPP. The Senior Citizen Allowance promised 
to pay NT$5,000 per month to the elderly sixty-five years of age or older. In 
addition, the KMT then turned and accused the DPP for the party’s unwillingness 
to take care of war veterans by stating that the battle involving pensions and fixed 
interest provisions is a battle no soldier can afford to lose.94 
 While the election results demonstrated that the KMT takeover of the 
DPP’s proposed welfare provisions was successful, the KMT then expanded the 
                                                             
94 Chien-Te Tu,  interviewed by author June 14, 2007, in Taipei, Taiwan. 
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target social groups by proposing the Welfare Allowance for Aged Farmers (Lao-
Non-Jin-Tie????) in 1997. The implementation of the Welfare Allowance for 
Aged Farmers plan permitted farmers age sixty-five or older to receive NT$ 3,000 
per month to subsidize living costs. By 1999, the welfare plan had seven hundred 
and three thousand recipients.95 Many KMT legislators, mostly Taiwanese 
members of the party, were very supportive of the welfare provisions proposed by 
the party due to the agricultural background of the Taiwanese. The Welfare 
Allowance bill did not receive any opposition when passed, even from the DPP. 
The DPP, as the emerging political party, could not afford negative publicity and 
risk losing votes. The KMT thus continued to expand its welfare provision to 
family-oriented plans to attract women voters and younger couples who are 
looking to purchase their first house or having their first child. For example, 
during the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections, the KMT proposed the Better 
Environment for Kids Plan (??????,??????). The proposed plan 
offered newlywed couples NT$2 million to mortgage their first house with 0% 
interest. In addition, before their first child turns two years old, parents are 
eligible to receive 60% of their salary during paternal and maternal leave. If one 
of the parents is not employed, then the government would offer NT$5,000 per 
month for childcare until the child turns two. In addition, the KMT offered free 
public preschool for children under the age of five and subsidized tuition for those 
who chose to go to privately run preschools. Not only did the KMT platform 
cover regular families, the Executive Yuan also drafted legislation to increase 
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welfare benefits for families with special-needs children by establishing funds to 
pay for medication, rehabilitation, and counseling for special-needs children. In 
addition, legislation was also passed so that special-needs children receive free 
annual checkups. The Executive Yuan advocated a “family first” welfare program 
supported by the legislature and proposed more welfare provisions for (1) single-
parent households; (2) foreign-spouse households96; (3)special-needs families; (4) 
aboriginal families; (5) low-income families; (6)families of prison inmates; and (7) 
crossgeneration families.97 The KMT administration proclaimed that the welfare 
program needs to reflect the importance of family and family values, and that 
family should be the center of an individual’s life.98  
 According to surveys conducted by TVBS, 44% of those surveyed felt that 
the KMT valued public needs and opinions in 1999. The percentage increased to 
47% in 2002, 54% in 2005, and 55% in 2006.99  
Year 
Political 
Party 
1999 2001 2004 2005 2006 2007 
KMT 44% 45% 44% 54% 55% 47% 
DPP 61% 48% 47% 44% 27% 33% 
Table 1 on Survey Question: Which political party considers public needs and opinion as 
important to the party?100 
                                                             
96 In recent years, there have been an increasing number of Taiwanese men who are married to 
women from Vietnam, the Philippines, and Thailand. 
97 The Ma-Siew Welfare Proposal for presidential Election, 2008. The number of grandparents-
raising-grandchildren households also increased in the past decade in Taiwan. 
98 Ma-Siew Social Welfare Provision, 2008 presidential election. 
99 TVBS Poll Center, opinion surveys conducted in November 1999, March 2002, May 2005, and 
July 2006. 
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Furthermore, according to the survey conducted by the Election Study 
Center of NCCU, after the 2004 presidential election, 49.9% of the voters 
surveyed considered the KMT candidates more capable of dealing with economic 
and social welfare issues, whereas 33% of the voters surveyed considered the 
DPP more capable of dealing with economic and social welfare issues. In addition, 
39.1% of the voters surveyed considered the KMT more capable of bridging the 
ethnic cleavage in Taiwan’s society, whereas 34.7% of the voters surveyed felt 
the DPP was more capable. Moreover, 36.6% of the voters surveyed considered 
the DPP more capable of establishing political stability and 41% of the voters felt 
that the KMT was more capable of establishing political stability.101 The 
percentage of voters identifying the DPP as more capable and effective in dealing 
with economic and social welfare issues has increased to 11.2%, and the KMT 
still leads the DPP with 30%.?
Political Party Capability KMT DPP 
Economic and Social 
Welfare Issue 
49.9% 33% 
Bridging Ethnic Cleavage 39.1% 34.7% 
Political Stability 36.6% 41% 
Table 2: 2004 Presidential Election Interview102 
The examination of subsequent results of Taiwan’s national elections from 
1990 to 2008 demonstrates a causal relationship between the KMT’s ideological 
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Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, 2004 Presidential Election Interview 
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and public welfare programmatic flexibility and public opinion regarding the 
party. On the other hand, the KMT’s ability to deliver its campaign promises rests 
on interlocking national institutions. Instead of providing the checks and balances 
similar to Western democracies, the ROC constitution was written with the 
purpose of designating the Kuomintang as the political party for the Republic of 
China. Therefore, the five branches, while possessing different governmental 
powers, also were designed to support the KMT in establishing self-reinforcing 
procedures, routines, and norms. The KMT transformation from an authoritarian 
party into a catch-all party has proven to be effective and successful. Moreover, 
along with the branches of government, the electoral system is also another 
dimension of the national institutions that is essential to the Kuomintang political 
resilience. 
The Electoral System  
March 23, 1996, was a historical and triumphant day for Taiwan and its 
people. Despite the two antiballistic missiles deployed by the People’s Liberation 
Army on March 8 and 15 just twenty-five  miles outside of the ports of Taipei and 
Kaohsiung, over 75% of the island’s population cast their votes in Taiwan’s first 
direct election of the president ever. In addition to previously scheduled political 
rallies, block parties simultaneously broke out the night before the election. 
Thousands of people crammed the streets with their small party flags and election 
gear in support of their favorite candidates. The different colors of the party flags 
created an impression of swimming schools of fish as the crowd moved around 
and about on the streets of Taipei and Kaohsiung. The block parties finally 
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disbanded about forty-eight hours later. The festivities and excitement of the 
presidential election did not represent the first time Taiwan has experienced the 
practice of elections. Local elections were regular occurrences during the 
authoritarian era.  
The electoral system in Taiwan bears everlasting institutional significance 
to the political resilience of the Kuomintang. The electoral system in Taiwan in 
not only part of the national institutions contributing to the unwavering political 
dominance of the KMT, it also is an ineluctable part in the establishment of local 
institutions such as the grassroots clientele political environment and the tiao-a-ka 
phenomenon.  
According to Shelley Rigger, the Republic of China “crafted a variant of 
authoritarian government [that she calls] ‘mobilizational authoritarian.’”103   
Mobilizational authoritarianism, as Rigger states, is a form of authoritarianism 
that the institutions of the government used to encourage political participation by 
citizens, but they channeled that participation in ways that favored the regime.104 
One of the methods for the Kuomintang regime to channel participation was to 
create electoral rules that were beneficial to the dominant party. To experts on 
Taiwanese politics, the electoral system was nothing but peculiar; nonetheless, 
this particular system “permitted competition and broad participation in local 
elections under the ruling party banner.”105   
                                                             
103 Rigger, 1999, 7. 
104 Rigger, 1999, 7. 
105 Rigger, 1999, 21;Rigger, 2001, 41–44; Copper, 2009, 138–143; Bush, 2005, 164–166. 
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The KMT utilized the regularity of local elections to recruit grassroots 
leaders from wards, villages, and neighborhoods and then co-opt them into the 
party. In other words, the KMT did allow political space for local leaders and 
factions to compete for votes in the tightly controlled local elections; however, 
nearly all candidates were affiliated with the KMT, since under the Temporary 
Provision of the Constitution, no other political parties were allowed to form. The 
mobilizational authoritarian regime formulated by the KMT that solidified the 
party’s political resilience was multifaceted. First, it demonstrated to the domestic 
population and the international community that the party was adhering to Sun 
Yat Sen’s original intent of creating a democratic China. The Chinese Civil War 
was the sole reason the KMT had to suspend the democratic constitution; 
otherwise, the KMT would most certainly have channeled the public’s desire for 
rights and liberty into effective political participation. Secondly, the operation of 
the national institutions insulated the KMT administration from opposition 
challenges and public pressure and guaranteed that policymaking and 
implementation remained under the control of the party. Lastly, it created 
clientele and paternalistic electoral routines and behavior at the grassroots level 
and facilitated the formation of local institutions.  
The electoral system in Taiwan is referred to as Single, Nontransferable 
Voting in Multimember Districts or the SVMM system. The SVMM not only 
produced favorable electoral outcomes for the KMT, it also helped to shape 
political behavior and environment. As a result, the KMT and the Pan-Blue 
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coalition never lost the majority even with the loss of the presidency.106 The 
previous sections demonstrated that the interaction of the branches of the 
government enabled the KMT to be extremely flexible with its policy and 
program proposals during election years. The Pan-Green Coalition, led by the 
Democratic Progressive Party, originally intended to use the constitutional 
amendment and electoral reform platform to generate support from potential 
voters to compel the KMT to revise the constitution and electoral rules, so the 
electoral system could be more conducive to opposition success. The KMT and its 
Pan-Blue Coalition, in return, assumed the same position as the Pan-Green and 
also advocated for constitutional amendment and electoral reform.107 However, 
with the legislative majority, the Legislative Yuan passed a new electoral system 
that changed the SVMM to the Single Member District, Two Votes system in 
2005, which reduced the number of legislators by half, so the party can 
concentrate its resources in support of its legislative candidate and redistribute 
other funds to local institutions and the tiao-a-kas. The following section will 
elucidate the SVMM system and the KMT electoral advantage. 
The SVMM System 
The Single, Nontransferable Voting in Multimember District system was 
the electoral system in Taiwan prior to 2005. The SVMM was not only the 
electoral rule established by the constitution; it was also the facilitator of local 
                                                             
106 The KMT lost its legislative majority as a party in 2001; however, the Pan-Blue Coalition, 
which consists of the KMT, the PFP (the People First Party), and the NP (the Chinese New Party) 
still retained a legislative majority in the Legislative Yuan. 
107 The TSU, or Taiwan Solidarity Union, is the political party founded by former President Lee 
Teng-Hui after he was forced out of the party by other KMT elites. The TSU essentially has taken 
a more radical position on advocating for Taiwan independence. Along with the DPP, the coalition 
is called the Pan-Green Coalition, because green represents independence and is also the color for 
the DPP.  
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institutions: coalition building, clientelism, grassroots mobilization, and the tiao-
a-ka phenomenon.  
Most legislative districts under the SVMM system consisted of 
municipalities, townships, and cities, which fluctuated greatly in size. Most 
legislative districts consisted of a municipality, while districts of the National 
Assembly followed townships and city lines.108 For example, Taipei City and 
Kaohsiung City, two of the largest cities in Taiwan, were divided into two 
legislative districts, while the islands of Jinmen and Matzu were also individual 
districts.109 In order to provide equal representation of the constituencies, the 
number of legislators each district was allowed to elect was based on the 
population of the district. For example, the residents of another large county, 
Taipei County, were allowed to elect seventeen legislative seats; on the other 
hand, residents from the smaller peripheral municipalities were allowed to elect 
one legislator per district.110 Under the SVMM system, the candidate did not need 
a majority of the votes cast in large districts. As in the case of Taipei County, the 
candidates who ranked as the top seventeen vote getters were considered as 
elected. In other words, the candidate only had to make sure they garnered as 
many votes as possible, which also meant the bigger the district, the smaller the 
percentage of votes for a person to win. This also meant a candidate did not need 
an overwhelming number of votes to win. Some candidates were elected with less 
than 20%  of the votes.111 In addition, there was no limit to the number of 
                                                             
108 Rigger, 1999, 39. 
109 National Chengchi University, Election Study Center.  
110 National Chengchi University, Election Study Center, 1995 Legislative Election data. 
111 Rigger, 1999, 40. 
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candidates a political party could have. As the Central Election Commission 
reported, in the 1992 Legislative Election, one district in Taipei County had forty-
eight candidates competing for sixteen seats. The sixteen elected legislators each 
received less than 3% of the overall votes.112  
The SVMM system encouraged cooperation between candidates within 
the party and coalition building, which came in extremely handy when the KMT 
had to deal with its splinter parties, the PFP and the NP, after its 2000 presidential 
defeat and after the implementation of the new Single Member, Two Votes 
system. The SVMM electoral competition was not a winner-takes-all, zero-sum 
game. In other words, just because one candidate from a political party was 
elected, it did not spell defeat for the other candidate from the same party. As 
Rigger states, “SVMM elections have many winners, allowing the KMT to 
reward several factions in each district.”113 Essentially, in the SVMM system, 
careful coordination of candidates and campaign strategies was compulsory. The 
political party not only had to ensure that the largest number of its candidates 
received the necessary number of votes to be elected, the party also had to make 
sure one candidate did not receive the majority of votes. In essence, decades of 
electoral practice with the SVMM system gave the KMT innumerable 
opportunities to perfect its electoral strategy to reduce intraparty conflict. 
Furthermore, the SVMM system was rewarding to those who cooperated instead 
of competed; therefore, the system generated the expectation of cooperative 
behavior from party members and cultivated a cooperative tradition within the 
                                                             
112 Rigger, 1999, 40;  Central Election Commission, Report on 1992 Legislative Election.  
113 Rigger, 1999, 40. 
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party. Lastly, the political consequences of the SVMM system were that the 
system favored large political parties with the resources to mobilize supporters, 
provide incentives to tiao-a-kas, and manage its nominees.  
Over the years the KMT developed an effective strategy to ensure positive 
outcomes for the party. The concept is called “pei piao” or vote rationing.114 The 
pei piao method is best utilized when the potential votes garnered by the parties 
are of a larger sum.  In Taiwan, the tiao-a-kas serve as tools for the Kuomintang 
to estimate the number of potential votes the party would be able to receive.  Prior 
to election, the KMT secretary general, the director of the Organization and 
Development Committee, and party candidates and local faction leaders would 
meet to approximate the number of votes the KMT could capture in a particular 
district. According to the estimation, the KMT would then assign candidates 
according to responsibility zones created by the party. The creation of 
responsibility zones also instituted two campaign practices employed by the 
Kuomintang, which have remained strong and consistent until today. Shelley 
Rigger labels the practices “the two faces of political campaigns.” According to 
Rigger, there are the private and the public faces of Kuomintang political 
campaigns. The public face incorporates conventional campaign activities as in 
other democracies, such as political rallies, public speeches, posters, and 
newspaper ads.115 On the other hand, it is the private face of political campaigns 
                                                             
114 Pei piao (??) literally translates into “vote rationing” or “vote redistribution.”  The 
opposition alleged that the term “vote redistribution” bears an extremely negative connotation and 
was an example of the KMT’s corruptive nature.  
115 Rigger, 1999, 41. 
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that has proven to be most effective. The private face of political campaigns 
emphasizes and encourages the practice of clientelism.  
Strategically, the KMT would nominate only as many candidates as the 
party estimated it could elect, given the research on the number of available votes, 
the socioeconomic situation, and the demographics of particular districts. Before 
democratization, the KMT utilized the pei piao strategy to assign seats to 
conciliate factions and reduce intraparty competition. After democratization, the 
pei piao strategy enabled the KMT to assign the appropriate candidate the party 
saw fit for the district. The habit of the KMT, according to the director of the 
Organization and Mobilization Committee, was to nominate candidates for all 
available seats in large districts and leave room for opposition candidates in 
smaller districts in hopes of creating conflict between oppositions and provoking 
intraparty competition within the opposition.116 Official party nomination also 
ensured the votes captured by the KMT did not spread too thin. Once the list of 
nominees was created, the candidates then were responsible for mobilizing the 
constituents in their districts.  
There were several distinctive characteristics of the pei piao strategy and 
the responsibility zones. First, the candidates were assigned to zones in which 
they had good personal connections and in which their demographic profile, 
especially ethnic origin, matched the zones and, subsequently, the district. A good 
personal connection had been established through clientelism and by tiao-a-kas. 
Secondly, knowing the incumbent advantage, the incumbents were normally 
                                                             
112Te, Chien-Te, interviewed by author on 7/12/2007 in Taipei, Taiwan. 
 
 
98 
assigned to their previous zones. The assignment helped to further interpersonal 
relationships and the candidates’ taking root within the community. Third, the 
zones were created not only according to demographics; some zones were created 
based on the occupational makeup of the community; for example, candidates 
with familial or previous occupational ties with the Jungongjiao community were 
usually assigned to the responsibility zones where members of the Jungongjiao 
resided. In addition, candidates with labor or union backgrounds were generally 
assigned to areas where blue collar workers resided. According to Lin Yu-Siang, a 
former Taipei City council member and three-term legislator, the most difficult 
part of the electoral process was nomination, where he had to negotiate with party 
bosses and factional leaders, as well as potential candidates, for his district. “The 
Pei Piao strategy worked perfectly once you became a nominee of the district,” 
said Mr. Lin, “Your chances of winning are pretty high, because the party does a 
great job with grassroots mobilization.”117   
As Mr. Lin indicated, the electoral system was closely associated with the 
clientelism and the tiao-a-ka culture in the local electoral arena. While the 
political campaign signified the public face of electoralism in Taiwan, the private 
face of a campaign was cultivated and sustained by local institutions, which will 
be discussed in detail in the next chapter.118  
New Electoral System 
 In 2005, with 70% of public support, the Legislative Yuan voted 217 to 1 
to change the SVMM system to the One Member District, Two Votes system. The 
                                                             
117 Yu-Siang Lin, interviewed by author on July 10, 2007, August 10, 2007, and March 17, 2008, 
in Taipei, Taiwan. 
118Rigger, 1999, 41. 
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new system favored large, well-organized and disciplined parties and put the 
smaller political parties at a disadvantage.  In Taiwan, the well-organized and 
disciplined party is the Kuomintang.  The Democratic Progressive Party has been 
plaque by factionism since its founding and is still unable to rid the bitter division 
among its elites, which are nicknamed, “The Kings of Heaven”.  The factionalism 
of the DPP will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five.  The new electoral 
system reduced the total seats of the Legislative Yuan from 225 to 113 and 
increased the term from three to four years. In the new electoral system, 73 out of 
the 113 seats were directly elected by the constituents with 6 seats dedicated to 
aboriginals and 34 seats filled proportionately by the political parties with the 
minimum of 5% of the votes.  
In the first legislative election in 2008, none of the KMT splinter parties 
were able to obtain more than 5% of the overall votes to receive the opportunity 
to place one of their own members in a seat. The new system subsequently 
eliminated the splinter party problem for the KMT, while still placing the KMT in 
an advantageous position based on the party’s geographic strongholds.  
 The new electoral system is set up so each county has at least one seat. 
Small counties such as Yilan, Hsinchu, Kinmen, and Penghu, which now each 
have one seat, are traditionally KMT strong holds.119 Due to population 
distribution, northern counties now are divided into more districts with more 
legislative seats than the south. Geographically, constituents from the north 
generally favor the Kuomintang, and demographically, more ethnic Chinese also 
                                                             
119 Kinmen and Penghu are offshore islands of Taiwan and are locations of military bases; the 
residents are largely members of the Jungongjiao. 
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live in the northern parts of Taiwan. The south is traditionally labeled as “green” 
or the strongholds for the Democratic Progressive Party. With the new electoral 
system, the south, with a less dense population, has fewer legislative seats.  In the 
new electoral system, each voter casts two votes; one for the candidate and one 
for the party. 
 In the 2008 legislative election, partly due to the voters’ disappointment in 
former president Chen Shui-Bian’s admission to improper use of his campaign 
funds and the possibility of corruption charges, the KMT-led Pan-Blue Coalition 
won 65 directly elected seats, and the party received 55.9% of the overall votes 
cast for the party, which made the KMT eligible to nominate 20 members to fill 
the at-large seats. On the other hand, the DPP received 13 seats, and with 40.7% 
of the overall votes for the party, the DPP was able to put 14 party members in the 
remainder at-large seats. In all, the KMT was able to capture 85 out of the 
possible 113 seats, making the 2008 legislative election the most successful 
legislative election for the KMT to date. With election results like this, even if the 
Democratic Progressive Party won the presidential election ten weeks after, the 
DPP would not be able to push for any legislation, due to the overwhelming 
majority of the KMT in the legislature.  
Conclusion 
The electoral results indicate that the KMT has been extremely resilient 
since liberalization, and its agility grew after Taiwan became democratized. The 
arrangement of the national institutions is one of the essential keys to the KMT’s 
political resilience. The dimensions of the national institutions carried over time 
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established the procedures, routines, and norms conducive to the KMT’s electoral 
success. The five governmental branches are designed to be more cooperative 
rather than to counterbalance and check. Along with the electoral system and the 
established routine from the heyday of KMT party-state corporatism, the national 
institutions ensured the legislation advocated by the KMT was effectively 
proposed, debated, and passed at critical junctures. The successful adaptation of 
the KMT would not have come to fruition if it had not been for the safety net 
created by the institutions. Furthermore, party cells established during the 
authoritarian era also permitted the Kuomintang to keep its unshakeable 
entrenchment within governmental bodies, local governmental units, and 
grassroots organizations, while simultaneously engaging in active recruitment of 
potential supporters and monitoring party members and officials. The SVMM 
electoral system also facilitated the generation of unwritten sociopolitical habits 
and routines of clientelism. The pei piao strategy and the tiao-a-ka system became 
the foundations of voter generation for the KMT that continues until today. In all, 
having an adaptive and flexible policy platform can only get a political party so 
far. The policies need to be promoted, and the implementers and bureaucrats need 
to be loyal to the political party. The next chapter will illuminate the aspects of 
local institutions and their affect on KMT political resilience.
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CHAPTER THREE 
“SMALL SOLDIERS CAN ACCOMPLISH GREAT THINGS (?????)”1 
Local Institutions and KMT Political Resilience 
 
I am the go-between. I take care of the one thousand plus people living in my 
community. If the street light outside of your house goes out, I will do my best to 
help you. With my good relationship with Legislator Fei, he would have the lights 
fixed in no time – Huang Chung-Chuan, Head of Li-Chung ward, Xinyi District, 
Taipei City.2 
 
The previous chapter offered insights into the extent to which institutions 
at the national level contribute to the political resilience of the Kuomintang. The 
mutually reinforcing nature of the national institutions was what made the KMT’s 
decision to adopt its programmatically flexible platform possible at critical times 
during the political history of Taiwan. Moreover, the characteristics of the 
national institutions enabled the KMT to deliver to voters what the party had 
promised, prior to and after each vital election. Just as the habit of regularly held 
elections in Taiwan set the KMT’s authoritarian regime in an unintended direction 
and led to the populations’ demand for democratization, the routines and norms 
established by the national institutions created a protective and sustaining political 
arena for the Kuomintang and its enduring political presence and success. In 
essence, the national institutions designed by Sun Yat-Sen are like a fortress that 
guards the Kuomintang. Moreover, the ROC constitution was written as a safety 
valve and specified that the Kuomintang was to be the vanguard party of a 
democratic China; the dimensions of the national institutions made political 
conditions extremely arduous for the political opposition to challenge the existing 
                                                             
1 One of the slogans of the KMT Employees’ Union. 
2 Huang Chung-Chuan, Head of the Li-Chung ward, Shin-Yi District, Taipei City, interviewed by 
author on June 28, 2007, in Taipei, Taiwan. 
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political order, even when the population was granted rights to freely elect their 
political representatives.  
The focus of this chapter is to explicate the contribution of local 
institutions to the Kuomintang’s political resilience and competitiveness. The 
chapter contends that while the national institutions implemented the rules and 
norms for political players, the local institutions played the role of facilitators and 
cultivators of electoral supporter for the Kuomintang. Parallel to the mutually 
enforcing characteristics of the national institutions, the local institutions are also 
closely tied to the national institutions and the Kuomintang by party cells and 
grassroots leaders known as the tiao-a-kas.  The local institutions nurtured the 
culture of clientelism and paternalism that was part of the electoral strategy 
adopted by the Nationalist Chinese Party, which was seen by the Taiwanese as a 
foreign ruler, in order to capture votes from the ethnic majority. Furthermore, 
during the authoritarian era, the local institutions collaborated with the 
Kuomintang in allowing the Taiwanese majority to compete and participate 
politically in a controlled setting in return for incentives for the faction leaders. 
The Kuomintang thus was able to retain governing power and set public policy 
agendas. After democratization, the culture of local institutions remained, and the 
faction leaders maintained a stable relationship with the Kuomintang, as long as 
the incentives continued.  
Taiwan experts like Shelley Rigger argue that under the SVMM electoral 
system, Taiwanese politicians developed informal institutions for mobilizing 
 
 
104 
votes they needed to win elections.3 This chapter argues that local institutions in 
Taiwan are anything but informal. The local faction leaders and tiao-a-kas 
regularly engage in systematic mobilization activities in correspondence with the 
Kuomintang and hold community meetings at the request of KMT politicians. The 
relationship between local faction leaders and potential voters is more than 
informal. Local faction leaders and tiao-a-kas attend weddings and funerals of 
community members as favors for the families to showcase their connection and 
influence, but then request the return of such favors at election time. The mutually 
beneficial relationship is the norm of the local community; therefore, it should be 
considered as a set of institutions at the grassroots level, even though the roles of 
the political actors in these institutions are not written into the constitution. Most 
importantly, while national institutions guaranteed the preservation of the policies 
that kept the support of KMT’s iron voters, the local institutions were essential in 
cementing the relationship between the population and the Kuomintang by 
including the Taiwanese in the political system through closely monitored 
political participation. 
This chapter addresses three dimensions of local institutions and their 
relations with the KMT political resilience. The dimensions are (1) the necessity 
for grassroots mobilization imposed by the electoral system; (2) local factions; (3) 
and the tiao-a-ka phenomenon. Each of the dimensions is related to the others and 
they work interactively to sustain the source of their incentives, the Kuomintang. 
As stated at the onset, the national institutions compelled the KMT’s political 
adversaries to play the electoral game in accordance with the rules designed for 
                                                             
3 Rigger, 1999, 83. 
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the party; local institutions, thus, are the social and political structures that 
ultimately kept the KMT deeply entrenched in Taiwanese society and are the key 
to the KMT’s endurance after democratization.  
The Electoral System and Local Institutions 
The Kuomintang is one of the largest political parties in the world and is 
also considered the richest. At one point, the party assets of the Kuomintang, 
including public and privately party-owned enterprises, newspapers, publishers, 
television and radio stations, and even a movie studio, were valued at over ten 
billion US dollars,4 The strictly disciplined party culture and organization have 
kept party members in sync with party ideology and platforms. More importantly, 
the tremendous resources, especially financial, have enabled the KMT to sustain 
and maintain support by rewarding those who are consistent advocates for the 
party. The Kuomintang offers incentives in the forms of societal status and 
financial prosperity to local faction leaders and then to voters who support the 
party in elections.  
In order for the SVMM electoral system and the “vote rationing” strategy 
to be successful, close interpersonal relationships were required.  The intimate 
relationship between the Kuomintang, local faction leaders, and potential voters is 
the trifecta of electoral success. Those who are interested in becoming politicians 
are faced with the challenges imposed by the electoral system—in order for a 
candidate to be elected, mobilization from the grassroots level is imperative. 
Therefore, local faction leaders and tiao-a-kas bear the important task of 
                                                             
4 Michael Bristow, “Wealth Probe for the ‘Richest Party in the World,’” BBC News, October 26, 
2001,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1621048.stm. 
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providing the KMT and its candidates with the preferences of the constituents and 
the possible votes to be garnered within the communities, while also relating the 
KMT’s platform and policies to potential voters. The electoral system and the 
electoral routine and norms also help solidify the political legitimacy of the KMT 
by drawing the Taiwanese into the political system without completely 
relinquishing the power of agenda setting and policymaking to the constituents.  
Grassroots Mobilization Strategies 
 The electoral system is designed to favor the KMT. On the other hand, just 
having the national institutions designed to be conducive to a party’s electoral 
success is not enough. The political party in a democratic regime has to make sure 
potential voters keep voting for it. Over the years, the KMT developed an 
effective strategy to ensure positive outcomes for the party, and the strategy 
involved active participation of local community leaders. The concept is called 
“pei piao” or vote rationing.5 Candidates representing the KMT are selected by a 
committee consisting of the party’s secretary general or his representative, 
director of the Organizational and Development Committee, and local faction 
leaders. Once the party candidates are selected, the candidates are responsible for 
the mobilization of party supporters for themselves. Local KMT party offices are 
then directed to lend their support as the mobilizational units.6 It is also the local 
party offices that oversee and allocate resources to the responsibility zones 
                                                             
5 Pei piao (??) literally translates into “vote rationing” or “vote redistribution.”  The opposition 
alleged that the term “vote redistribution” bears an extremely negative connotation and is an 
example of the KMT’s corruptive nature.  
6 Chien-Te Tu, interviewed by the author, June 14t, 2007, in Taipei, Taiwan. 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assigned to the KMT candidate. Local party offices then communicate with local 
factions and entice them to endorse the party nominees.  
Local factions often engage in negotiations with each other, so members 
from each faction are able to share the spoils of an electoral victory. The members 
of the local factions consist of community leaders, residents who have resided in 
the community for generations, and gangsters. Some local leaders are often 
referred as “local snakes” by the residents of the communities.7 Local factions are 
different from the national institutions or the national party apparatus. Local 
factions are institutions created for the sole purpose of election mobilization. Even 
though members of local factions do have preferences of one candidate over 
another, almost all are affiliated with the Kuomintang.8 For example, there are 
two major local factions in Taichung, the Red and the Black. The Red Faction is 
headed by the current KMT secretary general, Liao Liou-Yi. The Black Faction 
leader is Chen Shui-Tan. During the nomination process for the KMT candidate 
for the mayor of greater Taichung, then KMT Secretary General Kim Pu-Tsun 
traveled to Taichung more than five times to request the support of both factions 
for the KMT candidate Jason Hu. Liao was then promised the position of 
Secretary General of the President’s Office in exchange for his endorsement of 
Hu. Liao then made a public statement with both Kim and Hu, proclaiming his 
loyalty to the KMT and his support of Hu. Liao also encouraged his grassroots 
members to campaign for Hu to guarantee Hu’s victory. Hu was subsequently 
elected mayor of Taichung on November 27, 2010.  
                                                             
7 “Di-tou-sher” (???).  
8 Chien-Te Tu,  interviewed by author on July 12, 2007, in Taipei, Taiwan.  
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Since almost all local factions have affiliated themselves with the 
Kuomintang, opposition candidates are viewed as pariahs and targets of local 
factions.9 On the other hand, as mentioned in the preceding discussion, local 
factions are also only interested in the spoils of an electoral victory; therefore, the 
Kuomintang garners loyalty from local factions as long as the party can supply 
local factions with rewards, whether they be political offices, monetary 
compensation, business deals, or just prestige within the community. During the 
authoritarian era, grassroots mobilization activities by local factions created the 
competitive political environment and the electoral routine for the party 
candidates and local residents. Even though all candidates were members of the 
KMT, the established habits of negotiation and cooperation allowed KMT 
candidates to fulfill their political ambitions while maximizing their own self-
interest through working with other candidates from the same party. Consequently, 
grassroots mobilization is a habit carried over from the KMT authoritarian era, 
when limited local elections were sanctioned by the party. However, this practice 
and the establishment of local factions became the key for the KMT to maintain 
its entrenchment and electoral support at the local level. 
Local Factions and the KMT Resilience 
 As the previous section indicated, local factions are vital to the 
maintenance of the KMT’s political presence. Local factions are also an enduring 
institution from the authoritarian era when limited elections were allowed. Today, 
the KMT still prefers to nominate faction-linked candidates, because not only 
does faction mobilization work, faction-linked candidates also require fewer 
                                                             
9 Chien-Te Tu, interviewed by author on July 12, 2007, in Taipei, Taiwan. 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mobilization efforts from the party center. According to Rigger, “Local factions 
are neither rational nor ideological; instead they exist to accumulate and distribute 
material goods and prestige (or ‘face’).”10  The local faction’s survival depends on 
its ability to create a bridge between the party’s power center and delivering 
goods to the voters. This also explains the extent to which local factions are slow 
to question the Kuomintang’s legitimacy as a governing entity or to challenge the 
political platform promoted by the party. Local factions are thus engaged in 
mutual back-scratching behavior with the KMT. The local faction helps the KMT 
promote its policy agenda, while the KMT reward the faction leaders with goods, 
financial gain, and political space for power. The incentives local factions desire 
most are not  about Taiwanese identity and national integrity advocated by the 
opposition party. Therefore, local factions continue to operate to endorse KMT-
nominated candidates, because a KMT victory means more goods, financial 
benefits, and political prestige for faction leaders. Furthermore, this also helps 
explain why the transition from social and ethnic identity to political identity 
never came to fruition.  
 “The Pillar Legs”—The Tiao-a-kas 
 The tiao-a-ka is often considered the most important person in local 
politics, sometimes even more important than the faction leaders. In order to 
become a tiao-a-ka, the person not only has to be influential and possess 
knowledge about the details of the community, the tiao-a-ka also needs to have 
the trust of community members so he can be the go-to person when community 
members have difficulties or complaints. Sometimes, the tiao-a-ka and local 
                                                             
10 Rigger, 1999, 85. 
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faction leader are the same person, and some tiao-a-kas also hold local political 
offices. Routinely, KMT party leaders, local faction leaders, and potential 
nominees meet to develop a nomination strategy based on the estimation of 
potential votes that the party is expecting to capture in the election. Election 
experts might be surprised by the source of the estimations in Taiwan. They do 
not come from academic institutions or polling firms. The source is the local 
grassroots boss or the tiao-a-kas. Tiao-a-ka literally translates into “small pillar 
legs” in Taiwanese. Tiao-a-kas are small columns or pillars often used at 
construction sites in Taiwan that are made of wood for the purpose of propping up 
the large structures under construction.  The tiao-a-ka brokers votes for the 
political party that is able offer the most incentives to them and to the voters, 
whether the incentives are material, political, about status, or psychological. In 
Taiwan, the KMT was and still is the largest and most resourceful political party 
and the party most capable of delivering incentives. During the time of an election, 
the tiao-a-ka is considered the most important person in a candidate’s local office. 
The tiao-a-ka, who is a member of the community and possesses detailed 
knowledge of the community, goes around, speaks to potential voters, and recruits 
support for the party that can offer the most incentives. In most cases, the party is 
the KMT. Most tiao-a-kas do not hold formal political offices. Some hold lower-
ranking offices in the local government. The value of the tiao-a-kas, as well as 
their political power, come from the high-ranking people they know and their 
ability to “get things done.”  
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 The tiao-a-ka is the personification of Taiwan’s local factions. The 
position and the responsibility of the tiao-a-ka are not written into the constitution 
or any local government by-laws. The tiao-a-kas can also be people who hold 
formal electoral positions such as the heads of villages, neighborhood, or wards, 
or official positions such as the heads of farmer, fisherman, or labor unions. On 
the other hand, a tiao-a-ka can just be the patriarch of a group of very closely 
associated neighbors or families, a prominent local physician, or even the coach 
of the local little leaguers. Initially, the KMT used the spoils of the party to entice 
and seek out local leaders, and as the local leaders become more willing to work 
for the party, the party then delegated greater sources for the tiao-a-ka and 
incentives for the tiao-a-ka to offer those who live in his responsibility zone. The 
tiao-a-ka is so essential to the KMT entrenchment of local politics that some 
scholars label them the most fundamental political institutions in Taiwan.11 
According to Rigger’s interview with the head of the China Youth Corps in a 
Kaohsiung County township,  
The County executive [representative] is much too busy to attend to every little thing, so 
she relies on people in the villages to help out. If someone has a problem and they want 
to see the county executive about it, first they go to the tiau-a-ka in their town, then the 
tiau-a-ka and the voter go to see the county executive together. That way the person is 
more likely to get what he wants. In recruiting people to be tiau-a-ka, politicians look for 
people who are influential in their communities, respected by local people, loyal to the 
politician and respectful in dealing with him . . . during election, the tiau-a-ka are the 
most important people in a candidate’s organization. They go around and talk to 
everybody and drum up support.12 
 
The tiao-a-ka is sometimes responsible for mediating disputes between local 
residents, and he is also the messenger to elected officials and constituents. 
                                                             
11 Fell, 2005; Rigger, 1999 and 2001; Copper, 2009. 
12 Rigger, 1999, 86. 
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According to an office-holding tiao-a-ka, Mr. Huang, from the Li-Chung Li in the 
Shin-Yi District in Taipei,  
I am the go-between for the residents of my li and the government. I take care of the one 
thousand plus people living in my li. If the street light outside of Mrs. Li’s house goes out, 
and she is concerned about falling when she goes out at night, she comes and tells me. I 
will do my best to help her. With my good relationship with Legislator Fei (the Legislator 
representing the Shin-Yi District), he would have the lights fixed in no time. No longer 
than a week!  That’s how good of a relationship I have with the Legislator. Sometimes I 
even provide help for the residents during tax season. The people who live here are just 
common working class people. They don’t know how to approach parliamentary 
members. My job is to provide a venue for people to voice their concerns and needs to 
their representatives and let the representatives relate the incentives of voting for them.13 
 
Moreover, Mr. Huang also allows the legislator representing his ward to 
come for a three-hour session every month to listen to the complaints and needs of 
the residents.  While Mr. Huang fervently denies that as a dedicated public 
servant, he bears no political party affiliations, his office is decorated with plaques, 
service awards, and commemoration banners from KMT officials, including the 
current president. A photograph of Mr. Huang and the current president, then 
Taipei City mayor, is framed and displayed in the most visible place in the office.  
The great majority of the ward heads are KMT members; for example, as 
of 1990, there was only one DPP-affiliated ward head in all of Taipei City.14 “It is 
very difficult for the DPP to entice these ‘pillars of community’ with limited 
financial resources,” states Taiwan elections expert Professor Liu I-Chou. “How 
is one going to offer the free folk dancing, flower arrangement lessons for the 
women and free martial arts lessons for the children when the party has no funds?  
The KMT has billions of dollars worth of party assets, and the companies owned 
                                                             
13 Huang Chung-Chuan, Head of the Li-Chung ward, Shin-Yi District, Taipei City, interviewed by 
author on June 28, 2007, in Taipei, Taiwan. 
14 Rigger, 1999, 88. 
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by the KMT are all profitable, so they continue to generate money on their 
own.”15. With allocation of campaign funds from KMT local offices, candidates 
are then able to elicit the help of local tiao-a-kas by offering them gifts, banquets, 
trips, opportunities on business deals, and cash. The term of enticing potential 
tiao-a-kas is called “tying the pillar” or “bang zhuangjiao.” After the tiao-a-ka is 
approved for the incentives, he then invokes his local connections to mobilize 
support for the political party. 
The business card of Mr. Huang demonstrates the deep implantation of the 
tiao-a-ka. Mr. Huang has several titles aside from the head of the Li-Chung Li. 
Among the informal, communitarian positions are (1) chairperson of the Shin-Yi 
District Dispute Resolution Committee; (2) chairperson of the Jen-Te Lion’s Club; 
(3) the Da-An District Cooperation Committee chairperson; and (4) the 
International Lion’s Club District 300 A2 chairperson. More importantly, on the 
back of Mr. Huang’s business card is a picture of him with a slogan, “Ah-Chuan 
invites you to come have tea anytime and help you resolve your problems.”16 
                                                             
15 Rigger, 1999, 88; Liu I-Chou,  Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the 
Election Studies Center, National Chengchi University, interviewed by author, June 2, 2007, in 
Taipei, Taiwan. 
 
16 “Ah-Chuan” is Mr. Huang’s name in endearing format in the Taiwanese language. The 
endearing format is mostly used by family members to address each other. One might add “ah” in 
front of the person’s first name as a nickname to demonstrate the closeness of the relationship. 
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 As one of the office-holding tiao-a-ka, Mr. Huang holds one of the most 
important positions for the KMT’s electoral success. In order to deliver the most 
accurate estimation of votes, Mr. Huang’s responsibility is to monitor his ward as 
closely as he can. Mr. Huang goes to the extent of having six closed circuit 
television monitors installed in his office, so he is able to observe views of the 
streets at the local police station. Mr. Huang is familiar with popular local 
hangouts and can easily identify the areas where supporters of the KMT or the 
DPP congregate. As Professor Liu points out, “When I go to the rural areas to 
conduct research on local elections, I often see members of the community 
congregating in front of local temples playing Chinese chess. You would also see 
the tiao-a-ka playing chess and having tea with the group, and the conversations 
often centered on local gossips and politics.” Through the friendships generated 
from chess playing and gossiping, the tiao-a-ka is able to penetrate the lives of the 
local population and cue the voters on how to cast their votes.  “I try to help the 
                                                             
17 Business card of Chung-Chuan Huang. 
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residents to become informed voters,” explained Mr. Huang. “I tell them the 
platforms of political parties, and I let them know the party that will come to their 
aid more quickly if they have any complaints.”18  
The tiao-a-ka is not only responsible for providing an estimate to the KMT 
central committee; he is also in charge of delivering the votes. Some were even 
rumored to hire local gangsters to intimidate residents into voting for the KMT, 
but the claims were never validated. Many voters accept the recommendations of 
the tiao-a-ka due to the close association of the tiao-a-ka and the community. This 
was especially true in the SVMM system when many candidates were competing 
and it was difficult to choose a candidate from the long list of candidates. The 
basis of this simple yet complex political institution, the tiao-a-ka, is benefits and 
services; also, the clientelistic relationship tends to form chains.19 A city council 
member or legislator might act as a patron for several wards, villages, or 
neighborhoods, while also acting as a client for the county magistrate or mayor. 
Thus, ward heads such as Mr. Huang would rely on Legislator Fei and other city 
council members to make sure complaints and needs are met quickly, and in 
return, he would encourage the residents to vote for Legislator Fei on the ballot. 
In addition, Legislator Fei would also encourage Mr. Huang and the residents to 
vote for the mayor, in this case Mayor Hau Long-Pin, who in return would 
pressure the city bureaucracy to take special care of the legislator’s district. The 
opposition has been consistently complaining about the preferential treatment of 
                                                             
18 Chung-Chuan Huang, interviewed by author, June 29, 2007, in Taipei, Taiwan. 
19 According to the Deputy Director of the KMT, the local offices provide “constituent services” 
or “shuan-min-fu-wu” that cater to the needs of local residents from pottery and flower 
arrangement classes, yoga/taichi lessons, to the representative attending or helping arrange 
funerals and weddings. 
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residents in districts supportive of the KMT; however, the tradition of clientelism 
puts a human face on the public service rendered, and the face of public service is 
the face of a KMT representative and tiao-a-ka.20 “The KMT is not a political 
party in my book,” as former Minister of Examination Yuan, Yao Chia-Wen 
annoyingly relates “it is a giant vote-generating machine. It plays dirty by 
dumping loads and loads of money into local ward lords, so they would help 
generate votes for the party. You know the Chinese proverb, ‘If one has money, 
one can even make ghosts work  
In addition to the chain of relationships, every service, or “fu wu,” no 
matter how automatic, is portrayed by the tiao-a-ka as a favor from the elected 
representative to a specific group. Mr. Huang regularly attends, and requests 
Legislator Fei to accompany him, weddings and funeral services. It is a 
Taiwanese tradition to invite well-known politicians or community leaders to 
attend weddings and funerals as a demonstration of the family’s “face.”. 
According to Mr. Huang, “If you have two requests for appearances, let’s say you 
received a red envelope and a white envelope, you always go to the white event 
(meaning the funeral).”21. Director Tu also agrees with Mr. Huang that he would 
encourage representatives from the KMT to attend funerals before weddings. 
Director Tu elaborates that it is always culturally easier to ask a person to “return 
the favor” by casting his or her vote for a candidate when it was the person’s 
loved one’s funeral the legislator or council member attended.22  
                                                             
20 Taipei City Mayor Hau Lung-Pin was elected with 53.8% of the votes. 
21 Huang Chung-Chuan, interviewed by author, June 29t, 2007, in Taipei, Taiwan;  Chieng-Te Tu, 
interviewed by author, June 12t, 2007, in Taipei, Taiwan. 
22 Chieng-Te Tu, interviewed by author July 12, 2007, in Taipei, Taiwan. 
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 Being a tiao-a-ka is not an easy job. A tiao-a-ka like Mr. Huang is always 
busy because of the numerous titles and responsibilities he bears. In addition, 
providing estimates and mobilizing votes for the KMT candidate allows the 
candidate to receive the fruits of Mr. Huang’s labor. In the clientelistic 
relationship, there are plenty of incentives the tiao-a-ka receives in return for his 
work in the daily grinds of ward life. First, the tiao-a-ka is rewarded with a  
prestigious position in the community, where residents have to go to him to 
resolve bureaucratic problems, disputes with neighbors, and even domestic 
quarrels. If the village or ward head has a very close relationship with the elected 
official, the better the chance he has to display his “face.” In the case of Mr. 
Huang, his work for the KMT has earned him and his ward a six-floor community 
center next to his own house. Mr. Huang can thus organize different types of 
classes and entertainment for the residents of the community as well as 
demonstrate to the residents his efforts to improve and provide for the 
community.23 Secondly, being a tiao-a-ka for the KMT is a show of good faith 
and loyalty to the party and helps aspiring politicians to secure of the KMT 
central committee and leaders. The former Minister of Internal Affairs and the 
current Secretary General of the President’s office, Liao Liao-Yi, was a very 
prominent tiao-a-ka in Taichung County. Many current legislators such as Yen 
Chin-Biao and Chang Wen-Shuo were both tiao-a-kas from Da-Jia and Yu-Lin 
Counties. Lastly, some tiao-a-kas work for merely emotional rewards. Due to 
some of the intimate friendships some tiao-a-kas have with politicians, the tiao-a-
                                                             
23 Mr. Huang hosted a big community banquet during the time of the author’s visit. He set up a 
special table for the author and the former deputy-director of KMT Legislative Policy Research 
and many others. 
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kas were able to accomplish special projects for their communities, such as better 
drainage for the village or roads. During the time of the election, the tiao-a-ka 
would then visit the constituents and remind them of the good that the tiao-a-ka 
was able to accomplish due to his friendship with the public officials. He would 
also remind them that they should cast their votes for the same candidate as the 
tiao-a-ka would. The incentives for the tiao-a-ka seem to endure even after 
democratization as the clientelistic culture of local politics continues to flourish, 
and the KMT continues to achieve positive outcomes in elections. 
 In addition to office-holding tiao-a-kas, socially and association-based 
tiao-a-kas are also very effective in raking in votes for the KMT. Social tiao-a-kas 
approach constituents via social and sometimes business networks. The heads of 
prominent and traditional families still possess great control over other family 
members and relatives. In Taiwanese culture, families represent reciprocity and 
filial obligations. Many patriarchs serving as tiao-a-kas issue voting cues to their 
family members and request their family members to persuade their friends to 
vote for the KMT. This also leads to another source for the social tiao-a-ka, 
friendship. Friendships are also greatly valued in Taiwanese society, and friends 
usually consult on another on issues such as voting. In addition to the socially 
based tiao-a-kas, association-based tiao-a-kas operate within established 
organizations, such as the Lions Club, the Rotary Club, Parent-Teacher 
Associations, Women’s Associations, Farmers and Fishermen’s Associations, 
Labor Unions, and even local folk-dancing groups. Since there are already KMT 
cells embedded within local associations, many tiao-a-kas are also party cell 
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members. As the director of the KMT Employees’ Union, Liu Chien-Sun, states, 
“My job is to advocate for the employees of the KMT and ensure they get the best 
benefits and protections as workers. Even though I am a KMT member, not all the 
employees are. I would tell them that the KMT is the best employer they could get, 
because of all the benefit packages the party is providing its employees, and it’s to 
their best interest that the KMT stays in power, so the resources don’t get cut off. 
The DPP has been scheming to bankrupt us since they became a party.”24  The 
Kuomintang realized that without party assets, the party would encounter 
tremendous difficulty offering material and monetary incentives to the tiao-a-kas. 
This is also the reason the Legislative Yuan has yet to pass the Sunshine Bill, 
which would have the KMT party assets audited and force the party to return 
properties and pay restitution to those the KMT took properties from during the 
authoritarian era. 
Conclusion 
The political resilience of the KMT requires the collaboration of the party 
and political institutions at the national and local level. While the previous chapter 
explains the role of national institutions and their contribution to KMT resilience 
as the foundation of governmental operations and electoral rules, this chapter 
elucidated the function of local institutions in capturing and maintaining electoral 
support for the KMT. In short, seasoned politicians with long-cultivated 
relationships with the local community have many advantages in the Taiwanese 
political system. In Taiwan, most seasoned politicians are also KMT members 
due to the country’s authoritarian history. The well-organized and financially 
                                                             
24 Chien-Sun Liu, Director of the KMT Employees’ Union, interviewed by author, July 10t, 2007. 
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wealthy KMT is still the only political party that affords the incentives required 
by local factions and tiao-a-kas and that retains  local party offices/cells to 
monitor activities at the local level. Therefore, the KMT, as the previous 
authoritarian party and the foreign governing entity, is able to maintain a mutually 
beneficial relationship with potential voters through the workings of local factions 
and taio-a-kas. 
As the electoral results indicate, the KMT has been extremely resilient 
since liberalization. Its adaptability grew after Taiwan became democratized. 
Some of the resilience of the KMT should be attributed to the institutions and the 
structure of the ROC government. The pei piao strategy and the tiao-a-ka became 
the foundation of campaigning, which is in practice today. In all, having a flexible 
policy platform can only get a political party so far. The policies need to be 
promoted and the implemented. Voters in democracies hold politicians 
accountable for empty campaign promises and understand their ability to remove 
the politician from office in the next election. The two levels of institutions in 
Taiwan took on the role of catalyst and shield for the KMT. They permitted the 
KMT to promote the party’s original democratic ideology and its flexible policy 
platform to targeted constituents groups. The next chapter undertakes the issue of 
identity and the extent to which the KMT has successfully dealt with its 
authoritarian past to remain politically resilient and has now again solidified its 
political dominance in Taiwan today.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
I LOVE TAI-MEI, TAI-MEI LOVES ME!– ???? ????!1 
The Development of Taiwanese Identity and Party Politics 
 
 
Taiwan is a society of immigrants. Whether early settlers or late arrivals, all of us 
cultivated this land by the sweat of our brows. Believing that Taiwan is ours, 
loving Taiwan and wholeheartedly devoting ourselves to its cause—these are the 
real significance of being Taiwanese. – Lee, Teng-Hui, acceptance speech as 
KMT Presidential Candidate, 1995. 
 
 The political resilience and success of the Kuomintang rests on the 
political institutions of Taiwan. The multifaceted institutions at the national and 
local level bestowed on the Kuomintang the ability to adapt to the changing 
political environment and become programmatically flexible. The national 
institutions established the habits and customs for political processes and assured 
the Kuomintang’s ability to propose and deliver legislation targeting specific 
constituents; local institutions, on the other hand, abetted the Kuomintang’s goals 
by providing the necessary electoral support that the Kuomintang needed to 
remain politically significant and then successful. The purpose of this chapter is to 
examine the extent to which the Kuomintang tackles the issue of identity by 
recasting itself from a foreign governing force to becoming one with the local 
population. While the Kuomintang is able to employ tiao-a-kas in districts where 
                                                             
1 The terms “tai-ke” (??) and “tai-mei” (??) were originally derogatory terms used by KMT 
politicians and the mainlander population in reference to Taiwanese young men and women. The 
terms bear the connotations of lack of sophistication, lack of education, and bad manners. 
However, the terms became popular in the late 1990s among youngsters and were used to express 
their pride in being Taiwanese. In 2005, a group of young Taiwanese musicians named their band 
Tai-Ke. This was an example of contemporary Taiwanese youths embracing the language of 
Taiwan’s oppressive past by using derogatory terms as terms of endearment toward each other. 
Younger Taiwanese often use expressions such as “You are very Tai” in reference to someone 
who is proud to be Taiwanese. Many commentators parallel the language movement amongst 
Taiwanese youths to the homosexual community, embracing the word “Queer.” “I love tai-mei, 
tai-mei loves me” is a popular phrase that emerged in recent years to emphasize the cuteness of 
Taiwanese girls. 
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material and power incentives are enough to garner votes, cities such as Tainan 
and Kaohsiung, where the Kuomintang committed the most atrocities during the 
White Terror Era, might require more persuasion than mere material or power 
benefits. This chapter argues that institutional advantage is also key to the KMT’s 
successful “Taiwanization” campaign. The chapter will first address the issue of 
identity discourse in Taiwan and within the Kuomintang, and the party’s strategy 
to resolve its internal issues under the Lee administration. The chapter will then 
examine the KMT’s attempt to mitigate negative public perceptions of the party 
and turn Taiwanese identity from being a challenge to its power to being an asset 
to its own resilience and political success. 
Even though the political opposition only brought up the issue of identity 
periodically in political debates, it is still the undercurrent that pushes political 
parties to adopt one policy over another.2 More importantly, the issue of identity 
is directly related to Taiwan’s foreign policy, national security, relations with the 
United States, threats from China, and the future of the country, in which all 
potential voters find significance.3 Ironically, the emergence of Taiwanese 
identity was the unintended consequence of the KMT’s authoritarian rule, its 
brutal crackdown on its political dissidents, and its tremendously slanted favoring 
of mainlanders. Prior to the KMT’s arrival in 1949, the Taiwanese or “Formosan 
Chinese” as addressed by Ambassador John Leighton Stuart, welcomed the 
                                                             
2 Policies like the KMT’s decision to maintain the 18-pa program while extending welfare 
programs to farmers, aged farmers, single-parent families, and some labor organizations.  
3 In the 2008 presidential election survey conducted by the Taiwan Election and Democracy 
Studies Center, 57.6% of those surveyed agreed that if Taiwan can maintain a peaceful 
relationship with China after it declares independence, then Taiwan should become an 
independent country. On the other hand, 58% of the respondents disagree that Taiwan should 
declare independence if China will attack militarily.  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arrival of the Nationalist Chinese and considered their arrival as the return to the 
motherland.4 However, the unfair treatment of the Taiwanese and the favoring of 
the Chinese created two separate and distinct identities between the 85% of the 
island’s population who had been residing on Taiwan for generations and those 
who arrived after the KMT’s defeat in China in 1949. Since then, political 
disagreements and debates between the KMT and its political opposition over 
policies can all be related back to the issue of identity—Taiwanese verses Chinese.  
March 23, 1996 was a historical and triumphant day for Taiwan’s 
democratization.  On that day, Taiwan held its first democratic presidential 
election.  The night before the election, thousands of people crammed the streets 
with their political party flags and election gear in support of their favorite 
candidates. The different colors of the party flags created an impression of 
swimming schools of fish as the crowd moved around and about on the streets of 
Taipei and Kaohsiung. The Kuomintang and its candidate Lee Teng-Hui were 
victorious. Lee garnered 54% of the votes and became Taiwan’s first 
democratically elected president.  
While it is natural to mark a country’s first democratic election of its chief 
executive as a historical moment, for Taiwan, February of 1993 marked another 
significant moment in the island nation’s political history. In February 1993, 
Premier Hau Pei-Tsun resigned after assuming office almost two years before. 
President Lee Teng-Hui appointed Lien Chan as the next premier. The end of 
Hau’s term as premier marked the end to the mainlander-dominated political era 
                                                             
4 Memorandum on the Situation in Taiwan, submitted by Ambassador John Leighton Stuart to 
President Chiang Kai-shek on April 18t, 1947. 
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in Taiwan. “The symbolic import of change is that for the first time since the 
Nationalist Party fled to Taiwan, in the aftermath of the communist victory on the 
mainland in 1949, the ROC [Taiwan] is governed by a president and a premier 
who are both Taiwanese.”5  
Defining “Taiwanese Identity” and the Identity Discourse in Taiwan 
The term Taiwanese identity should not be intermixed with and used as 
exchangeable with what some have labeled Taiwan nationalism. Moreover, the 
term Taiwanese consciousness is also too ambiguous to be used interchangeably 
with Taiwanese identity. The word consciousness implies a person’s simplistic 
awareness of his or her ethnicity, whereas identity is multilayered and does not 
derive automatically and naturally. Furthermore, the interchangeable usage of 
Taiwan nationalism and Taiwan identity, and the exaggeration of the effects of 
Taiwan nationalism by political pundits and the media, created the illusion that 
when over half of the island’s population identified themselves as Taiwanese, this 
identity automatically led to a certain electoral outcome in favor of a particular 
political party.   
The pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party and the Pan-Green 
coalition have consistently invoked identity in their political campaigns and when 
advocating for the independent status of Taiwan. While the Pan-Green coalition 
has claimed to be the protector and champion of Taiwanese identity, Taiwanese 
identity emerged from Kuomintang policies under the authoritarian era. In other 
words, this particular identity that is distinct from the Chinese identity 
                                                             
5 Alan M Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 
1994), 3. 
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materialized as an inadvertent result of the policies of control implemented by the 
KMT in its fifty years of authoritarian governance. For this dissertation, a 
Taiwanese identity means that a person recognizes that he or she is Taiwanese. 
As Taiwan began to liberalize then democratize in the late 1980s, the 
usage of the term Taiwanese began to emerge. It is unclear when and who first 
made reference to the residents of Taiwan as Taiwanese; nevertheless, tracking 
surveys from the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University show 
that from 1992 to 2007, those who identified themselves as Taiwanese increased 
from 17% to 44%, and those who identified themselves as Chinese decreased 
from 26% to 5%.6 In addition, the survey from the Elections and Democracy 
Study Center demonstrate that in 2008, more than half the respondents identified 
themselves as Taiwanese only.7 The survey findings coupled with the KMT loss 
of the presidential seat in the 2000 election gave way to the popularization of the 
concept known as Taiwan nationalism. The assumption derived from the 
emergence of Taiwan nationalism was that as the majority of the population 
identified themselves as Taiwanese, they would turn against 
                                                             
6 Data obtained from the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University during field 
research in Taiwan (July, 2007); Data from the postelection survey conducted by the Election and 
Democracy Study Center in 2008, obtained by the author. 
7 Data from the postelection survey conducted by the Election and Democracy Study Center in 
2008, obtained by the author. 
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the Kuomintang and reject the party’s unification platform. Most media reports 
and popular writings on Taiwan covered the increasing vote gain by the 
opposition but neglected to also highlight what has remained constant—the 
Kuomintang, while losing some votes to its political opposition, still managed to 
retain a legislative majority and kept the presidency until 2000, then recaptured it 
again by a landslide victory in 2008. 
Twenty years ago, when academics in Taiwan first posed the question to 
potential voters on whether they considered themselves Taiwanese or Chinese, an 
overwhelming majority of the population identified themselves as Chinese. 
Moreover, according to the survey, 34% of the respondents said they preferred the 
Kuomintang as the governing party.8 On the other hand, in the most recent and 
comprehensive survey conducted by the Election Study Center of National 
Chengchi University, 53% of those surveyed identified themselves as Taiwanese 
and only 4.8% identified themselves as Chinese.9 Moreover, importantly, 33% of 
the respondents still preferred the Kuomintang as the governing party.10 When 
survey participants were asked, “Do you agree that loving Taiwan means 
supporting parties like the Democratic Progressive Party?”11, forty percent of the 
                                                             
8 National Chengchi University, Election Study Center tracking survey on political party 
preferences (1992–2010). 
9 The survey was made available for this dissertation in January, 2009. The survey was accessed 
with permission from the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University. The survey was 
conducted June through  August, 2008, and the survey title is “Taiwan’s Election and 
Democratization Study, 2008—Presidential election.” 
10 In 1994, 12% preferred the DPP. In 2001, when the KMT lost the legislative majority to its 
splinter parties and the DPP, 25% preferred the DPP, whereas the support for the KMT dropped to 
18% with the support of the PFP (KMT splinter) at 14%. Most respondents in 2001 refused to 
identify their preferences. In 2009, 19% preferred the DPP, while 33% preferred the KMT. 
11 The term “bentu” is used to identify things, including political parties and cultures, that are 
uniquely Taiwanese. The survey question asked the participants if they thought loving Taiwan 
meant supporting a party that is “bentu”(??).  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participants disagreed. The survey results also demonstrated that the Kuomintang 
has consistently retained popular support, while support for its opposition swayed 
between 12% and 25%. Why?  This dissertation contends that the constant 
support for the Kuomintang is the outcome of the party’s efforts to, first, redefine 
the definition of Taiwanese, then recast itself as a political party of Taiwan, then 
adopt public policies that kept the mainlander population close to the State, while 
drawing and incorporating the Taiwanese majority into the political system.  
Obtaining the abovementioned goals would not have been possible if it 
weren’t for strict party discipline, the top-down governing nature of the party, and 
the mutually reinforcing characteristics of political institutions.  In order to 
understand the challenges posed by the Taiwanese identity, one must be familiar 
with the unique history of Taiwan and its relationship with the Kuomintang. 
Political History and the Origins of Contesting Identities  
 One of the most contentious issues for politicians in Taiwan is the issue of 
identity. The root of this difficult issue lies in Taiwan’s authoritarian past. Identity 
is defined as a mental construct based on social experience and driven by emotion 
attachment, and this position is not a carefully reasoned one. Identity is also 
multifaceted. In Taiwan, people have different notions about what it means to 
identify with a particular ethnic group, and this notion extends into social, 
educational, and generational categories as well.12  “If people possess a political 
                                                             
12 For example, Pan-Blue Coalition supporters have consistently used the phrase “two low, one 
high” (er-di-i-kao????) to describe opposition supporters who are predominately Taiwanese. 
The two lows are low socioeconomic stature, low education level. The one high refers to the age 
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identity regarding themselves and where they live, that subjective construct 
becomes an objective fact. They brand as outsiders or alien those who they decide 
do not share their identity . . . that too becomes an objective political fact.”13 The 
formation of identity is not always natural. Identities are invented or “the result of 
a political experience.”14 The formation of Taiwanese identity and the 
identification of “outsiders” began when the KMT and two million Chinese 
arrived in Taiwan more than sixty years ago. The Taiwanese are often seen as 
unwilling participants in the larger conflict of World War II and the Cold War.15 
“The KMT government in Taiwan is usually characterized as having no 
legitimacy and as a failed and corrupted right-wing political and military force 
that was maintaining its position on Taiwan against all logic.”16 Hill Gates, author 
and ethnographer, describes his interpersonal encounters in Taiwan: “The 
common social chat among strangers attending dinner parties begins by 
establishing the origins of all persons present with jocular references to foods, 
speech peculiarities, or personality traits supposedly characteristic of each ethnic 
group.”17  
                                                                                                                                                                      
of the supporters (????????????). In other words, the Taiwanese who vote for the 
Pan-Green Coalition are often poor old citizens with no formal or higher education. 
13 Richard Bush, Untying the Knot—Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington DC: 
Brookings Institute Press, 2005), .43. Richard Bush was the former Director of the American 
Institute in Taiwan, the de facto embassy for the United States. 
14 Bush, 2005, 43 .  
15 Alan Wachman, Taiwan —National Identity and Democratization (New York: M.E. Sharpe 
Books, 1994), 56–63. 
16 Mark Harrison, Legitimacy, Meaning and Knowledge in the Making of Taiwanese Identity (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillian Press, 2006), 34. 
17 Hill Gates, “Ethnicity and Social Class,” in The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society, eds. Martin 
Ahern  and Hill Gates. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), 254. 
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The KMT’s personal identification procedures also created a deep sense of 
difference among the population. The state-employed administrative procedures 
mandated people to identify themselves on the basis of their ethnicity by 
identifying their “provincial origin.” Until the 1990s, every citizen in Taiwan over 
fifteen was required to carry an identification card similar to the driver’s license 
in the United States with the person’s name, address, identification number, and 
provincial origin. If the person was born in Taiwan, then his or her father or 
grandfather’s provincial origin was also listed. After democratization, the 
government eliminated listing provincial origins on the government-issued 
identification card. The requirement of an identification card was one of the 
examples of practices that induced exclusivity among the island’s residents. 
Taiwanese is also often used by historians and scholars to refer to the 
native or local people of Taiwan. Taiwanese is often referred to as “ben-sheng-
ren” (???), which literally means “people from the province.” Ben-sheng-ren 
are categorized as those who have been residing on the island since the 1600s 
prior to the KMT’s defeat in China. Two different ethnic groups of different 
provincial origins were amongst the ben-sheng-ren population. The Hakka 
emigrated from the Guangdong Province, and the Hoklo were from the Fujian 
Province. Immigration to Taiwan began in mid-sixteenth century and continued 
until late nineteenth century until the Qing Dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan under 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Approximately 2% of the ben-sheng-ren are 
aboriginals or “yuan-chu-min” (???), which means “original dwellers.” In 2008, 
the democratic record reflected that there were fourteen official aboriginal tribes 
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recognized by the government of Taiwan. The aboriginals are target groups of the 
KMT, and the KMT has been consistent in passing legislation to offer welfare 
assistance, affirmative action programs, and extra points on entrance exams for 
the aboriginal population to retain electoral support.  
The third group of residents in Taiwan is made up of the Chinese or 
“mainlanders.” The mainlanders are the Han population relocated to Taiwan after 
the end of China’s Civil War. Most mainlanders are KMT soldiers, governmental 
workers, and party personnel and their family members. The mainlanders are 
referred as “wai-sheng-ren” (???), which means “people from outside the 
province.” The wai-sheng-ren population constitutes approximately 14% of 
Taiwan’s population  
 
 
 
 
Even though the residents’ sense of “us” versus “them” was not a new 
phenomenon, the KMT was the political force that created the deepest cleavage 
between the ethnic groups residing in Taiwan. Alan Wachman elaborates that 
even today, the people of Taiwan was well aware of the “we” and “they” 
Demographic chart of ethnic groups in Taiwan 
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dichotomy, and “the propensity to classify people into ‘we’ and ‘they’ categories 
is a reflection of the division between Taiwanese and mainlanders and manifests 
itself most prominently in politics.”18  
The two groups of Han and aboriginal tribes fought each other for 
resources and better settlement prior to the arrival of the Japanese in 1895. When 
the Japanese arrived, the three groups set aside their differences to battle Japanese 
imperial control.19 There were sporadic uprisings against Japanese colonial rule, 
the most violent being the Wushe Incident, where 1200 of the Atayal tribal 
members clashed with the Japanese colonial police, government officials, and 
residents. One hundred and thirty-four Japanese were killed and more than 200 
Japanese were injured. The Japanese government reacted quickly, sending 
soldiers to the Wushe area with guns and poison gas canisters. At the end of the 
Japanese crackdown, 700 Atayals were dead and the Atayal chief committed 
suicide.20 The Japanese spent more than two decades to ultimately consolidate 
control. The Japanese did, however, contribute greatly to the infrastructure, 
transportation, economic and educational development, and public safety in 
Taiwan. “The colonial government built transportation and communications 
infrastructure, established an education and a public health system,”21 and the 
Japanese were the first to go “green” for cleaner sources of energy and agriculture 
in Taiwan. More importantly, the Japanese appointed civilian technocrats instead 
                                                             
18 Wachman, 1994, 58. 
19 Bush, 2005, 43. 
20 A quick summary of the Wushe Incident can be found at 
http://www.taiwanfirstnations.org/Wushe.html. 
21 Bush, 2005, 15. 
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of military generals as governors of Taiwan to help the island develop its 
economy even further. The Japanese then used the island of Taiwan to cultivate 
the resources it needed to exercise dominance in Asia. Many Taiwanese went to 
Japan to study during the colonial period. They came back to Taiwan as 
physicians, lawyers, professors, architects, and engineers. The Japanese governing 
mechanism effectively severed Taiwan from China by establishing a new set of 
educational, commercial, judicial, and agricultural systems, and in doing so, the 
Japanese were able to raise the standard of living in Taiwan significantly. Despite 
the strictness and harshness of Japanese colonial rule, some older Taiwanese who 
lived through the Japanese occupation often express nostalgia for the colonial 
period compared to the oppression from the KMT, who retreated to the island 
after losing the civil war on the mainland. Thus, the first challenge for the KMT, 
after democratization, would be to weather the nostalgia in the older generation 
and recruit the young by presenting the party as one with the indigenous identity. 
 Much of the older generation’s nostalgia stemmed from the period of 
Japanese occupation that was the first time in Taiwan’s history that a political 
power was able to govern the island in a comprehensive manner. After nearly a 
century under Japanese rule, most Taiwanese assimilated themselves with the 
Japanese under the Kominka Movement.22 The Taiwanese’s first encounter with 
mainlanders was in 1945, when KMT officials and troops arrived to replace the 
Japanese administration after the unconditional surrender of Japan after World 
                                                             
22 The Kominka movement was implemented by the Japanese colonial government in Taiwan to (1) 
reeducate the Taiwanese to adhere to the spirit of Japan, and (2) to turn the Taiwanese into good 
Japanese citizens. The Taiwanese had to dress in Japanese attire, learn to speak Japanese ,and also 
change their names into Japanese. 
 
 
134 
War II. Initially, the residents of Taiwan welcomed Chinese governance, and 
before the arrival of the Chinese personnel and military, the Taiwanese prepared 
banners and national flags and organized parades to welcome the new governor. 
One of the pioneers and the most prominent figure of the Taiwan independence 
movement, Professor Peng Mingin, wrote in his memoir, “One day I fell into 
conversation with two Americans in a jeep beside the road, and in passing, 
explained to them that I was not Japanese but a Chinese from Formosa. It was 
something of a shock to find myself for the first time openly and proudly making 
this distinction.”23 Peng’s pride, like that of most Taiwanese, soon disintegrated as 
he noted in the subsequent chapter of his memoirs, describing what he saw at the 
welcoming ceremony when the KMT troops arrived on the island:  
 The ship docked, the gangways were lowered, and off came the troops of China, the 
victors. The first man to appear was a bedraggled fellow who looked and behaved more 
like a coolie than a soldier, walking off with a carrying pole across his shoulder, from 
which was suspended his umbrella, sleeping mat, cooking pot, and cup. Others like him 
followed, some with shoes, some without. Few had guns. With no attempt to maintain 
order or discipline, they pushed off the ship, glad to be on firm land, but hesitant to face 
the Japanese lined up and saluting smartly on both sides. My father wondered what the 
Japanese could possibly think. He has never felt so ashamed in his life. Using a Japanese 
expression, he said, “if there had been a hole nearby, I would have crawled in!”24 
The Japanese had also been promoting a strict set of values, manners, and 
behaviors in Taiwan. It was said that before the Japanese left Taiwan, residents 
were able to leave their bicycles unlocked and their chickens in cages outside of 
their houses, and sleep at night with their front doors wide open. A Chinese 
soldier described his first experience walking on the streets of Taipei:  
                                                             
23 Mingin Peng, A Taste of Freedom: Memoirs of a Formosan Independence Leader (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston Press, 1972), 45. This particular conversation occurred when Peng 
was a graduate student in Japan during the U.S. occupation of Japan.  
24 Peng, 1972, 51–52. 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The Formosans were always smiling and bow while they greeted each other. The owner 
of stores would welcome his customers with cheerful Japanese. The people on the streets 
were wearing traditional Japanese clothing and slippers. Some of them wear linen shirts 
and they looked so comfortable, compared to those of us, who were wearing whatever 
clothing we had. Some of us were wearing winter coats and sweating like pigs, because 
that was the only clothing we could take with us.25 
Not only were there cultural differences, there were also communication issues 
upon the KMT’s arrival. The Taiwanese communicated with their dialects and 
Japanese, while the mainlanders spoke languages from their provinces.  
The happy welcome did not last long. Taiwan’s new rulers were 
incompetent at best and inclined to abuse and criminal behavior, which alienated 
the Taiwanese population. Chang Chun-hung, the vice chairman of the Straits 
Exchange Foundation, recalls in an interview with Alan Wachman:  
 We all took up flags and went to welcome them . . . President Chiang has come to take 
over Taiwan!  That was really how we felt—entering the embrace of our fatherland. But 
although we genuinely accepted the mainland takeover, we immediately began to sense 
the conflict of culture. Moreover, that conflict of culture was extremely intense. It was 
discovered that the Japanese culture . . . as compared to the culture of our fatherland, a 
strong culture, a superior culture. And the culture of the ruler is a worthless, inferior—an 
inferior kind of barbaric culture . . . that kind of conflict was extremely intense and 
transformed us from the heights of identification to the heights of hostility.26 
Similar to Chang, many Taiwanese recounted that, even though the Japanese 
colonial rule was suppressive, the  “[Japanese] perfected a system of civil service, 
obedience to the law and administrative efficiency, [which] made the Japanese 
incomparable to the KMT’s corrupt feudal regime.”27 After the mainlanders’ 
arrival in Taiwan, the crime rate increased drastically. Many Taiwanese reported 
theft, robbery, and cases of rape with the new administration turning a deaf ear. 
                                                             
25 Shiao-Feng Lee, View from China—Chinese Testimonies after the 228 Incident (?????- 
228?????????????) (Taipei: Gi-Chuang Publication, 2006), 45. 
26 Wachman, 1994, 95. 
27 Wachman, 1994, 95. 
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More importantly, it was the KMT administration’s attitude toward Taiwan and 
the Taiwanese that sparked tremendous resentment and finally came to a clash 
followed by mass killings of Taiwanese known as the 228 Massacre..  
228, White Terror, and the Beginning of Ethnic Cleavage 
 Upon arrival, the KMT saw itself as the legitimate governor of China and 
viewed Taiwan as its temporary residence and resting place before it took back 
China by military force. The KMT appointed mainlanders to governing positions 
rather than Taiwanese. Preference for mainlanders over Taiwanese and corruption 
of these newly appointed government officials were blatant. According to 
Wachman, those who held positions of responsibility had a strong sense of 
entitlement about their role and probably gave little thought to the way their 
presence would be perceived by [the Taiwanese].”28 On February 27, 1947, an 
altercation between a female cigarette vendor and two mainlander police officers 
brought the discontent of the Taiwanese to the surface and erupted into an island-
wide full-scale rebellion. Chiang Kai-Shek and then Governor Chen-Yi quickly 
sent in more troops to crack down on the insurgency. By the time the uprising was 
suppressed, 15,000 to 30,000 Taiwanese were reportedly killed. In the subsequent 
months from March to May, the local community leaders were systematically 
arrested, imprisoned, or executed. With the bloody introduction to the KMT after 
it arrived in Taiwan following its defeat on the mainland, the cleavage between 
the Taiwanese and mainlanders deepened and the indigenous population’s 
animosity toward the KMT grew. Since liberalization, the 228 Massacre has been 
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one of the examples cited by the KMT’s political opposition as evidence of the 
KMT’s lack of compassion for the Taiwanese.  
President Lee Teng-Hui, himself also a Taiwanese, in his attempt to 
defuse the accusations, made the first public apology to the Taiwanese population. 
It was the first time an official from the KMT had directly addressed the 228 
Massacre and claimed responsibility for the subsequent killings. Since Lee’s 
apology in 1995, the KMT chairpersons and presidents have consistently offered 
apologies on the anniversaries of 228 and other major uprisings in Taiwan.29 An 
example of the ethnic cleavage between the Taiwanese and mainlanders can still 
be found in recent elections. During the 2008 presidential election, the KMT 
presidential candidate Ma Ying-Jeou was consistently attacked by his political 
opponent for being an untrustworthy mainlander. Ma’s political opponent warned 
the constituents of the possibility that Ma would sell Taiwan to China, because 
Ma was born in China and often refers to himself as Chinese. Ma’s subsequent 
China-friendly cross-strait policies as president, like the opening of seaports and 
airports to China and the attempt to draft the Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement between China and Taiwan (CECA), received daily 
criticism from the DPP as sell-out policies and a disguised attempt to unify 
Taiwan with China. Ma’s response to his critics was to claim that he was too 
young to be involved in any of the atrocities. Furthermore, Ma called for 
toleration and encouraged the population to forgive and forget, while admitting 
                                                             
29 December 10 is also a day on which KMT officials have adopted the habit of making public 
apologies. In 1979, on December 10, International Human Rights Day, opposition forces staged a 
protest parade that ended in a brutal crackdown by the KMT, and eight leaders of the opposition, 
later referred to as the Formosa Eight, were tried and sentenced to life in prison. 
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that the KMT was indeed responsible. Ma made a public apology on February 28 
of this year by stating, “[I] hope that all people in Taiwan will display mercy, 
humbleness, mutual tolerance and understanding to get over the sad historic event 
and continue moving forward.”30 
Taiwanese Identity as a KMT Creation 
The initial harsh course taken by the KMT to institute its regime on 
Taiwan induced fear among the population and produced a lasting cleavage 
between the ethnic groups in Taiwan. The KMT’s subsequent attempt to solidify 
its political power by retaining the rights to resources and benefits exclusively for 
the mainlander group became the origin of the emergence of Taiwanese identity. 
The exclusionary and preferential policies based on ethnicity pushed the 
indigenous population toward categorizing the KMT as just another foreign ruler, 
not what the population had originally expected.  
In the past four hundred years, Taiwan has always been under the 
governance of foreign powers. The colonizers included Spain, Portugal, the 
Netherlands, and Japan. Timothy Mitchell points out that “the panopticon, the 
model institution, whose geometric order and generalized surveillance serve as 
the motif for this kind of power, was a colonial invention.”31 The KMT adopted 
public policies similar to previous colonizers in order to establish total control 
over Taiwan for the purpose of establishing the island as the springboard for the 
                                                             
30 “Tragedy like 228 will never occur again: Ma,” China Post, March 1, 2011,  
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2011/03/01/292913/Tragedy-
like.htm. 
31 Timothy Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press,1988), 35. 
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party to retake China. In doing so, the KMT created the separation between the 
Chinese and the Taiwanese and the distinct sense of difference between the two 
groups. 
The KMT had specific districts drawn for Taiwanese and Chinese 
residences. In addition, the KMT established the Garrison Command, which 
controlled the secret police, with offices embedded in every neighborhood to 
monitor the behavior of the population. Neighbors also were encouraged to 
inform and file complaints against neighbors for rewards from the KMT 
government. Mitchell states that “the method was no longer simply to take a share 
of what was produced and exchanged, but to enter into the process of 
production . . . [the] political power attempted to discipline, coordinate and 
increase what were now thought of as the ‘productive powers’ of the country.”32 
The KMT government offered special social and political privileges to those it 
considered to be the productive powers of Taiwan, namely, the military, public 
servants, and educators. Most importantly, according to Mitchell, “These modern 
strategies of control were not to expand and dissipate as before, but to infiltrate, 
re-order and colonize.” The KMT government adopted intentional strategies of 
infiltration, reorganization, and their own variant of colonization of Taiwan; 
however, in doing so, the KMT also inadvertently generated the perception of 
differences amongst the ethnic groups, or the “us” verses the “outsiders” as 
                                                             
32 Mitchell, 1988,. 35. 
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identified by Alan Wachman.33 There were three major policies to “infiltrate, 
reorganize and colonize,” and they are discussed in the following sections. 
Land Reform 
 Land reform policies were implemented in order to change the 
demographic composition of Taiwanese society. The KMT sought to separate 
communities of ethnic groups while implanting Chinese amongst the indigenous 
populations. The KMT regime launched a series of land reforms starting on April 
14, 1949.34 The KMT regime forcibly took away land owned by the Taiwanese 
and rewrote the deeds to the land. The KMT government then redistributed most 
of the land amongst the mainlanders. The KMT carved the large pieces of land 
into more than six million small individual areas and established a payment 
system to collect “rent” from the “tenants” every month to profit the state. The 
KMT government decreed a rent reduction for the tenants to a top limit of 37.5% 
of the crop.35  
In addition, the Chinese also received priority over the Taiwanese for the 
land. In short, the KMT government would rent to the Chinese first, then consider 
the Taiwanese as renters. The government also promoted the guaranteed security 
of the renters, which meant that the KMT government would invoke the local 
Garrison Command centers to prevent the Taiwanese from taking their land back. 
Furthermore, the KMT implemented a national rent price, which was significantly 
                                                             
33 Wachman, 1994, 53–64. 
34 The KMT had just lost the civil war in China and was forced to retreat to Taiwan two months 
prior.  
35 Richard L Walker, Taiwan’s Development as Free China. Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, vol. 321: Contemporary China and the Chinese, January 1959, 129. 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lower than what landowners were previously charging; instead of the landowner 
getting the profits, the state did. The KMT government also forced the landlords 
to rent their land to private citizens. In 1953, four years after the initial land 
reform, the KMT government went further by requiring landowners to sell to the 
tenants, most of them mainlanders, the land they had been renting.36 The benefits 
gained by the KMT government from land reform were two-fold: first, the state 
ultimately made profits by charging the tenants rent and then from the selling of 
the land; and secondly, land reform also meant the relocation of the two million 
mainlanders to virtually all areas in Taiwan.  
In addition to redistricting the land, Military Family Sections, some called 
Military Villages, were created by the government in order to house the families 
of Chinese soldiers. The KMT took over the most prosperous sections of major 
cities such as Taipei and Kaohsiung and established housing projects for Chinese 
military families. The projects were mostly demolished after Taiwan’s 
democratization and the transfer of power to the new DPP administration; 
however, there are still numerous buildings and apartments left where the 
descendants of the Chinese soldiers still reside. The legacy of land reform has 
lingered until the present. In the most recent five-municipality election, the KMT 
candidate for mayor of Taipei, Hau Long-Bin, campaigned under the Equal 
Housing Platform. Hau, a second-generation mainlander and son of former 
premier and military general Hau Pei-Tsun, responded to criticism of being part 
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142 
of the “high-class mainlanders” because he advocated flat-rate housing through 
Taipei for anyone who is in need of housing.37 
Education and Language 
 Education and language are very effective tools for an authoritarian power 
to secure control and to prevent future outbreaks of rebellion. Education can be 
seen as the extension of a government’s power over the person’s soul and psyche. 
Education can also be used to construct a new individual who is not contradictory 
to the newly established authoritarian regime. As political theorist Michel 
Foucault points out, once the sovereign has power over the individual’s body, it 
begins to extend its control over the human soul. Foucault contends in his book 
Discipline and Punish that the human soul opens up more possibilities for 
punishment and control.38 Timothy Mitchell also uses the term “enframing” to 
describe what European colonialists did when they ordered and controlled the 
reality of others,39 Part of enframing is to teach the colonized that the new order 
should be the better way, the way to operate one’s daily life. For example, in 
Egypt, enframing took the form of model villages that were “run like barracks . . . 
[people] would to be inspected, supervised and instructed.”40 There was the 
                                                             
37 The term “high-class mainlander (??????)” was coined by a Taiwanese diplomat to 
Canada. A mainlander, the diplomat, while stationed in Canada, blogged on the superiority of the 
mainlanders in comparison to the Taiwanese. The racist language of the blog ignited an uproar 
both in Taiwan and overseas. The diplomat was subsequently recalled and stripped of his post. 
However, the term lingered, and was often used by the KMT opposition in labeling the KMT 
officials. Hau won the mayorship by obtaining 55% of the vote. 
38 Foucault, 1977. 104–114. 
39 Mitchell, 1988,  34. 
40 Mitchell, 1988,  34. 
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creation of a disciplined army through the mobilization and regimentation of 
thousands of Egyptians, and the eventual establishment of prep schools. 
 In Taiwan, during the authoritarian era, mainlander teachers were assigned 
to the newly established public schools to teach the youngsters. School 
administrative officials were also replaced by mainlanders, with Taiwanese acting 
as secondary assistants. “The order and discipline of modern schooling were to be 
the hallmark and the method of a new form of political power,.41 In the 1957–
1958 academic year, there were 1,471,407 students in elementary schools in 
Taiwan, 270,523 in secondary schools, and 21,259 in colleges and universities.42 
The usual school curriculum included daily flag-raising ceremonies,43 military 
training courses, and music lessons on military anthems. Children in the public 
school system from ages six to eighteen were taught military songs such as “Fight 
Our Way Back to the Mainland,” “I Am a Chinese,” “China Will Be Strong,” and 
“The Plum Blossom.”44  
 Another important aspect of the KMT promotion of national education 
was the publication of new textbooks. Between 1949 and 1957, over nineteen 
thousand  
                                                             
41 Mitchell, 1988,  75. 
42 Walker, 1959,  132. 
43 There was a deliberate campaign launched by the KMT to introduce the national flag of the 
Republic of China to the Taiwanese, who were used to the Japanese Rising Sun as their national 
flag. 
44 The plum blossom is the national flower of the Republic of China. 
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textbooks were published.46 Many of the old texts in both Taiwanese and 
Japanese were confiscated and destroyed. Academia Sinica, a national academic 
research organization, was created by the KMT to take on the task of developing 
new textbooks.47 The new textbooks were written with the central theme of 
promoting Chinese culture, hailing Chiang Kai-Shek as the savior of all Chinese, 
and the legacy of the Republic of China. During KMT education reform, 
Taiwanese literature, geography, and history were abandoned, while Chinese 
history, geography, and writings were glorified and promoted. In addition, the 
KMT utilized the printing press as another tool to exert Chinese dominance. In 
1958, the KMT jump-started 28 newspapers and 498 journals and magazines48—
almost all of them propagandist in nature. 
 In addition to changing the subjects of the textbooks, schooling was also 
divided and ranked according to ethnicity. As Mitchell states, “By specifying the 
separate ranks of people eligible for each successive stage of schooling, a social 
order was represented in the exact form of a pyramid of social classes.”49 Most 
Taiwanese were not encouraged to, and were even prevented from,  studying 
social sciences such as political science, sociology, or law. In addition, the 
number of people admitted to law school was based on the number of provinces in 
China. The Republic of China had thirty-five provinces before the civil war. The 
KMT decided to admit individuals to law school according to their provincial 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Chinese textbook. The text describes Chiang Kai-shek coming to the realization that an individual 
must always rely on himself in order to achieve greatness by looking at a school of trout 
swimming against the current. 
46 Walker, 1959. 132. 
47 Walker, 1959. 132–133. 
48 Walker, 1959,  132. 
49 Mitchell 1988,  77. 
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origin. For example, if thirty-five individuals were admitted to law school, thirty-
four of them would be from provinces in China and only one person would be 
Taiwanese, because Taiwan was seen as just another province. The unfair practice 
was frustrating to the Taiwanese, who often excel in academia. 
Another part of the education reform of the KMT was the mandatory 
learning of Mandarin Chinese. Before the KMT regime, under the colonial rule of 
Japan, most individuals in Taiwan were bilingual. The Taiwanese were able to 
converse in their ethnic dialect and in Japanese. Soon after the arrival of the KMT 
regime, Chiang Kai-Shek and his cohorts realized that language barriers were 
posing a serious problem for the reform programs. As a result, the KMT 
government required all Taiwanese to learn Mandarin Chinese and implemented 
coercive mechanisms within the public school systems to accelerate the language-
learning process. For example, mainlander school administrators served as 
“language police” in school yards. If the language police discovered an individual 
conversing in Taiwanese, the individual would be issued a citation and would 
have to pay a fine. In addition, teachers were instructed to make signs that 
displayed “I spoke Taiwanese” for students to wear around their necks after they 
were caught speaking Taiwanese. The signs and ticketing thus created the general 
attitude amongst the younger generation that speaking Taiwanese was shameful, 
ungraceful, and lower class. Even though there were attempts by Taiwanese 
intellectuals to resist the invasion of the Chinese language, the coercive 
mechanisms of the KMT were too powerful. Taiwanese thus became the language 
of the “lower class” and the unsophisticated. According to Mitchell, “Texts too 
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carried their own authority, an authority which mirrored that of politics in its 
tendency to degenerate over time and become corrupt.”50 It was not until after the 
democratization of Taiwan that the Taiwanese language finally made a comeback 
and debates started to emerge amongst politicians and academics on whether the 
Taiwanese language should be taught as the national language in Taiwan. 
Cultural Domination 
 In the years between the 1940s and 1960s, the KMT regime successfully 
reorganized and enframed Taiwan into different model villages, counties, and 
magistrates. At the same time, the KMT also exercised cultural imperialism 
through its control of the media to substitute a new sinocentric identity for the 
Taiwanese for the multicultural Taiwanese tradition.51 The KMT regime 
disallowed public performances of Taiwanese songs, music, and theater. The 
Taiwanese opera was an art form popular with the indigenous population. It was 
usually performed on an outside stage in the town square. The KMT banned the 
performance of Taiwanese opera and replaced it with the Peking opera, which 
was the favorite of Chiang Kai Shek. In addition, Taiwanese was only allowed to 
be spoken for thirty minutes per day on television. The Taiwanese actors were 
also forced to perform in Mandarin Chinese. The performances of Japanese songs, 
which were very popular amongst the senior generations, were eliminated 
altogether.  
                                                             
50 Mitchell,1988, 135. 
51 Because of the various colonial legacies, the Taiwanese have adopted practices, rituals, and food 
from different cultures. In combination with the aboriginal population, Taiwan was always 
multicultural and multiethnic until the attempts of the KMT to assimilate the population to 
Chinese. 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The KMT’s cultural imperialism, its reformation of the education system 
and language, had been in practice for almost fifty years before the first 
Taiwanese president took office. The segregation of ethnic groups and the 
assignment of benefits to only the mainlanders not only frustrated the Taiwanese 
majority, it also reinforced the sense that Taiwanese are indeed different than 
Chinese. This was a reaction to the efforts of the KMT to impose the Chinese 
identity on the Taiwanese by belittling indigenous languages, cultural practices, 
songs, and folkways. During and after the liberalization and democratization of 
Taiwan, the Kuomintang began to find itself a casualty of its own creation. 
Acknowledging the Taiwanese as the ethnic majority, the DPP called for a 
Republic of Taiwan (ROT) and a new Taiwan constitution.  
Even though the DPP would later split into factions representing those 
who advocated for aggressively pushing for Taiwan independence and those who 
were more moderate, in 1991, the DPP party headquarters and the candidates all 
campaigned under the platform of Taiwan independence and called for the voters 
to drive foreign authoritarianism out of Taiwanese politics. The DPP’s political 
platform culminated in the DPP’s passing the Taiwan Independence Clause to add 
to the Party Charter. The clause states:  
The DPP’s position on Taiwan’s future is the “people’s self-determination,” and it 
maintains that all inhabitants should jointly determine their common destiny. As 
Taiwan’s largest opposition party, the DPP has the responsibility to reflect the aspirations 
of the masses of society, to vigorously try to obtain accelerated implementation of 
constitutional government reform, and to avoid Taiwan’s losing its way in the abyss of 
unification.52 
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The DPP party headquarters then released a television ad with the on-screen 
slogan “Let us establish a sovereign, independent Republic of Taiwan.”53 Many of 
the DPP candidates assigned their individual campaigns similar titles. For 
example, Lin Cho-Shui (???), one of the senior DPP legislators, ran under the 
campaign slogan, “ROT defeats ROC” in 1991.54 Wu Ming-Yang (???) called 
for the voters to write ROT on their international mail to show the world that the 
Taiwanese deserved a republic of their own instead of the defeated residue of the 
Republic of China.55 The DPP also attacked the KMT’s unification policy with 
China by claiming that unifying with poor and backward China could only hurt 
Taiwan. 
Recasting the Identity Issue, Becoming Taiwanese 
With its fifty-year authoritarian legacy and inequitable social policies, one 
might think undertaking the issue of identity would be a daunting task for the 
KMT. The KMT dealt with the harsh attack by the opposition by leaping to the 
offensive with several bold moves. First, the KMT did not formally sever itself 
from the original ideology of reuniting all China and establishing a Chinese 
Republic, but President Lee Teng-hui issued a statement stating that due to 
changes to the international environment, the growing strength of the PRC, and 
the increase of cross-strait interaction, there came a need for creating an 
institution to handle “mainland affairs.”  Lee requested a presidential advisory 
                                                             
53 Under the old Central Election Committee rule on television ads, the characters for “Taiwan” 
were blacked out of the DPP ad, so the ad broadcast on television only showed the characters for 
“Let us establish a sovereign, independent republic.” 
54 “ROT defeats ROC” (???????????),  Liberty Times, December, 14t, 1991, 1. 
55 Liberty Times, December 11, 1991, 1. 
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council to convene to discuss the establishment of such a ministry.  The Executive 
Yuan would direct such an endeavor and the Legislative Yuan would pass the 
legislation and budget for such a ministry. A few months later, in January of 1991, 
the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) was established with the cooperation of 
both yuans. In March 1991, the Executive Yuan approved the council’s National 
Unification Guidelines. The guidelines established three preconditions for 
unification: democracy, liberty, and equal prosperity on both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait.  
The establishment of the MAC and the passage of the National Unification 
Guidelines were implemented in order to send a direct message to the voters that 
the leaders of the KMT were dedicated to promoting and maintaining democracy 
and liberty. In addition, Lee argued that the establishment of the MAC was a clear 
indication that Taiwan, although under the official name of the Republic of China, 
was already an independent country run by a Taiwanese president.56 Lee further 
called for tolerance, encouraged the population to move on from the past, and 
emphasized the democratic ideological basis of the KMT. Lee stated, “We have 
just begun to practice democratic government . . . we must admit that different 
opinions exist in this society, which affect the formation of a symbiotic 
community. This goal can only be achieved through our mutual understanding, 
cooperation, wisdom and tolerance and brotherly love.”57 
                                                             
56 Lee Teng-hui was the first president who was ethnically Taiwanese.  
57 Teng-Hui Lee, The Road to Democracy: Taiwan’s Pursuit of Identity (Tokyo: PHP Institute, 
1999), 60–61. 
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The 1991 National Assembly election was especially contentious because 
the election was set to replace what the opposition dubbed as the “old thieves.” 
The National Assembly members were allowed to retain their elected seats and 
collect their stipend indefinitely, and most of them remained in office until their 
deaths. The ailing National Assembly members were all Chinese, and the 
Kuomintang translated the National Assembly to Taiwan with its members still 
representing the thirty-five provinces of the Republic of China. According to one 
of the DPP founders, Chou Ching-Yu, “I was not trying to embarrass these old 
timers, but whenever I got the chance, I would ask them questions regarding 
contemporary Taiwan to show the public that these old men were totally stuck in 
time and place. Some of them are totally senile. The KMT owned and managed 
the National Assembly and did not have the democratic ethic nor the ethnic 
foundation to be our representatives let alone receiving salaries that came out of 
the Taiwanese people’s pockets. I called them ‘ten-thousand year Assembly’ and 
those members ‘old thieves.’”58 
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Ching-Yu Chou, interviewed by author on June 13, 2007.  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Members of the National Assembly dozing off during an assembly session59 
 
 
Chou further elaborates, “When one of these old guys died, a new face 
would mysteriously appear to replace the old guy, and these new faces were 
almost always mainlander faces.”60 
 
Rally for the Forced Retirement of National Assembly members by the DPP.61  
 
To defuse the relentless attack from Chou and the DPP, the Kuomintang 
further distanced itself from the authoritarian past by officially ending the 
Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion and 
restored the constitution. The KMT’s reinvention of itself as the leader of 
democratization and the defender of political and civil rights happened with the 
close collaboration of the President’s Office, the Executive Yuan, and the 
                                                             
59 Photograph contributed to author by Professor Hsiao-Feng Lee, Professor of Postwar Taiwan 
History at National Taipei University of Education, June 25, 2007.  
60 Ching-Yu Chou, interviewed by author on June 13, 2007. 
61 Photograph contributed to author by Ms. Ching-Yu Chou, former Changhua County magistrate, 
and national policy advisor to President Chen Shui-Bian, interviewed on June 13, 2007. The sign 
Ms. Chou (middle) was holding said “Old Reps Get Lost” and her shirt said “Reelection.”  
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Legislative Yuan. The KMT also carefully utilized the media to further deliver the 
regime’s message to the general public.  
 The party headquarters promoted the 1991 Legislative Yuan’s campaign 
under the banner of “reform, stability and prosperity.” The KMT also claimed 
credit for Taiwan’s economic prosperity and democratization to date. The 
television campaign ad portrayed the KMT as an “experienced, responsible 
political party with enough flexibility for reform.”  It also advocated the idea that 
the constituents should view the KMT as a “faithful old friend.” “The protective 
and nurturing role of the KMT was illustrated with the image of a naked infant 
boy lying on the rich blue expanse of the KMT party flag.”62  In other words, the 
television ads depicted the KMT as the devoted guardian of Taiwan that would do 
whatever it took to protect Taiwan from external threats or from its own 
population, such as the advocates of independence.63  More importantly, 
recognizing the emergence of a Taiwanese identity, the KMT also adopted the 
DPP’s strategy by capitalizing on the population’s close attachment to Taiwan’s 
first native-born president. Another featured KMT slogan for the 1991 campaign 
stated, “To support Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui, please vote for the 
KMT.”64  
                                                             
62 Wachman, 1994, 208 
63 Former President Lee elaborated in an article in the Free China Journal, “I am the president of 
the Republic of China. Faced with a small group of people advocating secessionism, I am 
naturally concerned. I will do my best to dispel the doubts of these people and help them believe 
in the government’s determination to promote democracy, and have faith that all actions taken by 
the government will respect the rights of the people in Taiwan.” Teng-Hui Lee,, Free China 
Journal, July 5t, 1991: 7. 
64 Political campaign pamphlet supplied by the KMT Party Archive, accessed on July 7, 2007. 
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The 1991 National Assembly election was an electoral victory for the 
KMT. The KMT captured 179 out of the 225 available seats with 71.2% of the 
overall 8.93 million votes cast. The DPP won 40 seats with 23.9% of the votes. 
The DPP was able to appoint 20 at-large delegates and 5 overseas representative 
seats. The election results demonstrated that the KMT had deflected yet another 
challenge posed by its opposition and the new democratic political environment.  
1992 Legislative Yuan Election 
The 1992 Legislative Yuan election brought the issue of identity front and 
center. This election was the first democratic election of the Legislative Yuan 
since 1947.  The election campaign had once again developed into a contest 
between Chinese and Taiwanese identity while the KMT was undergoing a major 
transition with its leadership and foreign policy positions. The factional division 
within the KMT was due to many hard-core members, mainly mainlander party 
members, who were dissatisfied with the pace of democratization and the 
ideological shift adopted by Lee and his supporters within the party.  
This ideological shift was often referred to as the KMT’s “Taiwanization.” 
The process of incorporating native Taiwanese and identifying with the 
indigenous culture and identity actually began in the 1970s with President Chiang 
Ching-Kuo.65 The exclusiveness of Sartori’s authoritarian party began to be 
dismantled with Chiang’s attempt to “Taiwanize” the party. Many KMT 
candidates started to openly support the de facto independence of the Taiwanese 
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Scholars such as Peter Moody, 1992, and Hung-Mao Tien, 1992 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government. The supporters of Taiwan’s de facto status formed the Wisdom 
Coalition (Chi-Si Hui ???). Almost all members of the Wisdom Coalition 
were Taiwanese and were actively making efforts to gain votes from 
proindependence voters. As party chairman, Lee did not restrict or prevent KMT 
legislative candidates who had chosen to campaign under the de facto 
independence slogan. For example, Lin Yu-Siang (???), a former member of 
the Taipei City Council, ran under the campaign slogan inspired by an old 
Taiwanese song, “Mother, please take good care of yourself” (???????), 
during his bid for a seat in the Legislative Yuan. At the center of Lin’s campaign 
pamphlet was the map of Taiwan. China was nowhere to be seen. On the map of 
Taiwan were pictures of Lin’s parents and grandparents. Lin’s pamphlet listed his 
past accomplishments as a legislator; on the other hand, the pamphlet also had 
large characters for the central theme of the Wisdom Coalition’s campaign slogan, 
“Taiwan First” (????), printed on every page.66  Lin’s campaign truck 
blasted his theme song as it circled around his district and responsibility zones. 
The candidates’ ability to play Taiwanese music loudly in public was also a first 
for national campaigns. As stated in the previous section, the KMT suppressed 
things that were culturally indigenous to Taiwan, such as banning Taiwanese 
songs from television, replacing Taiwanese serial dramas with Peking opera, and 
allowing Taiwanese variety shows to be shown only one hour per day. The 
elaborate focus on Lin’s Taiwanese heritage as the central theme of his campaign 
was a clear demonstration of the KMT’s party apparatus supporting campaign 
                                                             
66 Campaign pamphlet supplied to author by Lin Yu-Siang. 
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strategies that targeted the Taiwanese identity specifically, and this would 
ultimately help the party in garnering votes during the crucial time of a national 
election. 
1993 Municipal Council, Township Council, and Township/Village Executive 
Elections 
 The KMT government under Lee’s leadership opened up even more 
elections of government officials to direct popular vote, and the regime continued 
taking credit as the leader of the democratization of Taiwan. The municipal 
executive election of 1993 did not center on the issue of Taiwan independence or 
the theme “Taiwanese should vote for Taiwanese,” but the KMT was faced with 
another challenge. Members from the New KMT Alliance accused Lee and those 
at party headquarters of “secret independence” and the members of the Wisdom 
Coalition for “public independence.” Disillusioned and dissatisfied, the members 
of the New KMT Alliance resigned their party membership and formed the 
Chinese New Party (NP) in August, 1993. The NP publicly accused Lee and the 
KMT of forgetting the party’s founding principles and Lee’s “Taiwan First” 
strategy. The NP argued that ideological stretching would only create chaos and 
alienate the People’s Republic of China and prevent China from being united once 
again. Fortunately for the KMT, the formation of the NP only reduced the KMT’s 
legislative majority by six seats since not all New KMT Alliance members from 
the Nonmainstream Faction defected from the KMT.67 On the other hand, the 
                                                             
67 One of the major reasons for other nonmainstream factions not defecting from the KMT was the 
party’s tremendous wealth and election support through local grassroots advocates, tiao-a-kas. 
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NP’s core constituents were the Deep-Blue mainlanders who supported the 
Nonmainstream Faction and the hard-core politicians in the KMT.  
It was during this election that the KMT accelerated its move toward the 
center in order to capture votes from voters who identified with their Taiwanese 
heritage and identity but were still undecided on lending electoral support to the 
DPP. It did so by hijacking the DPP platform to pursue a seat in the United 
Nations. 
 Two foreign policy setbacks in 1992 prompted opposition politicians to 
initiate a campaign for the bid for a seat in the United Nations. In the summer of 
1992, South Korea severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan and normalized relations 
with the PRC. In addition, GATT decided to admit Taiwan but only assigned it 
the same status as Hong Kong and Macau. The DPP contended that in order for 
Taiwan to function effectively as a legitimate nation for its people, Taiwan must 
have representation in the United Nations. “[The DPP’s] UN bid was an 
immediate hit with the public, and it was a very successful issue for DPP 
candidates in the 1992 Legislative Yuan race.”68 Even though embracing the UN 
bid might undercut the party ideology that the ROC was the one and only legal 
authority for all China and the Chinese state, Lee and the Mainstream Faction 
made the decision to free the party from its original rigidity and had the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs initiate Taiwan’s bid to the United Nations, making one of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
The KMT was said to be the one of the richest political parties in the world, with assets ranging 
from newspaper companies and radio/television stations to real estate ownership and land. The 
party’s net worth at the time of democratization was approximately 10 billion USA, and the 
KMT’s party assets have been an issue in opposition attacks in almost all elections. 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Rigger, 2000, 38. 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most successful DPP campaign proposals in 1992 into a reality in 1993. As a 
result, the KMT captured 67% of the council seats and 82% of the executive posts 
while the DPP captured only 7% of the council seats and 11% of the executive 
posts.69  
1994 Governor Election and Mayor’s Election 
 During the 1994 provincial governor’s election, the KMT’s strategy was 
to continue taking the political space in the center while absorbing the vote share 
from the Chinese New Party and the DPP, except that the KMT had two fights on 
its hands.  While the DPP took a position similar to its position in 1992 and 
campaigned under the slogan “Taiwan’s only path is to refuse unification,” the 
NP attacked Lee and the KMT with the accusation that they were secretly pushing 
and desiring independence for Taiwan. The KMT, with assaults from both fronts, 
went on the offensive, utilizing the welfare of the Taiwanese people as the reason 
not to vote for its political adversaries. The KMT portrayed its political 
adversaries as highly ideological political parties that only cared about reaching 
the parties’ ideological goals instead of taking care of the common people. The 
KMT attacked the NP with messages like “The NP advocates seek both sides of 
the Strait to accept a confederate system and rapid unification.70” In newspaper 
and television ads, the NP was portrayed as an ally of the Chinese Communist 
Party and China with messages such as “the NP shouts loudly, ‘protect the ROC,’ 
and actually it is forcing Taiwan to be annexed by the CCP.” The KMT 
                                                             
69 Election results from the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University. 
70 United Daily News, November 28, 1995, 5. 
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capitalized on the cleavage between mainlanders and Taiwanese, which originated 
from the policies implemented by the KMT when it first arrived in Taiwan in 
order to establish itself as the sole governing power. Since the members of the NP 
were predominantly mainlanders, and some were even born in China, the KMT’s 
strategy seemed to be working. On the other hand, the KMT also accused the DPP 
of not making the welfare and safety of the Taiwanese people its priority. The 
KMT produced a spinoff from the DPP slogan “Give Taiwan a Chance.” The 
KMT ad stated, “Giving DPP a chance is giving Taiwan independence a chance, 
moreover, it is also giving China a chance to militarily attack Taiwan.”71 The ad 
ended with the question, “Are you willing to take that chance?” and the KMT 
promise of “reform, stability and progress.”72 The KMT candidate, James Soong, 
a mainlander, also claimed that he had visited all the townships in Taiwan more 
than three times, and during those visits Soong promised material and political 
assistance to township leaders and residents. The DPP candidate Chen Ting-Nan 
resorted to attacking Soong’s ethnicity as a mainlander as the reason to not trust 
him. With the KMT’s promise for political stability and economic prosperity, the 
DPP strategy did not resonate with the electorate. Soong won the election by 
capturing 56% of the vote.73 The 1995 gubernatorial election demonstrated that 
the KMT’s flexible ideological strategy was extremely effective in the political 
environment where an increasing number of voters identified themselves as 
Taiwanese and would support political candidates who offered the most economic, 
social, and political benefit to them. While offering the township voters financial 
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Lin Yu-Siang, interviewed by author in Taipei, July 15, 2007. 
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Lin Yu-Siang, interviewed by author in Taipei, July 15, 2007. 
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Election results from the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University. 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and social assistance, James Soong was also successful in demonstrating to the 
electorate that the KMT was the most “pro-Taiwan” and the political party that 
could guarantee political stability and the safety of all Taiwanese by not 
aggressively pushing for unification or independence. The result of the election 
also confirmed that a negative attack on one candidate’s ethnicity as a mainlander 
was not enough for a candidate to win an election. In other words, the simplistic 
slogan “Taiwanese vote for Taiwanese” proved to be a strategic failure.  
The First Democratic Direct Presidential Election, 1996 
 The 1990s was the decade of democratization and direct elections in 
Taiwan. The series of elections allowed the KMT to claim credit and reclaim the 
party’s original ideology as a party supportive of democracy; on the other hand, 
the elections also posed new challenges that the KMT had never experienced 
before. The 1996 presidential election marked a turning point in the political 
history of Taiwan and a major step toward Taiwan’s democratization. As Shelley 
Rigger describes,  
Friday, 22 March 1996 was a night of celebration in Taipei, Taiwan. Thousands jammed 
parks and public squares for huge rallies, then spilled into the streets for impromptu 
midnight marches. The warm, humid night had carnival feeling . . . 76 percent of 
Taiwan’s eligible voters exercised their right to select their country’s head of state. Fifty-
four percent cast their votes for President Lee . . . for many observers, the presidential 
election completed Taiwan’s democratization.74 
The election of 1996 began with the PRC’s missile testing off the Taiwan coasts 
warning Taiwanese voters not to elect a candidate who was unacceptable to the 
PRC. As a result, in the 1996 election, identity and cross-issues became the center 
foci of the presidential candidates’ campaigns. The KMT again took the centrist 
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position, while the DPP candidate Peng Ming-Min campaigned under the same 
platform of Taiwan independence and the creation of a Republic of Taiwan for 
Taiwanese. Lee, on the other hand, developed an interesting rhetoric on 
Taiwanese identity that still resonates with  KMT candidates and their campaigns 
today. In one of his interviews, Lee stated, “It is impossible to form a political 
culture that embodies Taiwan’s identity without an intense love for Taiwan itself. 
I say this all the time, but the person who will lead Taiwan in the future must be a 
real fighter, someone who loves Taiwan deeply and will shed blood, sweat and 
tears for Taiwan.”75. Lee also offered his interpretation of Taiwan identity to the 
voters. He elaborated:  
What is Taiwan identity? Some might answer right off, “an independent Taiwan.” I, for 
one, do not believe that independence is the only option available to make Taiwan’s 
position in international society completely clear. It is more important for us to establish 
ourselves as the Republic of China on Taiwan. In my recommendation for political 
reform, I cited “Republic of China on Taiwan” as the phrase that best represents the 
position we are establishing. Under that term, our jurisdiction covers Taiwan, the 
Pescadores, Quemoy, and Matsu, but not mainland China. As soon as I stated that policy, 
there was a critical reaction that I was not interested in carrying on a relationship with the 
Chinese mainland.  I believe that before we do anything else, Taiwan has to get its own 
house firmly in order. If Taiwan’s identity is not complete clear to its people, how can we 
deal with mainland China?76 
In addition to Lee publicly addressing the issue of identity, the KMT Secretary 
General Hsu Shui-Teh recalled that during the 1996 election, the KMT dropped 
the mentioning of unification altogether, even though the party officially 
maintains its legitimacy as the sole governing entity of all China and the 
legitimacy of the Republic of China as the real China in previous years.77 
According to Hsu and many others, the KMT was a very different party from 
                                                             
75 From the Office of the President, Republic of China, “Founding Fathers and Former 
Presidents.” 
76 Teng-Hui Lee, 1999, 52.  
77 Fell, 2007, 104–105 
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what it had been ten years earlier. Lee Teng-hui also explained, “Though the 
official name was the ROC, later I began to use the term the ROC on Taiwan and 
later it became Taiwan ROC, to give it more local flavor. There is no meaning in 
talking of Taiwan independence. There is no need. We have already established 
something new here.”78  While the KMT engaged in direct outreach to the 
electorate with its interpretation of Taiwanese identity and the meaning of the 
ROC on Taiwan, the KMT also issued attacks on its political opponent, Lin Yang-
Kang and Hau Pei-Tsun of the NP and Peng Ming-Min and Frank Hsieh from the 
DPP. The KMT labeled its defectors as mouthpieces for the PRC and 
spokespersons for the CPP. For example, the Lin-Hau team campaigned under the 
slogan “New Order, New Hope.” The KMT’s attack ads stated that the new order 
promised by the NP meant order imposed by the PLA and the new hope meant the 
NP’s hope to be unified with China.79 This was the first time the KMT’s ads 
portrayed unification in a negative light. The 1996 presidential election was also 
the first time the KMT candidate addressed the PRC as China and Taiwan as 
Taiwan, instead of using the term mainland. This particular usage of terms was 
first used by the DPP.  
“The people who supported Taiwan independence started to support Lee 
Teng-hui,” said Nora Tsay, former president of the North American Taiwanese 
Women’s Association, “because he spoke openly about his belief that the Taiwan-
China relationship is a two-states relationship and that Taiwan is Taiwan, China is 
China, so people who are supportive of Taiwan independence began to support 
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Siao Yu-Ming, interviewed by author in Taipei, June 22, 2007. 
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Lee and his party, which was the KMT.”80 According to the research conducted 
by the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University, in 1996, 72% of 
those surveyed considered themselves Taiwanese, while 32.2% of the voters 
wished to keep the status quo between Taiwan and China and decide the future of 
Taiwan, whether it was independence or unification, later. The percentage of the 
voters who desired keeping the status quo indefinitely was 16.3%, while 5.1% of 
the electorate wanted immediate independence and 3.3% of the voters desired 
immediate unification.81 The survey results provided a clear explanation for the 
KMT’s electoral success. While most voters in Taiwan did identify themselves as 
Taiwanese, their desire on the cross-strait policy was moderate. Most were 
satisfied with keeping the status quo and did not want immediate unification or 
declaration of independence. By avoiding discussions and debates on unification 
and independence altogether while emphasizing the importance of Taiwan’s de 
facto status as an already existing state, Lee’s campaign successfully redirected 
the aversion most of the electorate had toward China and unification onto the NP 
and also shifted the burden of putting the electorate’s lives in danger to the DPP. 
Once again, the KMT was successful in demonstrating to the voters that it was 
still the political party most capable of securing the welfare and safety of the 
general population while respecting the Taiwanese’s sense of identity. 
2008 Presidential Election 
                                                             
80 NoraTsay, interviewed by author in Dallas, November 18, 2007. 
81 “Changes in Unification-Independence Stance of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys (1994-
2009),” Election Study Center, National Chengchui University. 
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The electoral victory of Ma Ying-Jeou as Taiwan’s fourth directly elected 
president was referred to as a landslide.  The percentage of eligible voters who 
cast their ballots was 76%, and out of the thirteen million total votes, Ma received 
58% of the overall votes, defeating his opponent, Frank Hsieh, by two million 
votes.82 Ma’s presidential victory had been preceded by another landslide victory 
of the Legislative Yuan, the legislative body of the Taiwanese government, in 
January 2008. The Kuomintang won 81 out of the overall 113 seats in the newly 
structured Legislative Yuan, which constituted about 75% of the overall 
legislative seats. This was one of the largest electoral victories of the KMT since 
democratization. Even though the party had almost always been able to maintain 
legislative majority through coalition or on its own, compared to the 49.86% of 
the seats the Kuomintang and the Pan-Blue coalition retained four years 
previously, the Kuomintang had now solidified its political dominance.83 
The causal factors for the KMT’s defeat in the 2000 and 2004 presidential 
elections were the party’s exhibition of ideological rigidity and popular James 
Soong’s split from the KMT. On the other hand, the 2000 and 2004 presidential 
elections were two of the most contested and closely fought elections in Taiwan’s 
history. Chen Shui-Bian of the DPP won the presidency. This was the first time an 
opposition candidate had won the country’s highest executive office; however, 
Chen did not win the majority of votes. While Chen won with 39.3% of the 
overall vote, James Soong, the former governor of Taiwan and the rogue 
candidate who split from the KMT, managed to capture 37.46% of the overall 
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Central Election Commission of the Republic of China (Taiwan). “Results of Elections in 
Taiwan” 2008. http://vote.nccu.edu.tw/engcec/vote4.asp (Accessed July 25th, 2008). 
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The KMT lost legislative majority in 2001. 
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vote while the KMT candidate, Lien Chan, received 23.1%. Needless to say, if 
James Soong hadn’t split from the KMT, a joint ticket with Lien-Soong would 
have won the presidency. In addition, the KMT still held a strong majority in the 
Legislative Yuan. In the 1998 Legislative Yuan election, the KMT retained 123 
seats while the DPP received 70 seats. Even though the KMT lost its single party 
majority in the 2001 Legislative Yuan election with winning 68 seats, James 
Soong’s splinter party, the People First Party, was able to capture 46 seats. The 
KMT and the PFP were able to bridge their minor differences and form the Pan-
Blue Coalition with 114 seats in the Legislative Yuan, which outnumbered the 
DPP by 87 seats.  
Learning from its first major electoral defeat in the 2000 presidential 
election and the 2001 Legislative Yuan election, the KMT sought to redeem itself 
in the 2008 presidential election. The KMT negotiated to absorb the PFP back 
into the KMT. Candidates who were originally registered under the PFP’s banner 
promoted the KMT’s platform, and once elected, the candidate then relinquished 
his/her party membership in the PFP and rejoined the KMT. After obtaining 75% 
of the seats in the Legislative Yuan, the KMT’s next step was to win the 
presidency back from the DPP. 
The party nominated Ma Ying-Jeou, the mayor of Taipei, a Harvard-
educated lawyer and a charismatic character to the voters, especially the female 
constituents. Knowing that the DPP and its candidate, Frank Hsieh, would again 
turn to the usual attack on Ma’s ethnicity as a mainlander, the KMT used Ma’s 
age and historical circumstances as a defense. Even though Ma’s birthplace was 
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still contested, the KMT explained the confusion by arguing that Ma, who was 
born in 1950, was born somewhere between China and Hong Kong due to the 
chaos toward the end of the Chinese Civil War and Chiang Kai-Shek’s relocation 
to Taiwan with two million mainlanders.84 The DPP use Ma’s birthplace as 
evidence of his dishonesty to the Taiwanese people. Frank Hsieh said, “If Ma 
Ying-Jeou can’t even be honest to the voters on where he was actually born, how 
can we expect him to be honest with anything else?”  The confusion over Ma’s 
birthplace did little to damage his political stamina. The public opinion poll 
conducted by TVBS on February 24, 2008, showed that the Ma-Siew ticket 
received 49% of the support from those who were polled, and the DPP Hsieh-Su 
ticket received only 29%.85 Ma answered his critics with the proclamation that he 
was only one year old when he relocated to Taiwan and emphasized the fact that 
he, like most of the Taiwanese, grew up eating Taiwan’s rice and drinking 
Taiwan’s water; therefore, if he was to “burn to ashes, he would still be a 
Taiwanese.”86 Ma further stated that his “Grandmother, Grandfather, Father, 
Uncle and In-laws were all buried in Taiwan. If they saw Taiwan as their final 
resting place, then Taiwan is also my home and will be my resting place.”87 
 In addition to Ma’s direct response to those who were questioning his 
sense of identity, the KMT also released a series of television commercials 
                                                             
84 The confusion rose from the different locations on Ma’s birth certificate and the birthplace Ma 
filled out on his daughter’s birth certificate. On his own birth certificate, Ma’s birthplace was 
listed as Hong Kong; however, on his daughter’s birth certificate issued in the United States, the 
father’s birthplace was filled in as Shenzhen, China. Furthermore, Ma also said in one of his 
autobiographies that his birthplace was Guangdong Province, China. 
85 TVBS Public Opinion Poll, March 12, 2008, 
http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=114&anum=4222. 
86 Ma’s answer to Frank Hsieh’s accusation that he was not being loyal to Taiwan during the first 
televised presidential election on February 23, 2008 
87 First televised presidential debate, February 23, 2008. 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depicting the KMT as an inclusive, indigenous political party. The television ad, 
title, “Our Taiwan, our home,” featured people from all ethnic groups with 
background music, titled “The Harmony Song,” sung by one of Taiwan’s most 
popular pop stars. The commercial only used indigenous languages and no 
Mandarin Chinese.88 Another television commercial titled “Sky Light” was shot 
with the backdrop of Taiwan’s traditional festival, the lighting of sky lights. The 
mechanics of sky lights are similar to hot air balloons, except the sky lights are 
made out of paper and bamboo. Traditionally, villagers send the sky lights up to 
the sky with messages and wishes written in calligraphy. In the KMT “Sky Light” 
ad, wishes such as “Economic Prosperity for Taiwan,” “Working Hard, Only for 
Taiwan,” “For Taiwan, 6% Economic Growth,” “For Our Children, 3% 
Unemployment Rate,” and “For the People, Gross National Income Per Capita 
30,000 USD” were written on the sky lights and sent toward the sky. The ad also 
featured individuals from different indigenous ethnic groups to create the 
impression of the KMT as a party of all people in Taiwan.89 Furthermore, the 
theme of Ma’s campaign was the slogan “Taiwan moving ahead, Taiwan will 
always win!”90  One thing worth noting was that “Republic of China” simply 
vanished from the 2008 presidential campaign for the KMT. Ma’s campaign 
focused on everything Taiwan. With the number of constituents identifying 
themselves as Taiwanese at record high, the KMT was not going to jeopardize the 
                                                             
88 The “Our Taiwan, Our Home” commercial is uploaded to and can be access at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PUaxrnNMS3k. 
89  The “Sky Light” commercial is uploaded to and can be accessed at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CuEeBDWKnLY. 
90 Ma’s campaign slogan: Taiwan moving ahead, Taiwan always wins!  (??????????
?) 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party and Ma’s popularity by reminding the voters of the party’s Chinese origin 
and ideology.  
If one compares Frank Hsieh’s presidential commercial, which featured 
Taiwan as a multicultural island nation with many ethnic heritages, and Ma Ying-
Jeou’s “Our Taiwan, Our Home” commercial, it would be extremely difficult to 
tell the ads apart. In fact, some of the parties’ ads were so similar, it was difficult 
to differentiate them until the end of the commercial when the candidates’ names 
appeared. On the other hand, if one examines the DPP’s television ads in the 2000, 
2004, and 20008 elections, one discovers that the commercials looked similar 
with similar themes and familiar faces, such the Formosan Eight, indigenous 
populations, street protests challenging the KMT, and Taiwanese songs as 
background music. However, when one examines KMT’s television commercials 
in the last three presidential elections, one sees that the commercials in 2000 and 
2004 featured former president Chiang Ching-Kuo, seas of ROC national flags at 
political rallies, and traditional Chinese philosophical figures. On the other hand, 
in the 2008 commercials, the previously featured former leaders of the KMT were 
not featured, even when the party claimed them as initiators of the liberalization 
and democratization process. “This is it for us,” said Tu Chien-Te, the Director of 
Mobilization and Development,  
“I have worked grassroots mobilization for more than three decades, and I understand 
there are still a lot of people who consider Chiang Ching-Kuo as brutal as his father, 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, so we couldn’t take any chances. We cannot let the 
public think that we are still the old Kuomintang, authoritarian, rigid, and Chinese. As 
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you can see, all of us who worked in this office are Taiwanese. I’m Taiwanese. We 
represent the party, and our campaign should also reflect that.”91  
Tu planned two trips around the island of Taiwan for Ma. On the two trips, 
Ma visited all the townships as James Soong did and stayed in average citizens’ 
homes.92 The KMT also offered a counterreferendum for the UN application 
under “any practical and honorable name” regardless of the ROC or Taiwan to 
combat the DPP’s version of the UN referendum, which sought membership in 
the United Nations for Taiwan. Ma called his position to retain the status quo the 
best way to ensure the safety of all Taiwanese, and the de facto sovereignty of 
Taiwan, “practical independence.” Even though Ma generated some criticisms 
from hard-line supporters of the KMT for stating that both unification and 
independence are possible ways to resolve Taiwan’s future, the gamble seemed to 
echo well with most of the electorate. A few days before the general election, 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao offered to begin dialogs with Taiwan under the One 
China guideline while stating that “all the Chinese people, including our Taiwan 
compatriots should decide Taiwan’s future.” Ma responded by stating that “the 
future of Taiwan should be decided by Taiwan’s 23 million people, and no 
intervention by the PRC is to be tolerated. What Premier Wen said was not only 
rude, irrational, arrogant and absurd, but also self-righteous. It ignored the 
mainstream opinion of Taiwan’s 23 million people.”93 
The election result was sweeping. On Election Day, Ma swept to a 58.5% 
to 41.4% victory with 762 million votes, carrying twenty of the twenty-five 
                                                             
91 Interviewed by author in Taipei, June 14, 2007. 
92 Tu Chien-Te, interviewed by author in Taipei, June 21, 2008. 
93 David B. Kopel, “Taiwan’s 2008 Presidential Elections: An Analysis of what happened, and 
what may happen next,” Independent Institute, April 3, 2008. 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counties. In every county, the KMT gained 7%to 10% over its 2004 showing. In 
Ma’s victory speech, he continued with his campaign theme of “Taiwan Moving 
Forward, Taiwan Always Wins” by mentioning Taiwan more than thirty times. 
As one can see, the KMT’s identity platform has been systematic, consistent, and 
well-executed.  The party’s fluidity and flexibility should be credited to the 
KMT’s established habit of obeying the policies advocated by party headquarters. 
The KMT has received the majority of the votes in every national election.  
According to Kirchheimer, “Deideologization [of catch-all parties] in the 
political field involves the transfer of ideology from partnership in a clearly 
visible political goal structure into one of many sufficient but by no means 
necessary motivational forces operative in the voters’ choice . . . ideology was 
from the outset only a general background atmosphere, both all-embracing and 
conveniently vague enough to allow recruiting.”94 In other words, broad 
ideological goals allow parties that are aspiring to become catch-all to appeal to 
voters across the population. The reconciliation of the KMT and its authoritarian 
past, and the unintended consequences of Taiwanese identity, enabled the KMT to 
transform itself into the party for all Taiwanese, or the catch-all party of Taiwan. 
The KMT has relinquished its hold on the special loyalty of a group of clientele 
and expanded its constituent base to cover all Taiwanese. In addition, the 
Kuomintang’s synchronized campaign efforts, and the party apparatus’s 
encouragement of its Taiwanese candidates to campaign under the Taiwanese 
                                                             
94 Kirchheimer, 1991, 55 
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identity platform, gave the KMT the opportunity to turn Taiwanese identity from 
a challenge into an asset.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
 
ARE YOU PREPARED? – ???????1 
The KMT Solidification of Power 
 
Today we are here not to celebrate the victory of a particular party or individual, 
but to witness Taiwan pass a historic milestone. . . . Above all, the people have 
rediscovered Taiwan's traditional core values of benevolence, righteousness, 
diligence, honesty, generosity and industriousness. This remarkable experience 
has let Taiwan become “a beacon of democracy” to Asia and the world. We, the 
people of Taiwan, should be proud of ourselves. The Republic of China is now a 
democracy respected by the international community. – Ma Ying Jeou, 
Inauguration Speech, May 20, 2008 
 
We accept defeat. It’s my own defeat. It’s not the defeat of the Taiwanese people. 
Please don’t cry for me. . . . Although we lost the election, we have a more 
important mission. The torch of democracy should not be extinguished. - Hsieh 
Chang-Ting, DPP Presidential Candidate Concession Speech, March 22, 2008. 
 
The political resilience of the Kuomintang is not a coincidence. As this 
dissertation has demonstrated, the Kuomintang is not the lingering pest Pan-Green 
supporters make it out to be. The hierarchical structure of the Kuomintang is a 
tightly run, self-sustaining, and highly disciplined political machine that has 
tentacles extended to all parts of Taiwanese society. The Republic of China 
constitution, which the Kuomintang has fiercely upheld and safeguarded since its 
arrival in Taiwan, established institutions that are essential to the party’s survival. 
The institutions are the mutually engaged and interactive five branches of 
government, the electoral system, the local institutions, and the clientele culture it 
has facilitated. Therefore, the institutional design of the Republic of China, and 
                                                             
1 “Are you prepared/ready?” is one of KMT’s principle campaign slogan. The Party promised to 
bring change and prosperity to Taiwan. In the last campaign commercial aired a week before 
election day, the television ad showed all the KMT elected local officials making statement such 
as “Taipei is ready (for change)”, “Taichung is ready”, and “Hsinchu is ready” with Presidential 
candidate Ma Ying-Jeou asking the question to the voter, “Are you prepared for change?” at the 
end of the commercial.  
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the organization of the party itself, helped sustain the Kuomintang for more than a 
century. As President Ma Ying-Jeou proclaimed proudly as the Republic of China 
celebrated its centennial,  
In ROC year 35 in Nanjing, our elected representative ratified the most innovative 
Constitution in Asia. In the past sixty years, we have implemented public policies such as 
the land reform, ten infrastructures, 9-year national education system, laborer social 
security, national health insurance, citizen’s annual security and encouraged local self-
governance. All made the Republic of China on Taiwan a respectable member of the 
international community and this experience is now the collective memory for all of us. 
We are all witnesses to Taiwan’s transformation and growth.2 
The purpose of this dissertation is to elucidate the political longevity of the 
Kuomintang and the author hopes this study of the world’s second-longest ruling 
political party can contribute to the study of democratization and political party 
competition. In addition, the study of the Kuomintang and its political resilience 
demonstrates the necessity for constitutional reform in Taiwan. With the existing 
institutional design, it is extremely difficult for political power to be fully 
transferred. This difficulty also directly affects the quality of democracy in 
Taiwan. It is the hope of this author to conduct subsequent projects on the quality 
of Taiwan’s democracy in such areas as the necessity of judicial transparency and 
reform, electoral fairness, accountability of government branches to constituents, 
and so forth. Moreover, the author feels that it is through close examination of the 
Kuomintang and the variables in its political resilience that one can obtain the 
necessary knowledge to meliorate the democracy in Taiwan.  
                                                             
2 Press release from the Presidential Office; transcript of President Ma Ying-Jeou’s New Year’s 
day address, http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid=23185&rmid=514. 
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The year 2008 was known as the year of blue in Taiwan.3 On January 12, the 
Kuomintang captured 85 seats out of the possible 113 seats in the first legislative 
election after electoral reform in 2005. The Democratic Progressive Party 
captured the remaining 27 seats. Subsequently, the KMT presidential candidate 
Ma Ying-Jeou obtained electoral victory by capturing 58% of the overall vote and 
also became the presidential candidate who received the most electoral votes 
compared to all candidates to date. In the evening of March 22, 2008, in front of 
the Kuomintang headquarters, President-elect Ma Ying-Jeou declared his 
landslide victory in front of a jubilant crowd of thousands. “Citizens of Taiwan,” 
Ma stated, “I am here to report, according to the latest report from the Central 
Election Committee, Mr. Siew and myself are now the new President and Vice 
President of Taiwan! . . . This election result is not a personal victory, or a victory 
for the KMT, it is a victory for all Taiwanese people.”4    
On the other side of town, one could hear gasps from DPP supporters 
accompanied by exclamations such as, “How can this be? (?????)” and 
“That’s troublesome! (???!)” as the vote count widened between Ma Ying-
Jeou and the DPP presidential candidate, Hsieh Chang-Ting. Hsieh Chang-Ting 
emerged from campaign headquarters and headed toward the previously erected 
platform. Some DPP supporters were chanting “Reverse, and Win! (???!)”5 
                                                             
3 Blue is the official color of the KMT.  
4 Ying-Jeou Ma,  “Victory Speech”  (KMT Headquarters, Ba-De Road, Taipei, Taiwan, March 22, 
2008). 
5 “Reverse and Win! ???!”was the slogan used by the DPP after their detrimental defeat in the 
Legislative Yuan election in January, 2008.  A song of the same name was also used by the DPP 
during the last two months of the election to motivate younger voters to show off their pride as 
Taiwanese.  
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and  Stand up, Taiwan! (?????!),” while some supporters embraced each 
other, patted each other on their backs, some with tears running down their cheeks.   
“Dear compatriots,” Hsieh began to speak, ”The People of Taiwan have spoken. 
We have to accept defeat. Let us congratulate Mr. Ma and Mr. Siew.”6  With 
three-fourths of the legislative seats and the presidency, the Kuomintang became 
the most powerful political party in Taiwan once again, but this time, it was 
through democratic means.  
Although the Democratic Progressive Party’s crushing defeat in the 
legislative and the presidential election of 2008 can partly be attributed to 
corruption scandals involving former DPP President Chen Shui-Bian, his wife, 
son, daughter-in-law, and son-in-law, the Kuomintang also engaged in structurally 
organized, well-executed, and synchronized campaigns that exemplified the 
institutional vigor of the Kuomintang.  As one examines the Kuomintang’s 
political strength and electoral success, the opposition’s ability to consolidate 
their political power is also called into question. Aside from the institutional 
design that has handicapped the opposition from the outset, organization 
impediments such as lack of control over party discipline, factionalism, and the 
inability to propose and carry out solid domestic policy and foreign policy 
platforms, also contributed to the Democratic Progressive Party’s incapability of 
becoming politically successful. The following section provides a brief discussion 
on the deficiencies of the Democratic Progressive Party. 
                                                             
6 Chang-Ting Hsieh, “Concession Speech” (Wei-Shin Building, Chang-An East Road, Taipei, 
Taiwan, March 22, 2008).  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Barrier to Power for the DPP 
 The Democratic Progressive Party’s capture of the presidency in 2000 and 
2004 was accompanied by great frustration.  The presidency of Chen Shui-Bian 
was marred from the outset. The Kuomintang and its coalition still retained a 50% 
legislative majority, with the DPP capturing 38%. Without a legislative majority, 
Chen faced tremendous difficulty and inability in pushing through his policy 
objectives for most of his presidency. According to the Chengchi University 
follow-up survey after the Chen presidency, almost 70% of those surveyed were 
unsatisfied with Chen’s performance as president, 22% of whom thought Chen’s 
economic policies were a failure, whereas 30% of the respondents said Chen 
failed at every policy.7 In addition, 38% of the respondents deemed citizens’ 
welfare the most important issue and most respondents thought the KMT was the 
party that was more capable of dealing with the most important issues.8 
Furthermore, according to a tracking survey conducted by TVBS, the respondents 
who thought the KMT was more responsive to constituents’ needs have always 
been between 45% and 55%.9  More importantly, the survey demonstrated that 
prior to the DPP’s taking office, 44% of the respondents felt that the KMT was 
responsive to constituents’ needs, and the responsiveness percentage began to 
increase. One year after Chen took office as president for the second term, 51% of 
                                                             
7 Taiwan Election and Democratization Study Center,  Postpresidential election survey, 2008. 
8 TVBS Poll Center (October 10–3, 2007) on voters twenty and older. The percentage of the 
respondents who deemed the KMT more capable to deal with economic and daily issues of the 
citizens than the DPP was 46%. Taiwan Election and Democratization Study Center,  
Postpresidential election survey, 2008. 
9 TVBS Poll Center (October 1–3, 2007). 
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the survey respondents thought the KMT was more responsible to constituents, 
while only 26% thought the DPP was more responsible. 
The Democratic Progressive Party, twenty-five years after its founding, 
has always fallen short of capturing a 50% vote share in both national and local 
elections. Furthermore, most of the DPP victories in national elections were the 
result of a KMT split. Chen Shui-Bian was elected as mayor of Taipei when KMT 
candidate Huang Ta-Chao and New Party candidate Chao Shao-Kang divided the 
Pan-Blue voters. Again in 2000, KMT presidential candidate Lien Chan and 
People First Party candidate James Soong divided the blue votes. As one will see, 
institutional factors are the roadblocks to the DPP’s political success in contrast to 
the KMT. 
Party Origin and Organization 
 The origins of the DPP can be traced back to the Dangwai Movement. 
Dangwai literally translates into “outside of the party,” in this case, the 
Kuomintang. The Dangwai movement was then transformed into the Democratic 
Progressive Party when martial law was lifted in 1986. Since the party’s 
establishment, there have been ideological differences among DPP members. 
According to former DPP Party Chairman and former Minister of Examination 
Yuan, Yao Chia-Wen, “DPP is not a party. It’s just a collection of people who are 
against the KMT from all aspects of their lives.”10 Yao’s observation explicated 
what has been plaguing the Democratic Progressive Party from the beginning: 
                                                             
10 Interviewed by Author, June 14, 2008, in Taipei, Taiwan. 
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factionalism and the party structure. The founding differences of opinion 
regarding the issue of independence split the party into at least four distinct camps: 
the Formosa Faction, the New Tide Faction, the Justice Alliance and Welfare 
State Alliance, the Taiwan Independence Alliance, the Mainstream Alliance, and 
The Kang Faction.11  
 The Formosa Faction was founded by staff members of the Formosa 
Magazine. The Formosa Magazine was what sparked the Formosa Incident of 
1979. The Kuomintang government’s attempt to shut down the magazine ignited a 
public protest on International Human Rights day in Kaohsiung, which ended 
with the arrest of the Formosa Eight and a very public trial. The Formosa Faction 
favors public demonstrations and a direct challenge of the KMT to achieve 
political reform. The New Tide Faction was founded by student activists. It is the 
most intellectual branch of the DPP factions. This faction is highly idealistic and 
more rigid in its desire to collaborate with other factions and especially the 
Kuomintang. It is the major internal competitor of the Formosa Faction. The New 
Tide Faction became extremely critical of President Chen Shui-Bian during his 
corruption scandal and his inability to declare Taiwan independence.  
 The Kang Faction and the Justice Alliance and Welfare State Alliance are 
no longer in existence. The Kang Faction was founded by Kang Ning-Hsiang, one 
of the Dangwai movement founders. The Kang Faction was pragmatic and was 
willing to work within the system and with the Kuomintang to achieve policy 
goals. The Justice Alliance was formed by the defense lawyers of the Formosa 
                                                             
11 Rigger, 2001, 73–89 
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Eight. The Taiwan Independence Alliance was founded by Taiwanese expatriates 
in exile, many of whom were blacklisted by the Kuomintang regime and were 
unable to return to Taiwan for decades. The overseas expatriate group supporting 
the TIA is the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI). The WUFI 
and the TIA are hard-core supporters of the Taiwan independence movement and 
advocated the declaration of independence as soon as the DPP assumed 
administrative power. The members of the WUFI and the TIA accused Chen of 
being too soft in his proindependence stance and for referencing himself as the 
president of the ROC. The Mainstream Alliance emerged after Chen Shui-Bian 
took office in 2000. The members consisted of Chen’s core advisors and 
supporters. There were subsequent factions, such as the New Era Faction, the 
Progressive Alliance, The Hsieh Faction, and the Centrist Faction, which emerged 
after the founding of the DPP. In all, the factions, while all supporting the 
independence of Taiwan, differed in their methods to achieve such independence, 
and they also disagreed on the prioritization of policies, such as the expansion of 
the welfare state or the antinuclear power campaign and clean energy platform.  
 More importantly, aside from the number of factions distinctively different 
from the Kuomintang, the Democratic Progressive Party was not founded as a 
revolutionary vanguard party for the purpose of establishing democracy in a 
feudal nation. The Democratic Progressive Party was founded during a strategic 
meeting of Dangwai members on methods to capture seats in an upcoming 
supplementary election sanctioned by the Kuomintang. The decision was made to 
mimic the Leninist organizational style of the KMT, in which the party 
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chairperson and the central committee bear the most power within the party and 
possess strict control and oversight of policy platforms.  The decision to adopt a 
party organization similar to the Kuomintang has proven to be a terminal fault of 
the DPP, due to factionalism and the lack of ideological and policy consensus, 
which divided the party from the beginning.  
 The Kuomintang adopted the Leninist model due to the party’s history 
with the Communist Party in the former Soviet Union and the Chinese 
Communist Party; however, the Democratic Progressive Party had no relations 
with the Leninist parties nor advisors from the former Soviet Union to aid its 
establishment, so the DPP’s decision to mimic the internal structure of the KMT 
was a peculiar move. While the nature of the KMT is strict and top-down, the 
culture of the DPP is extremely democratic. The Leninist party structure 
establishes a strong party chair, a central standing committee, and a central 
committee. While the party chair in the KMT almost always is the president, who 
possesses the power to make authoritative policy decisions and delegate resources, 
the DPP chairperson and standing committee has few resources to delegate or 
offer to the aspiring politicians and members. The lack of sources also directly 
affects the party’s ability to establish local interpersonal relationships with 
grassroots organization members, the tiao-a-kas and local faction leaders. 
Moreover, the burden of finding campaign resources falls on the shoulders of the 
candidates themselves. According to Professor Liu I-Chiou, one DPP legislator 
from Chiayi once admitted that he had to sell his house and his parents’ house in 
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order to finance his own campaign.12 This internal structure weakens the DPP’s 
effectiveness in directing its members and synchronizing policy platforms. 
Electoral System 
 As illustrated in the previous chapter, the electoral system in Taiwan is 
designed to favor the Kuomintang. In the SVMM system, a political candidate did 
not have to capture the majority of votes to win. The candidate only had to make 
sure the votes he received put him near the top in the overall vote share. In other 
words, if a political party possessed the resources and organization to nominate as 
many candidates as possible, then it put the political party at an advantage of 
having more candidates elected. This, of course, was favorable to the Kuomintang. 
In addition, to garner enough votes to put the candidate above the others, a close 
relationship with the grassroots organization and local faction leaders was 
required, and the patron-client relationship was also highly valued. The 
Democratic Progressive Party was unable to reward the tiao-a-kas and local 
faction leaders with material gain. The party was also unable to reward the tiao-a-
kas and local faction leaders with social and political status.  While the DPP 
posed no real challenges to the KMT, KMT candidates were able to practice the 
habit of cooperation in order to win, which was deemed to be extremely useful in 
the new electoral system as well.  
 After the electoral reform of 2005, the Pan-Blue-dominated Legislative 
Yuan passed a reform measure still favoring the Kuomintang. The new Single-
                                                             
12 Interviewed by author, June 12, 2007, in Taipei, Taiwan. 
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Member District System allows at least one seat per district. The institutional 
advantages of the new electoral system give small electoral districts that are 
traditionally Pan-Blue, Kinmen, Matsu, and Taitung, each one seat. The new 
electoral system also reserves six seats for the aboriginals, which are also 
traditionally supportive of the Kuomintang because of the Kuomintang’s 
proaboriginal welfare policies. The seats of the Legislative Yuan were reduced 
from 225 to 113. Because of the lack of party discipline in the DPP and the 
KMT’s norm of cooperating to win, many DPP legislators, who were not 
nominated by the party, defected from the party and ran as independents. In 
contrast, legislators like Feng Ding-Guo, a member of the KMT, decided to 
withdrew his legislative bid for, according to Feng, “the harmony of the blue-
camp, because the DPP always wins when the blue votes are divided.”13 
 Another feature of the electoral system in Taiwan is the cultivation of 
patron-client voting relationships. According to Shelley Rigger, there are both 
cultural and institutional explanations for electoral habits. Culturally, the 
Taiwanese value interpersonal relationships, and the electoral rules play a critical 
role in reinforcing this inclination.14 One of the institutional explanations for the 
voters voting for candidates instead of basing their decisions on parties is that the 
SVMM system required the voters to choose amongst candidates from the same 
political party, diluting the importance of party identification. In addition, martial 
law provisions prevented the development of party identification. The Taiwanese 
                                                             
13 “Collaboration of the Blues, Feng Ding-Guo, Lie-Chien Backs out,” Liberty Times, November 
20, 2007, 
http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2007/new/nov/20/today-p1-2.htm. 
14 Rigger, 2001, 45. 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voters have formed a habit of voting amongst candidates from the same political 
party and have been choosing the candidate who can propose the most beneficial 
policy for them, instead of voting for a specific political party.  
 The lack of critical features of the institution and poor party discipline 
prevented the Democratic Progressive Party from becoming a formidable 
challenger to the Kuomintang. In addition, the DPP’s inability to carry out its 
policy proposals due to the party’s minority status in the Legislative Yuan, even 
when the party had captured the presidency, also prevented the DPP from 
fulfilling the party’s campaign promises and fell into the KMT’s categorization of 
the DPP as incompetent policy makers. 
The Issue of Corruption 
 The issue of corruption was one of the most potent weapons the 
Democratic Progressive Party had against the Kuomintang; however, the 
embezzlement scandals of former President Chen and his family, coupled with the 
Kuomintang’s institutional strength within the judiciary, enabled the Kuomintang 
to turn the tables on the DPP and neutralize the allegations against the party for 
vote buying, party assets, and corruption. According to Dafydd Fell, “KMT 
corruption was a central Taiwanese grievance leading up to the 1947, February 
28th Incident.  According to Shelley Rigger, “Vote buying is an open secret [with 
the KMT],” especially prior to democratization. Both scholars admit that surveys 
on corruption and vote buying are not very useful for estimating the extent of this 
practice. According to Yung-Mao Chao, 70% of the electorate has heard about 
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vote buying and at least 30% of the potential voters admit that they have been 
offered money at one point in time.15  
 The issue of corruption had been the focus of the DPP’s attack on the 
Kuomintang in the DPP’s attempt to create a more level playing field amidst the 
institutional advantages, such as the tremendous party assets the KMT dedicated 
to cultivating local institutions and vote buying.  According to a tracking survey 
by the United News Daily, as Taiwan began to democratize, there were increasing 
numbers of constituents seeing the KMT as corrupt. However, after 
democratization, there were a series of corruption allegations filed against the 
DPP president. In 2005, the charges of corruption began to surface, and the chief 
prosecutors and judges began to act. While the DPP and Chen Shui-Bian accused 
the prosecutors and the judges of political persecution, Chen and his party could 
provide little evidence to support their claim. On the other hand, all prosecutors 
and judges were required to pass the qualifying exam designed and administered 
by the Examination Yuan and closely monitored by the Control Yuan for proper 
conduct.  
One of the corruption charges was the allegation that Chen’s wife had 
wired $21 million in campaign funds to accounts in Singapore, the Cayman 
Islands, and Switzerland, which Chen later admitted in 2008. Chen was later 
charged with embezzling $3.15 million during his 2000–2008 presidencies from a 
special presidential fund, receiving bribes for at least $9 million in connection 
                                                             
15 Yung-Mao Chao, “Local Politics on Taiwan—Continuity and Change,” in Taiwan—Beyond the 
Economic Miracle , eds. Denis Fred Simon and Michael Y.M. Kao.  (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 
51. 
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with government land deals and money laundering. Chen was subsequently 
arrested, tried, and sentenced to life in prison. The Kuomintang jumped at the 
chance to redirect the public’s distain for corrupted officials to the DPP. The 
KMT’s 2008 presidential candidate, Ma Ying-Jeou, had a pristine image. He was 
nicknamed “Teflon” for his lack of political scandals. As former Minister of 
Justice, Ma resigned his post citing that his anticorruption efforts were being 
jeopardized by other Kuomintang officials, which helped generated Ma’s “fighter 
of corruption” image. As the charts demonstrate below, the public perception of 
the DPP as the “clean party” of Taiwan began to dwindle. Before the 2008 
presidential election, the public perception of corruption was that the KMT was 
now cleaner than the DPP.  
Table 5.1 
Year/Party KMT is clean DPP is clean 
1992 37 26 
1993 32 41 
1994 31 39 
1995 23 41 
1996 25 41 
1997 21 47 
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16 
Party 
Year/Month 
KMT is clean DPP is clean 
1999 21 47 
2001 22 41 
2002 27 48 
2004 31 38 
2005  29 17 
2006  40 14 
2007  29 21 
17 
The Politics of Adaptation and the KMT Solidification of Power 
 This dissertation aims to be a starting point for theorizing the domestic 
politics of Taiwan, rather than focusing on Taiwan’s international status and 
independence/unification issues. The political resilience of the Kuomintang can 
also be a reference for political party adaptation. It can serve as a comparison 
and/or contrast to the study of the political resilience of the ruling parties of 
                                                             
16 Christian Schafferer, “The 1997 City and County Magistrate Elections in Taiwan,” 
http://www2.uni-linz.ac.at.fak.SoWi/gespot/DOWNLOAD/electact.doc. 
17 TVBS Poll Center on (October 1–3, 2007).  The year 2005 was when Chen was first accused of 
embezzlement. In 2006, the Legislative Yuan threatened to impeach Chen, which sparked a 
massive protest in front of the Presidential Office with protesters wearing red shirts for more than 
a month. 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former authoritarian regimes in other regions of the world. The case of the 
Kuomintang is an interesting one.  Unlike some other former authoritarian parties 
in postcommunist Europe and South Korea, the Kuomintang has never changed 
its official name nor completely severed itself from its authoritarian past. The 
Kuomintang also has successfully transferred its power of governance from one 
country to another. While initially the Kuomintang solidified its power by the 
implementation of authoritarianism, the party also took the leading role in the 
liberalization and democratization of Taiwan.  
 The contribution of this dissertation is to provide a theoretical explanation 
to the Kuomintang’s political resilience that goes beyond the vast descriptive 
literature on Taiwan’s domestic political development and democratization. 
Explanations such as “superb elite decision making” or “excellent communication 
between the ruling elite and the political opposition” fall short in identifying the 
extent to which these decisions were implemented and delivered as campaign 
promises and rewards to constituents for their support. Moreover, the Kuomintang 
never had to communicate with the opposition or form a coalition to govern.  
The political opposition to the Kuomintang has never been able to retain 
more than 50% of electoral support. The functionalist explanation falls into a 
tautological trap. It states that the Kuomintang had no choice but to adopt public 
policies favorable to the voters, because the voters would only support the KMT if 
it offered beneficial public policies. Essentialism relied on the automatic 
transformation of ethnic and social identity to political identity, which would lead 
to the support of the Democratic Progressive Party instead of the Kuomintang. 
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Even when the Kuomintang had successfully Taiwanized, the votes would then 
have been a possible split, instead of overwhelmingly in favor of the Kuomintang. 
In addition, the cultural explanation is deficient for it refers to the prodemocratic 
nature of the Kuomintang, but it does not offer a direct causal link between the 
prodemocratic Chinese culture that is the basis of the Kuomintang culture and the 
Kuomintang political resilience compared to the DPP’s lack of resilience. More 
importantly, the cultural explanation is used explain and interpret both the 
absence of democratic behavior of the ruler, as well as the presence of democracy 
and the executive’s decision to honor the preferences of the people. 
 The democratization of Taiwan might not have been the intended goal of 
the Chiang Ching-Kuo regime; however, once the liberalization process was 
engaged, the Kuomintang systematically utilized the tools provided by the 
constitution originally designed to favor the party to first maintain the party’s 
political presence and neutralize the backlash caused by its decades of 
authoritarianism.  The KMT employed established electoral routines, habits, and 
interpersonal relationships, coupled with mutually sustaining national institutions, 
to create policies that retained mainlander supporters of the party while 
incorporating the majority of the population into the political process by offering 
policies favored by the Taiwanese majority. With the double security provided by 
national and local institutions, the Kuomintang thus was able to push through its 
policy objectives, and through the bridges of communication and mobilization 
facilitated by local institutions like the tiao-a-kas and local faction leaders, the 
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party was then able to estimate the possible votes and mobilize to capture the 
maximum number of them.  
 The future of the Kuomintang seems promising. The party has once again 
captured the presidential seat and 75% of the legislature. With the safety valve 
provided by the institutions, the Kuomintang appears to be unchallengeable. On 
the other hand, recent polls have shown that popular support for the Kuomintang 
is dwindling again due the global economic crisis and the party’s inability to 
provide the speedy economic recovery Ma promised during the presidential 
election.  With President Ma Ying-jeou’s popularity reduced to the low 30 percent 
range, the upcoming legislative and presidential elections seem to be a perfect 
time for the Democratic Progressive Party to attempt to capture a legislative 
majority and the presidency.  What the Democratic Progressive Party needs is the 
ability to obtain the funds to provide the incentives the Kuomintang has been able 
to offer the tiao-a-kas, e.g. activity fees, neighborhood conflict resolution sessions, 
having elected officials visit local tiao-a-ka offices to listen to the neighborhood 
grievances.   
The Democratic Progressive Party also needs a chairperson who is able to 
reach cross faction lines and unify the party.  It seems the Democratic Progressive 
Party has found her.  The new chairwoman of the Democratic Progressive Party, 
Tsai Ing-wen, is a London School of Economics educated professor, who has 
more than fifteen years of government experience, ranging from trade negotiation 
to national security and has also served as Vice Premier under the previous DPP 
administration.  Tsai was not affiliated with any DPP faction.  She took over the 
 
 
190 
party chairperson position after the disastrous elections in 2007 and 2008 for the 
DPP.  So far, under Tsai’s leadership, the DPP seems to have come together with 
comparatively much less bickering amongst its elites.  The grassroots leaders have 
also seemed to take to the soft-spoken economics professor, who does not 
resemble the typical smooth, fast-talking politician.  Financially, the DPP is no 
match for the KMT.  However, Chairwoman Tsai advocated small-amount 
donations from the constituents, which has proven to be a very successful way to 
raise funds - as demonstrated by President Barack Obama during the 2008 
presidential election in the United States.  If the DPP can transcend itself to match 
the KMT in these ways as the legislative election looms at the end of 2011, 
followed by the presidential election in 2012, then it might have a chance to 
garner legislative majority and the presidency and once again, remove the 
Kuomintang from power.  Until this happens, the Kuomintang remains one of the 
most powerful political parties in Asia and possibly the world. 
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